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Faced with a variety of unprecedented societal challenges such as terrorism, 
climate change, and pandemics, the traditional epicentre of decision-making - the 
nation-state - is increasingly reliant on its bureaucratic supplement, the 
administrative state, to ensure viable, long-term solutions. Concomitantly, as the 
world grows closer, so do national administrative institutions by frequently 
engaging in policy-making both within and across levels of government. 
Consequently, public policy is initiated, shaped, and implemented at the 
intersection of national and international levels of government. National 
administrations, particularly national agencies, serve as administrative bridges 
between international and national politics and contribute to coordinate policy 
agendas and outcomes. At the abstract level, this has been conveyed as the 
emergence of common political orders and has given rise to a (re-) new(ed) set of 
questions: how can we conceptualize and explain political orders? What are the 
mechanisms and consequences of integration of states and their administrations? 
To what extent do new patterns of multilevel cooperation supplement or challenge 
the nation-state? 
 
This Ph.D. thesis confronts these questions by addressing the impact of 
organizational factors in the public governance process. The theoretical point of 
departure examines the explanatory power of organizational characteristics to 
account for how integration impacts public governance and political orders more 
generally. The study thus aims to contribute to organizational scholarship more 
broadly by testing and building on established causal relationships. The empirical 
impetus for this project lies in the institutional interconnectedness that 
characterizes public administrations. Specifically, the study investigates how the 
supranational locus for policy-making integrates into domestic structures. The 
study thus follows in the footsteps of established scholarly approaches focusing on 
the national-supranational nexus and adopts two classical questions: (i) how do 
organizational factors affect governance processes generally, and (ii) how do 
supranational institutions influence decision-making processes within domestic 
public administration particularly? Methodologically, the study is quantitatively 
driven (large-N questionnaire data) supplemented with qualitative data (semi-




This thesis consists of two parts: part I comprises the synopsis with six chapters, 
while part II collects three independent studies that each address different aspects 
relating to the aforementioned research questions. The study makes both 
theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions. Theoretically, it adds to 
organizational scholarship by testing and building on established variables. 
Empirically, it offers a study of the Norwegian central administration 
encompassing 47 agencies and 16 ministries (2016). Methodologically, it 
contributes a large-N study of national officials combined with a mixed-methods 
approach. The main novelties introduced include: firstly, a study on ministerial 
officials over a time period of two decades (article I); secondly, a study of the 
relationship between secondary organizational affiliations and actor-level 
identities among agency officials (article II); and finally, a study of the effects of 
‘institutional overlaps’ in domestic inter-organizational relationships on agency 
autonomy in practicing of EU legislation (article III).  
 
A key observation of this thesis regards the self-reinforcing administrative bias 
fueled by organizational properties and moreover, how sectoral cleavages are 
sustained by a series of interconnected processes. Article I showcases how 
organizational variables at the domestic level bias how supranational policies and 
steering signals are received and processed. It also shows that these processes 
intensify over time. Article II finds a causal link between participation in 
secondary structures, such as advisory boards or expert committees, and identity 
shifts, and that this shift is particularly evident in supranational secondary 
structures. Article III reaffirms the role of organizational duplication and illustrates 
how this may affect how supranational policies are processed and steered from the 






Connection has been the key word of this Ph.D. project.  
 
Public institutions connect across levels of government and give rise to new sets 
of theoretical puzzles and empirical playgrounds. Along these lines, this Ph.D. 
dissertation seeks to enhance understanding of how national administrations are 
linked to institutions in the European Union (EU). To do so, it applies data from 
the Norwegian central administration and asks what implications the ‘EU-
connection’ has for decision-making behaviour within national agencies and 
ministries. The Ph.D. dissertation has been part of a larger project systematically 
collecting and analysing data from the Norwegian central administration. The 2016 
questionnaires are the fifth set in a larger array of surveys that have been conducted 
every ten years, with the first survey dating back to 1976.  
 
Well-functioning public institutions are the crux of society. Every once in a while, 
we are reminded of just how much we rely on these institutions to live good lives 
and moreover, how privileged we are to have them. Finalizing this Ph.D. 
dissertation at my kitchen table-turned-home office during the lockdown induced 
by the COVID-19 pandemic, has certainly been (another) one of these moments. 
It also highlighted both shortcomings, challenges, opportunities and, above all, the 
importance of international cooperation and coordination. The COVID-19 crisis 
has illustrated how fragile international cooperation may appear during the initial 
phases, however, lesson for past crises suggest that it may be equally resilient in 
the long run. Provided the latter, we will hopefully avoid further eras of mandatory 
kitchen table-home offices.  
 
In life we connect to other people. The completion of this dissertation is thanks in 
large part to the special people who have supported and challenged me along the 
way.  
 
It’s been a privilege to work with my principal supervisor Professor Stefan Gänzle.  
He has been inspiring and constructive throughout my process and I have benefited 
greatly from his insights and comments. He has always been available to advise 
me on my questions, drafts and ideas. I am deeply grateful for his patience, 
kindness and constant encouragement. I would also like to extend my sincere 
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Public institutions have the power to make or break a society. When institutions 
work well, we hardly take notice. It is not until we are faced with the consequences 
of their failure that we fully come to appreciate them. Consider, for instance, the 
recent threat posed by COVID-19 to healthcare systems across the globe or the 
complete failure of government to provide basic welfare to citizens in war-torn 
societies such as Syria. In essence, well-functioning societies begin with viable 
and legitimate policies drafted within the frame of well-functioning institutions. 
Understanding conditions for political order1 has thus been essential in political 
science (Elster 2007; Olsen 2007). During the last decades, this focus has shifted 
from studying conditions within states (Christensen and Lærgreid 2007; Rokkan 
1999) to studying conditions across states (Bartolini 2005; Trondal 2010), notably 
through studies of interconnected orders such as the European Union (EU) 
(Hooghe and Marks 2001; Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2017). One string of literature 
has been concerned with discussing the nature of this interconnectedness, pursuing 
what it is and how we can understand it (Haas 1958; Moravscik 1998). A second 
line of study preoccupies itself with implications and seeks to identify causal 
mechanisms and effects of integration. Scholarly contributions to this field include 
studies on identity (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009), democracy (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2002; Piattoni 2015; Stie 2013), differentiated integration (Leuffen et al. 
2012) and institutions (Héritier 2007; Olsen 2007). This study focuses on the latter, 
asking what implications interconnected administrative orders have for state level 
institutions (Bauer and Trondal 2015; Heidbreder 2011).   
 
The grand arguments of political order can roughly be grouped into three main 
macro-level research agendas: firstly, scholarly efforts have been directed at 
studying the emergence and development of political order with a focus on state 
building and nation formation (Fukuyama 2014; Huntington 1968; Rokkan 1999). 
A second research agenda has been concerned with limited or failed political order 
(Börzel and Risse 2010; Risse 2011). Finally, another prevalent line of research 
studies the factors that improve and sustain political order (Dahlström et al. 2012, 
                                               
 
1 ‘Political’ refers to institutions that are “entitled to and able to (contribute to) initiate, decide and 
implement public policy”. ‘Order’ suggests a “relatively stable arrangement of institutions that are fairly 




Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Putnam 1993). Building off of these arguments, this 
thesis functions at the meso-level that studies public organizations as part of 
political order. Aligning with studies that advocate for the ‘public administration 
turn’ in political science (Trondal 2007), it asserts the view that organization 
matters in understanding political systems. In order to discern why and how 
political orders emerge, develop, succeed and fail, it is necessary to unpack 
encompassing organizational characteristics. Hence, the study contributes with an 
organizational approach to institutions and decision-making dating back to studies 
by Luther Gulick (1937) and Herbert Simon (1957). This study draws on 
contemporary organizational studies with emphasis on structure, demography, and 
site (Egeberg 2006).  
 
Combining the two arguments outlined above, this thesis applies theoretical 
insights from organizational studies to understand and explain interconnected 
administrative orders. It addresses two classical questions: (i) how do 
organizational factors affect domestic governance processes? and (ii) how do 
supranational public institutions influence decision-making processes within 
domestic administrations? The latter refers to processes in which supranational 
institutions become important points of reference for domestic actors, leading to 
“[…] adaptions and changes in policies and institutions at the domestic level” 
(Sverdrup 2000: 8). The thesis therefore has both a theoretical and an empirical 
dimension. Theoretically, it draws on the explanatory value of organizational 
factors to assess transformation of domestic institutions in response to order 
formation across levels of governance. Empirically, it examines the effect of 
supranational institutions on domestic public administration.2 Figure 1 suggests a 
heuristic overview of the aforementioned scholarly literatures and how 






                                               
 
2 I am aware that the theoretical concept of institutions (March and Olsen 1989; Selznick 1957) is broader 
than the theoretical concept of organization (Scott and David 2016). In this thesis, I refer to ‘institutions’ 



















Source: own compilation 
 
The thesis is article-based and most of the results are presented through three 
papers —already published or under review—in peer-reviewed journals. The 
thesis consists of two main parts: 
 
I) Section I comprises the synopsis in six chapters. The introductory chapter 
presents the empirical and theoretical debates that underpin the main research 
questions, as well as the main conclusions. Chapter 2 engages with the literature 
and discusses the contribution of the thesis. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical 
framework including background, variables, and causal model as well as 
reflections on contemporary debates on applicability. Chapter 4 discusses 
methodology, including philosophical underpinnings, methods, case and 
limitations. Chapter 5 summarizes and links the main findings in the three papers. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions drawn from the thesis.  
 
II) The three articles appended in section II pose three main sub-questions. The 
articles are theoretically framed from an organizational perspective and each 
examine a different empirical focal point within the administrative system. The 
articles appear in the order they have been submitted for publication. 
 
• Article I asks if and how organization of domestic level executive 






















‘received’ at the national level over time (the empirical focus is on the 
‘intersection’ between levels of governance). 
• Article II asks if and how organizational affiliations at the supranational 
level influence national government officials’ identity perceptions (the 
empirical focus is on supranational structures). 
• Article III asks how and to what extent organizational variables affect 
ministerial influence of domestic agencies’ handling of EU/EEA/Schengen 
related-work (the empirical focus is on national structures). 
 
1.1 An interconnected European political order  
The aim of this section is to introduce and contextualize the empirical relevance 
of this thesis. The point of departure is the administrative interconnectedness that 
characterizes Europe. Administrative integration implies that different 
organizational entities cooperate and become connected as relatively coherent 
wholes (Curtin and Egeberg 2008). Other studies have taken these observations a 
step further by substantiating ensuing processes and implications at various levels 
of government, also conceptualized as a European Administrative Space (EAS). 
EAS is understood as a “process of institutionalization of common administrative 
capacity” (Trondal and Peters 2017: 79) and denotes increased integration of 
national and supranational administrative units (Heidbreder 2011; Hoffmann 
2008). The EAS consists of five main blocks: firstly, expert committees under the 
European Commission (Commission) are consultative bodies comprised of 
officials from member state administrations as well as members from other 
stakeholder institutions (Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008). Secondly, comitology 
committees monitor implementation of EU regulations and are also partly 
populated by member state officials (Brandsma et al. 2008; Wessels 1998). 
Thirdly, transnational regulatory and administrative networks mainly consist of 
national ministries and agencies and often also the Commission (Mastenbroek and 
Martinsen 2017). Fourthly, member state officials participate in EU agencies, 
primarily on management boards (Egeberg and Trondal 2017; Groenleer 2009). 
Finally, national officials may be seconded to the Commission for a minimum of 
6 months and maximum period of 6 years (Murdoch and Geys 2012; Suvarierol 





The EAS can be conceptually re-described as a ‘multileveled administrative 
system’ (MLA) consisting of three dimensions: institutional interdependence, 
integration, and co-optation (Trondal and Bauer 2017). Correspondingly, 
administrative integration has been operationalized in various manners. This study 
identifies three main clusters of indicators (see also table 5). One group of studies 
sees integration as processes of coordination and cooperation between different 
administrative entities at the national and supranational level. A second group 
examines administrative integration through the lens of institutional autonomy and 
finally, a third group of studies perceive administrative integration as an instigator 
of shifts in personal attitudes, role perceptions, and loyalties. The three articles that 
form this thesis each fall neatly into one of these categories (see table 1).  
 
Effectively, MLA materializes through cooperation and coordination between 
national public institutions (agencies and ministries) and their European 
counterparts (Commission Directorate-General [DGs] and EU agencies). An 
organizational perspective holds that such cross-level interactions are nudged by 
certain organizational characterises at both levels (see also section 3.2).  
 
































Source: Based on Egeberg (2006) 
 








A key component of the European administrative space has been the decoupling 
of national agencies from their parent ministries and subsequent recoupling into 
new administrative configurations (Egeberg 2008). Figure 2 outlines a conceptual 
model of MLA and how it is characterized by certain patterns of governance 
processes – both across levels of governance as well as within each level. The 
intertwining of administrative units is a prominent feature of both European and 
national governance. Alignment and sustained interaction of domestic and 
supranational institutions has been coined ‘a European executive order’ (Trondal 
2010). The administrative dimension of integrated political systems is an 
important, yet often overlooked part of comprehending political order (trans-) 
formation. As mentioned, shifts in ‘institutional logics’ (that is, shifts in patterns 
of cooperation/coordination, autonomy or behavioural logics) may serve as 
indicators of order formation. Such patterns inherently display the transformative 
power of executive institutions and can be useful in assessing the distribution of 
power between levels of governance. Understanding administrative change is thus 
necessary for understanding European political order (Olsen 2007).  
 
European order formation has precipitated another central debate: the balance 
between national autonomy on one hand and integration above states on the other. 
This dilemma is not new; however, it has been reinvigorated in recent years. Most 
notably, it has been projected as widespread support for populist, Eurosceptical 
movements. This culminated in the 2016 Brexit referendum, spearheaded by the 
Leave-campaigns mantra “take back control.” An apparent game changer, Brexit 
has left practitioners and scholars alike to ask renewed questions about the 
ramifications of an integrated, interconnected Europe (Gänzle et al. 2019). The 
debate surrounding the terms and conditions for Britain’s departure have often 
been simplified into the concepts of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Brexit3. Though the narrative 
of regaining control through a ‘hard’ Brexit and a ‘no-deal’ exit has been 
repeatedly emphasized by certain politicians, the viability of such options has been 
called into question (Gänzle 2019). Illustrative attempts to reach an agreement and 
leave the EU has proven more difficult than initially anticipated by the most 
persistent ‘brexiteers’. After decades of globalization and integration, 
                                               
 
3 Essentially, ‘soft’ Brexit is understood as close affiliation with the EU, notably by remaining in the 




interconnected political orders have become tightly interwoven into the societal 
and political fabric of European nation-states. The classical dichotomies of 
member-states versus non-members, of in versus out, and dependent versus 
sovereign all fall short of expressing the reality of an integrated European 
continent.  
 
1.2 The organizational dimension of administrative interconnectedness  
One dominant objective of social sciences has been to produce theoretical ideas 
and empirical insights that can travel across time and space, and thus be 
generalizable beyond the case at hand. Scrutinizing isolated empirical cases may 
be a fruitful endeavour in itself, yet there is an added value of research that outlines 
and tests theoretical models that demonstrate causal connections between 
variables. This section introduces the theoretical perspective that constitutes the 
second dimension of the research question (see also chapter 3). Organizational 
theory maintains that understanding governance (political orders) requires an 
understanding of the government apparatus (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). It seeks 
to make causal inferences between certain organizational attributes (independent 
variables) and governance processes (dependent variables). The independent 
variables applied in this thesis are grouped into structure, demography, and locus 
and each encompass different dimensions with subsequent assumptions (Egeberg 
2006). 
 
The dependent variable, ‘governance processes,’ may broadly be defined as a 
process through which the steering of society takes place (Ansell and Torfing 
2016). Political science scholars generally subscribe to the idea that governance 
comprises several phases of decision-making, such as agenda-setting, policy 
development, formal policy-making, and implementation (Egeberg and Trondal 
2018: 4). Thus, operationalizing a ‘governance process’ means researchers are 
confronted with several possible proxy measurements. For organizational scholars, 
decision-making behaviour has been a prevalent construct in this regard. 
Dependent variables in organizational studies thus often attempt to capture 
attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs that suggest a likelihood of certain behavioural 
patterns to occur. Therefore, dependent variables relate to decision-making 





There are several theoretical venues that can be pursued to disentangle drivers of 
public governance. This study, however, chooses a partial theory of public 
governance by focusing on the causal role of organizational factors. An 
organizational perspective falls under a comprehensive umbrella of institutional 
theories that in itself harbours numerous fruitful sub-perspectives (see also figure 
4). Scholars have pinpointed two main reasons for applying organizational theory 
to the study of governance. Firstly, generic variables allow for generalizations 
across time and space. Insights drawn from organizational theory may be applied 
to understand both single organizations or institutional configurations consisting 
of multiple organizational entities within or between levels of governance (Olsen 
2007; Simon 1958). Secondly, scholarly efforts have sought to translate theoretical 
scholarship into instrumental scholarship through highlighting design implications 
of organizational theory (Egeberg and Trondal 2018; March 1965) (see also 
section 3.3). The latter has been amplified through increasing calls to ‘rediscover’ 
political science by focusing on the compatibility of pure (theoretically-driven) 
and applied (practical-driven) knowledge (Densch 2015; Holmberg and Rothstein 
2012; Ricci 1987; Stoker et al. 2015). On a broader note, another reason for 
applying organizational theory in this study is found in the Scandinavian academic 
tradition of which it is part. This scholarship (also referred to as the ‘Bergen-school 
of public administration’) pioneered the study of organization in political science 
(Olsen 2018).  
 













Source: Based on Egeberg and Trondal (2018) 
 
Up until that point, the combination of political science and organizational theory 
had a longstanding history of parallel agendas but mutual disregard (Olsen 1991) 













theory as the analytical tool in this study is firstly, organizational theory remains a 
marginalized perspective in public governance studies4 (Döhler 2020). Secondly, 
rather than confronting different theories it confronts different independent 
variables within organizational theory (figure 3). Consequently, this study seeks to 
investigate the robustness of organizational theory with the aim of advancing the 
organization theory research agenda.  
 
Organizational theory is the theoretical backbone of MLA. How we organize 
matters for how people meet. It determines who meets who and with what agenda. 
The street-level relevance of organizational theory derives from the assumption 
that the aggregated outcome of this amalgamation of ideas, preferences, and 
experiences ultimately becomes embodied in public policy. Notwithstanding, this 
argument emphasizes bureaucracy as a fundamental provider of political premises 
(Christensen et al. 2018; Peters 2014; Waldo 1948). With a focus on organization 
of the European executive space, organizational scholarship aims to contribute 
another piece to the puzzle of European integration. 
 
1.3 Methodology and data 
Predominantly situated in the positivist methodological tradition, this study aims 
to make causal inferences between a set of independent variables (organizational 
factors) and a dependent variable (administrative integration). The principal source 
of data is large-N quantitative datasets from the Norwegian central administration 
(agencies and ministries5). This dataset has been supplemented with qualitative 
data collected from two Norwegian agencies in 2018/2019.  
 
Applying quantitative data in this study comes with two main advantages. Firstly, 
it allows for statistical inferences on a high number of observations that may 
uncover patterns of behaviour across large populations and produce generalizable 
conclusions. Secondly, results may easily be replicated, increasing the overall 
reliability of the study. Additionally, qualitative data has been collected to 
corroborate and explore some statistical patterns observed. Key advantages of data 
                                               
 
4 For instance, the Oxford Handbook of Public Governance (Levi-Faur 2012) lacked a discussion of the 
implication of organizational variables. 
5 The surveys are part of a series of identical inquiries conducted once every decade from 1976 until 
2016. Article I apply surveys conducted at the ministerial level in 1996, 2006, and 2016.  Articles II and 




triangulation in this case is increased validation of data that can then be cross-
referenced by multiple sources, as well as to enhance the complex understanding 
of cross-level interactions. Table 1 below summarizes the main components of the 
research design in each article.  
 
Table 1. A broad overview of the research design  
Article Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable(s) Methods and data 
I Patterns of 
coordination 
Organizational structure 
• Horizontal specialization 
• Vertical specialization 
• Organizational affiliation 
Large-N survey data on 






• Organizational affiliation 
Large-N survey data on 








• Educational background 
Organizational locus 
• Location 
Large-N survey data on 
agency officials, 2016 
supplemented with semi-
structures interviews of 
agency officials (N=11) 
Source: own compilation 
 
The Norwegian central administration is the empirical testing-ground for this 
thesis. Norway is not a formal member of the EU, yet it is closely affiliated with 
the EU through numerous agreements, such as the European Economic Area 
(EEA) and the Schengen agreements (Archer 2005; Fossum and Graver 2018; Kux 
and Sverdrup 2000). The former, in particular, is the cornerstone of Norway-EU 
relations. Norway’s relationship with the EU may be seen as territorially dis-
integrated yet sectorally integrated: Politically, participation in the EU Council and 
EU Parliament remains blocked, however, the agreements grant the Norwegian 
central administration privileged access to the EU administrative system on the 
same terms as regular member states. Norwegian officials are thus frequently 
represented in EU executive institutions (such as Commission DGs and EU 
agencies) as envoys of their policy sector. More detailed descriptions of the 







1.4 Summarizing the articles  
This section presents how the three articles fit together and briefly illustrates the 
bigger picture that emerges (see also chapter 5). As outlined, the articles share 
fundamental theoretical and empirical properties. Theoretically, they differ in that 
they employ various organizational variables. Empirically, they differ in that 
Article I studies ministerial officials, while Articles II and III study agency 
officials. Additionally, the articles examine three different avenues in which EU-
level institutions may influence domestic government officials, demonstrating 
how organizational variables may facilitate or impede the impact of EU-level 
institutions at different points in the multilevel system. Figure 4 provides an 
overview of the empirical focal points of each study.  
 


















Source: own compilation 
 
Article I discusses how organizational characteristics at the national level ‘filter’ 
how EU level institutions are received and processed by national level officials. 
The empirics are drawn from surveys conducted among ministerial officials at 
three points in time over two decades (1996, 2006 and 2016). Article I finds that 
EU level institutions contribute to a self-reinforcing administrative bias enabled 
by favourable organizational conditions at the national level. Article II asks for the 





Article II: Agency officials’ 
behaviour affected by 
participating in EU-level 
executive institutions  
Article I: Ministerial officials’ 
behaviour affected by national 
executive institution at the 
‘intersection’ of governance 
levels  
Article III: Agency officials’ 
behaviour affected by national 




at the supranational level influence identities among national officials. This is 
contrasted to similar effects from secondary structures at the national level. It 
suggests that supranational level structures have a stronger impact on identities 
among national officials. Article III examines the scope of inter-organizational 
relationship between national ministries and agencies. The objective of Article III 
is to establish if – and how – different types of ‘institutional overlaps’ affect 
ministerial influence over agency’s handling of EU-related legislation. It finds a 
positive relationship between ministerial influence and organizational duplication. 
Additionally, it suggests that secondary structures at the ministerial level may be 
an effective means to exert influence. This aligns well with Article II that discussed 
the impact of secondary structures. The empirical stepping stone for the latter two 
articles is survey data from national agency officials in 2016. Additionally, Article 
III draws on interview data. 
 
What main conclusions can be drawn from this thesis? Theoretically, the study 
emphasizes the role of organization in multilevel governance systems. It highlights 
how organization contributes to a self-reinforcing administrative bias that appears 
to expand over time. Empirically, it shows how supranational institutions are 
increasingly institutionalized and integrated in daily operations of national 























Table 2. Summary of articles and Ph.D. thesis 
 Article I Article II Article III Ph.D. thesis 
Argument/ 
Aim 
EU contributes to 
a self-reinforcing 
administrative bias 
due to favourable 
conditions at the 






























impact of EU level 
institutions on the 
domestic level 
over time 

















influence at the 
domestic level 
































practicing of EU 
legislation 
Examines influence 
of EU level 
institutions on the 
central 








Mixed methods Secondary analysis 
Data 
collection 
Survey Survey Survey 
Interviews 
Analyzes data from 
articles I, II and III 







EU contributes to 
a self-reinforcing 
administrative bias 












Capacity is the 
most influential 
variable. No effect 
could be 







of EU in domestic 
administration. 






































2. Contribution and notes on literature  
 
This thesis explores the implications of organizational factors in public 
governance. The main ambition is thus to add to the literature concerned with 
questions of how, why, and under what conditions certain ways of organizing can 
have an impact on politico-administrative institutions. Empirically, the thesis asks 
how domestic government institutions are transformed by supranational ones and 
thus how nation-states are transformed through processes of integration. This 
section presents both the overall and the specific contributions in more detail 




This thesis offers theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions. 
Theoretically, its overarching ambition concerns the expansion of a research 
agenda that advocates for examining organizational variables in public governance 
processes. The thesis builds on the work of Herbert Simon (1957), March and 
Olsen (1989) and Egeberg and Trondal (2018), amongst others, and its objective 
therefore is to test the robustness of organizational variables with a view to adding 
new insights to this line of scholarship.  
 
Article I examines the sustained effect of organizational variables over a time 
period of two decades. A key theoretical contribution of this article is thus the 
systematic inquiry of the effects of organizational properties over time. Article II 
is motivated by ‘unpacking’ the implications of organizational affiliations. Initially 
understood as a dichotomous variable (primary/secondary affiliations), the article 
attempts to nuance this understanding by examining the effect of secondary 
affiliations on government officials’ identities. To this end, the article suggests a 
focus on structural ambiguity and argues that secondary structures produce diverse 
impacts depending on their organizational embedment. Finally, inspired by 
previous studies on organizational duplication (Egeberg and Trondal 2009a), 
Article III aims to develop this argument by introducing and testing other types of 
‘institutional overlaps.’ Combined, the three articles subsequently explore the 





Empirically, this thesis makes two main contributions. First, it aims to illustrate 
developments within national executive institutions in response to European 
administrative integration. This includes questions such as: How - and to what 
extent - does the supranational level influence national executive institutions? 
What main patterns of integration can be observed? In what ways are governance 
processes at one level linked to governance processes at another? Secondly, the 
thesis contributes to the debate on autonomy versus integration by illustrating to 
what extent Norway as a third country is interwoven into European affairs. 
Whereas the vast majority of MLA literature has been focused on agency officials 
at one point in time (Egeberg and Trondal 2011a), Article I takes a longitudinal 
approach. In this vein, it casts a spotlight on the role of ministerial officials over 
time. Articles II and III, by contrast, examine agency officials at one point in time 
by means of survey data collected in 2016. The former asks what effects 
supranational engagements (such as expert groups or committees) may have for 
national officials’ identity. Arguably, identity is a significant indicator of 
integration, yet has not previously been subjected to much scrutiny within MLA 
literature (see Egeberg 1999a). Article III takes a close look at how certain 
variables may affect ministerial control of subordinate agencies’ execution of EU-
related policy. The empirical contribution of Article III therefore pertains to 
questions related to the national politico-administration nexus, in particular, how 
organizational properties may be employed by the ministries to prevent the 
emergence of so-called ‘runaway’-bureaucracies.  
 
Methodologically, the thesis uses statistical analysis of large-N questionnaire data 
and additionally draws on 11 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2018/2019. 
Article I and II apply quantitative analysis only, while Article III is based on mixed 
methods. One particular novel contribution by Article I is to provide a study  
over a time period that spans two decades. The thesis therefore offers a 
comprehensive study of the whole central administration, allowing broad 
conclusions across sectors and policy areas.  
 
By extension, the thesis epitomizes the question of the implications of 
organizational interconnectedness. In doing so, it contributes to literature that links 
specific organizational properties to governance literature. Equally, it informs 




governance. Established literature on public administration has long been confined 
to political processes within national borders appraising the different levels of 
governance as distinct analytical spheres (Egeberg 2008; Trondal 2010). 
Accordingly, this thesis builds on various tenets of scholarship that illuminate 
reciprocity between different levels of government, pursuing questions such as 
what the causal mechanisms at play are, how can they be identified, and what 
causal inferences can be drawn from cross-level interlinkages (Bach et al. 2016; 
Egeberg and Trondal 2015; Trein and Maggetti 2019). The study thereby also 
advances the literature on differentiated European integration.  
 
2.2 Notes on literature    
This thesis elaborates upon different strands of literature roughly grouped into 
three main categories: organizational theory (including institutional theory where 
required), Europeanization research, and finally, literature that combines 
organizational theory with the study of governance, and Europeanization more 
specifically. Given that organizational theory will be discussed in chapter 3, this 
section will be limited to the latter two. This section is sequenced in chronological 
order and summarizes the literature that underpins this thesis. It begins with a brief 
introduction and definition of ‘Europeanization’ before sketching out the main arc 
of its theoretical antecedents to current use in public administration literature. 
Next, it discusses contemporary research relevant to the thesis before proceeding 
to consider what the future might hold for the study of multi-level administration.  
 
2.2.1 Past: From European integration studies to Europeanization 
The concept of ‘Europeanization’ has traversed across several sub-disciplines of 
political science, from political economy to European Union studies to public 
administration. Accordingly, it has been widely applied and adapted to fit different 
research agendas, methodologies, and empirical phenomena. As such, the term in 
itself has become a separate field of scholarly debate (Featherstone and Radaelli 
2003; Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2015; Graziano and Vink 2007; Radaelli 2018; 
Jensen and Kristensen 2013; Olsen 2002). One of the many scholarly interests that 
emerged within Europeanization studies was the question of the relationship 
between European integration and domestic administrative adaption (Héritier et al. 
1996; Jacobssen 1999; Mény et al. 1996; Trondal and Veggeland 1999). In the 
same way, Europeanization in this study focuses how supranational logics embed 




Europeanization as a process6 where the domestic realm adjusts to supranational 
dynamics - to the extent that they become an endogenous logic of national politics 
and policy-making (Ladrech 1994). By the same token, Europeanization has been 
understood as an explanatory factor in political continuity and change at the 
national level (Hix and Goetz 2000). This is also echoed in Olsen’s seminal work 
on Europeanization (2002: 932), in which he cites five possible uses of the term 
‘Europeanization,’ one of which denotes the ‘alignment of institutions across 
levels of governance: “[another conception of] Europeanization focuses on change 
in core domestic institutions of governance and politics, understood as a 
consequence of the development of European-level institutions, identities and 
policies.”  
 
At the outset, studies of European integration were concerned with explaining 
European integration itself. Different theoretical schemes were suggested to 
discern and explain why and how integration occurred. Most notably, the main 
theoretical cleavage formed between the neo-functionalists (NF) (Haas 1958) on 
the one hand and liberal intergovernmentalists (LIG) (Moravscik 1998) on the 
other (see for instance Rosamund 2000). From the 1990s onwards, however, the 
dependent variable changed from studying processes of integration itself to 
studying the impact on political processes at the national level. Up until that point, 
studies of national political systems and studies of European integration had 
largely evolved in isolation (Hix and Goetz 20007), however, developments at both 
the European and at the domestic realms increasingly called for research that 
considered interdependencies between levels. This marked the beginning of the 
study of ‘Europeanization’ (see also Puchala 1999).   
 
                                               
 
6 Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2009: 206-207) list three possible conceptions of ‘Europeanization’: Firstly, 
Europeanization can be seen as an outcome. This enables comparisons of the degree of Europeanization 
of social domains, political parties, social movements or whole countries. Secondly, Europeanization may 
be understood as a process in which the outcome is change (or lack thereof) of public policy, politics or 
polity. And finally, Europeanization as a broad political strategy implying the construction of governance 
architectures such as the Eurozone. 
7 Hix and Goetz (2000 1-2) list three main reasons for this. Firstly, the study of the interconnectedness of 
levels of governance was caught between two stools: it did not fit the research agenda of comparative 
politics scholarship, nor did it quite match the interests of international relations scholarship. Secondly, 
scholars of comparative European politics were reluctant to take on the question of European integration 
because they saw it as a normative project, and doubted that it would contribute to much generalizable 
knowledge. Finally, there was little evidence that European integration had much impact on the national 




Rather than residing solely in the realm of European integration’s grand theories, 
Europeanization literature drew inspiration from other fields of political science, 
such as international relations (IR) and comparative politics. As a consequence, 
EU studies shifted from being largely sui generis in nature to having broader 
applicability and interdisciplinary relevance (Trondal 2007). For scholars seeking 
to unveil mechanisms for change (or lack thereof) within domestic administrative 
sphere, insights from institutionalist scholarship in particular became a promising 
avenue.8 The integration of EU studies and institutionalism followed what has 
been labelled ‘the institutionalist turn’ in political science (Aspinwall and 
Schneider 2000; Dowding 2000; Jupille and Caparaso 1999; Jupille et al. 2003; 
Olsen 2018). The influx of institutionalist perspectives into political science and 
integration studies particularly (Bulmer 1993; Pierson 1996; Olsen 2000), has been 
attributed to Scharpf’s (1988) landmark piece on the joint-decision trap as well as 
Johan P. Olsen’s entry into the study of European integration (Olsen 1996). March 
and Olsen’s (1984) equally influential article on new institutionalism - that 
championed the role of organization in political life - has been seen as pioneering 
this regard. March and Olsen continued to advocate for the role of institutions in 
their books “Rediscovering Institutions: the organizational basis of political life” 
(1989) and “Democratic Governance” (1995). Their core argument was that 
actors’ institutional embeddedness was imperative for understanding political 
reality.  
 
Inspired by institutionalist advances, public administration scholarship became 
increasingly invested in forging a research agenda that not only built more 
extensively on the institutionalist frame of reference, but also bridged analytical 
borders between the national and international level (Egeberg 1980; Knill 2001). 
Up until that point, the dominant context for public administration studies had been 
power relations within and across nation-states, and less attention was given to 
organization of relations between states (Olsen 2018: 196). Egeberg (1989) argued 
that in order to understand public administration in modern democracies, it was 
necessary to account for both institutions and actors within the national level of 
government, but also relations to institutions and regimes outside national borders. 
                                               
 
8 On a broader note, social constructivism for example, was largely adopted from IR scholarship into the 
study of Europeanization (see for instance Checkel 2005; Jupille et al. 2003). In the same vein, multi-




Egeberg proceeded to develop this argument by studying various aspects within 
and between national and European executive institutions (Egeberg 1996; Egeberg 
and Trondal 1997; Egeberg 1999a; Egeberg 2001). In 2004, he published an article 
which heralded an organizational approach to the study of European integration. 
A prelude to MLA, and building on his early work on the fourth level of 
government (Egeberg 1980), this perspective expressed how decision-making was 
contingent upon its surrounding organizational framework (see chapter 3).  At the 
same time, various institutional spins on cross-level analysis were adopted across 
public administration scholarship in Europe (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; 
Börzel 2002; Knill 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Kohler-Koch 1999; Sbragia 
1992). Moreover, questions about the relationships between European integration 
and domestic administrative institutions catapulted to the forefront of scientific 
debate (Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997; Trondal 
and Veggeland 1999).9 Notwithstanding, the research program ‘Advanced 
Research on the Europeanization of the Nation-state’ (ARENA), established by 
Johan P. Olsen in 1994, remained a flagship for the import of institutional theories 
to the study of European integration and Europeanization.  
 
2.2.2 Present: From Europeanization to multilevel administration in Europe 
The 1990s and early 2000s endowed public administration scholarship with the 
first generation of Europeanization literature. Incited by the institutional epiphany, 
key questions related to the extent of institutional adaption (in administrative 
institutions) at the domestic level, convergence and how such institutional changes 
could best be understood (Sverdrup 2000). Thus, the first wave of literature was 
principally occupied with institutional relations, notably how EU-level institutions 
affected and ‘hit’ domestic-level institutions (Börzel and Risse 2000).  
 
The next generation of public administration scholarship expanded their focal 
point to institutional interrelations, that is, the mutual impact between EU-level 
and domestic-level institutions and how member-state institutions ‘hit’ back 
(Beyers and Trondal 2003).10 Acknowledging that “[u]nderstanding change 
                                               
 
9 For a comprehensive review of the Europeanization research agenda see Graziano and Vink (2007) 
chapter 1.  
10 This is also akin to Trondal and Bauer (2017: 77) who identify two ‘waves’ of MLA research. The first 




requires information about how different types of institutions fit together, their 
interdependencies and interactions […] and how change in one institution is linked 
to change in another” (Olsen 2009: 24), this scholarship became increasingly 
interested in capturing the integrated nature of public institutions across levels of 
governance (Egeberg and Trondal 2015). A key concern of this scholarships has 
thus been the reciprocal effects of the institutional arrangements within and across 
levels (Ansell et al. 2016; Bach et al. 2016). Bauer et al. (2019: 913), for instance, 
argue that “administrative internationalization11 is not just a trend that ‘hits home’ 
in a top-down manner […] but needs to be understood also as a domestic 
transformative force transcending the borders between the national and the 
international.”   
 
This second generation of public administration scholarship, interested in the study 
of executive institutions in a multi-leveled Europe, can largely be arranged within 
two dimensions: horizontally and vertically (see also Brandsma et al. 2019). 
Prominent examples of studies on the horizontal axis have been interested in 
network governance within and between levels of government (Heidbreder 2015; 
Levi-Faur 2013; Maggetti 2013; Maggetti and Giladi 2011; Mastenbroek and 
Martinsen 2018; Mathieu 2016; Yesilkagit 2011), while literature centered around 
the vertical axis is geared mainly towards hierarchical relationships within and 
between levels of governance12 (Bach and Ruffing 2018; Egeberg 2006; Groenleer 
2009; Hofmann and Türk 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Trondal and Bauer 
2017). Bearing most relevance for this thesis, the following discussion will mainly 
focus on the latter.  
 
‘Vertical’ inquiries have been dominated by two main empirical interests.13 First, 
there exists a considerable body of literature on EU-level institutions, notably EU 
                                               
 
MLA by its outcome. The second wave saw MLA as featuring an emergent common administrative order 
in Europe and underscored new patterns and processes of integration rather than its outcome. 
11 Defined as “domestic administrative change whose origin can be traced to developments outside the 
national realm” (Bauer et al. 2019: 906) 
12 Bauer and Trondal (2015: 10) note that scholarship centered around the emergence of a multi-level 
administrative system can be split into two-dimensional sub dates: the first represents a political-science 
based literature that tries to theoretically conceptualize multi-level governance (MLG) (e.g . Hooghe and 
Marks 2001) and a more recent public-administration based scholarship that aims to understand the EU as 
a multilevel administrative system (MLA) (e.g Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2010). The second scholarship on 
multi-level administration is largely legal (e.g. Hofmann and Türk 2006).  
13 Due to space limitations, literature that primarily focuses on the Commission (for instance, Kassim et 




agencies and expert committees. Literature on EU agencies has been concerned 
with three central themes (for a comprehensive review see Egeberg and Trondal 
2017): (i) agencies’ organization, tasks and proliferation (Bach et al. 2016; Coen 
and Thatcher 2008; Egeberg and Trondal; Levi-Faur 2013; Ongaro et al. 2015; 
Vos 2000), (ii) their implications for power relationships (Busuioc 2016; Busuioc 
and Groenleer 2012; Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014; Kelemen and Tarrant 2011; 
Ossege 2016) and finally, (iii) policy consequences of ‘agencification’ (Eberlein 
and Grande 2005; Levi-Faur 2013; Vestlund 2017). Additionally, the study of EU 
expert committees has been a parallel research interest, including Commission 
expert groups, Council working groups and comitology committees (Christensen 
and Kirchner 2010; Egeberg et al. 2003; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008; 2011; 
Mauer and Larson 2002; Metz 2013; Schafer 2000; Trondal 2001; Trondal and 
Veggeland 2003). Secondly, an extensive literature developed on the 
administrative national-supranational nexus. In fact, this literature was in part 
inspired by early studies on EU committee governance that hinted at national 
administrators enacting different roles when attending different EU-level 
committees. On one hand, they represented their national ministries, while on the 
other, they were part of a common multi-level administration. Egeberg et al. (2003) 
successfully established that this effect appeared to be stronger for officials 
attending Commission expert committees than for officials attending Council 
working groups or comitology committees. They argued that this divergence was 
due to a stronger territorial component in the latter two instances. Thus, officials 
attending Commission expert groups did not only evoke a broader repertoire of 
roles but were also subjected to less coordination from their ministries than their 
peers in Council working groups or comitology (see also Schaefer et al. 2000). 
Similarly, a preceding study undertaken by Trondal (2001: 231) concluded that 
“administrative integration […] is affected differently by the various [domestic] 
institutions embedding them.”  
 
Executive Europeanization has been associated with a dual centralization through 
strengthening of the administrative-level (the EU Commission) – as well as the 
political level in the form of an increased role of key ministers and heads of 
governments (James 2010; Kassim 2003; King 1994; Szukala 2003). However, as 
demonstrated in the aforementioned studies, the EU policy process may not 
uniformly favor centralization. Building the case for the organizational argument, 




depending on the organizational principles on which they are constructed (Egeberg 
1999; Trondal and Larsson 2005). Hence, participation in EU institutions based on 
territorial lines (the Council) would invoke intergovernmental loyalties, while 
participation in sectoral-oriented institutions (the Commission) would invoke 
stronger sense of loyalties along sectoral and functional lines. These assumptions 
were supported by studies of Germany (Derlien 2000) and the Netherlands 
(Harmsen 1999) that also found evidence of increased sectorization rather than 
centralization (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008: 14).  
 
Impelled by such observations, Egeberg (2006: 2) suggested that processes of 
administrative integration could be seen as the emergence of a new political order 
in which national and supranational administrators converged to form a “[…] 
genuine multilevel union administration.” Evidenced by several empirical studies, 
Egeberg found that national agencies became increasingly ‘double-hatted’ in the 
sense that they comprised constitutive building blocks for both their national as 
well as the supranational administrations. He argued that their ability to detach 
from national administrations in order to recouple into the European 
configurations hinged on their organizational properties (see for instance also 
Egeberg 1999b; Egeberg 2005). Innately, this process is tied to both specialization 
principles (Gulick 1937) as well as to the proliferation of semi-autonomous 
agencies both at the national- and supranational level (Lærgeid and Christensen 
2006; Yesilkagit 2011). This was corroborated by Trondal (2010: 29) who 
concluded that “[the] emergent European executive order is driven by the formal 
organization of its component institutions.” Correspondingly, in her analysis of 
agencification, Martens (2010) argued that changing patterns of cooperation, 
coordination, and power were intrinsically linked to organizational conditions at 
both the national and European level.  
 
Under the conceptual heading ‘multilevel administration’ (MLA), this arising 
scholarship aimed to unpack the organizational components of government and 
study how these components may interact across levels of government (Bauer and 
Trondal 2015: 10).14 Bauer and Trondal (2015) suggest three dimensions of MLA: 
                                               
 
14 While MLA emanates from public-administration scholarship, its conceptual counterpart, MLG, was 
inspired by comparative politics. Three key variations of the MLA and MLG approach include: firstly, 
the unit of analysis in the MLG approach is based on regions while MLA suggests a focus on 




institutional independence, integration, and cooptation. As exemplified by 
empirical studies, these may serve as indicators for the institutionalization of a 
common administrative order (Egeberg and Trondal 2009b; Olsen 2007). 
Similarly, Brandsma et al. (2019: 261) note that ‘administrative autonomy’ has 
been a central area of interest for public administration research on the EU. This 
is supported by Bauer et al. (2019) who identify ‘transformation of bureaucratic 
power’ as a key theme in debates on ‘administrative internationalization’15 more 
broadly. Accordingly, research efforts along these lines have been directed at 
exploring various dimensions connected to the inner workings of bureaucracy. For 
instance, Martens (2010: 7) notes that “increased cooperation and development of 
common rules […] are seen as indications of administrative integration” (see also 
Olsen 2007).  
 
Consistent with the exploration of this thesis is research that explores the effects 
of EU multi-leveled administration on executive inter-organizational relationships 
on the national level (Goetz 2000). These studies share the common assumption 
that the administrative institutions at the EU-level form a new European executive 
center that bears direct consequences for the modus operandi of national 
administrations, and thereby also politics (Egeberg 2006; Lægreid et al. 2004). On 
an abstract level, this is interpreted as transformation of the European political 
order (Gulbrandsen 2012: 5). Relevant for this thesis are the implications on 
national regulatory agencies as well as executive ministries. Empirical studies have 
documented that European institutions have a stronger impact on national agencies 
than on national ministries (Egeberg 2006; Egeberg and Trondal 2011a; Ruffing 
2017). As mentioned, a number of authors have recognized that this has led to the 
emergence and institutionalization of new layers of bureaucracy, so-called 
‘agencification’ (Coen and Thatcher 2008; Levi-Faur 2012). A central question 
examines how these developments relate to national administrative regimes. This 
line of inquiry, that departs from the perspective of ‘double-hatted’ agencies 
(Egeberg 2006), maintains that national ministries remain the dominant principals 
                                               
 
The MLG approach largely treats regions as coherent units of analysis, while the MLA approach treats 
their units as internally differentiated. Thirdly, they differ on core assumptions on the contingency of 
governance processes (see Trondal 2017, 13-16)  
15 Bauer et al. (2019) identify three key themes in studies on ‘administrative internationalization’, namely 
diffusion, resistance, and transformation of bureaucratic power. Administrative internationalization in this 




of their agencies (Egeberg and Trondal 2011a). However, it acknowledges that the 
European drift is likely to (gradually) alter operating principles within agencies 
and that the degree to which they do so may vary. Juggling the roles of both sector 
expert and national representative, agency officials often embark on European 
policy-processes with a relatively ambiguous mandate (Esmark 2008) that 
arguably leave them more open to supranational ideas and impulses. Moreover, as 
noted by Lægreid et al. (2004), political leadership is generally more involved in 
policy-making in EU states than in non-EU states. Overall, these developments 
point to discretionary loss of political steering and control (Goetz and Meyer-
Sahling 2008). Consequently, a vital concern has been the implications on 
decision-making behavior amongst national incumbents (Egeberg and Trondal 
2015).  
 
An analogous line of inquiry has examined the potential impact of administrative 
integration on bureaucratic autonomy vis-à-vis the Commission and national 
governments (Maggetti 2007). Two observations stand out in this regard. Firstly, 
it is contended that agency involvement in international and supranational 
regulatory networks may cause national ministries to lose sight of their agencies, 
notably due to restricted possibilities of monitoring and control (Eberlein and 
Newman 2008). Secondly, empirical studies suggest that ‘agencification’ 
empowers national agencies vis-à-vis national ministries (Bach and Ruffing 2013; 
Bach et al. 2015). However, as Bauer et al. (2019: 911) point out, the debate on 
this is still open. Recent contributions to this discussion suggest that core-
executive institutions may have (re-)gained some control over their agencies (Di 
Mascio and Natalini 2014; Dommett et al. 2016). Equally, the perceptions of 
growing independence of bureaucracy may also be at odds with comparative 
public administration scholarship in particular, which has suggested that European 
bureaucracies have become subject to increasing functional politicization (Page 
and Wright 1999; 2004; Peters and Pierre 2004) as the capacity of elected 
politicians to monitor and steer the behavior of non-elected officials has increased 
(Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008: 13). 
 
Over time, an extensive literature on the study of Europeanization of national 
ministries has developed. A key observation here points out how Europeanization 
likely affects organization, routines, and culture of ministries (Bulmer and Burch 




and Ireland, James (2010: 832) for instance, notes that “[core executives in 
member states] encourage greater alignment of domestic coordination structures 
within the EU decision-making.” Similar inter-departmental coordination 
structures have also been established in non-member states, albeit the de facto 
effect of these remains contested (Trondal 2006). Lægreid et al. (2004: 357) find 
that governments and political leadership in EU member states are more directly 
involved in ministerial EU policy-making than their counterparts in EEA member 
states, suggesting that administrative traditions, organizational structure and forms 
of affiliation to the EU play a role. Other studies have found that Europeanization 
of national ministries has a more powerful impact on a limited number of civil 
servants in the ministries (Geuijen et al. 2008; Masterbroek and Princen 2010; 
Meyer-Sahling and von Stolk 2015; Meyer-Sahling et al. 2016; Müller et al. 2010; 
Vifell 2006). Similar to the central administration survey reported in this thesis, 
Geujien et al. (2008) conducted a comprehensive study of Dutch civil servants in 
which they mapped the extent to which government officials were involved in EU-
related policy-making. They found that overall engagement in EU-matters in the 
Dutch civil service was limited, and moreover, largely confined to a small core of 
specialized ‘eurocrats’. Akin to such observations, secondment to the European 
Commission equip a group of national civil servants with competences and skills 
in European policy-making (Trondal et al. 2008). Yesilkagit (2012: 7), who 
emphasizes such tendencies of differentiated integration of national ministries, 
notes that “though the […] EU impact [of the ministries] is modest for what one 
can observe, it remains the case that many policy issues have become international. 
It is even fair to suggest that some of the national ministries […]  have essentially 
become the national branches of the European Commission rather than ministries 
of the nation-state.”    
 
2.2.3 Future: From multilevel administration in Europe to the world 
There are at least two major pathways ahead for the study of Europeanization and 
MLA more specifically: one concerns the research agenda within the field of EU 
governance while the second relates to export of ideas to new empirical domains. 
Firstly, on a broader note there is still a need for studies on how to conceptualize 
and empirically map administrative integration (Brandsma et al. 2019). Moreover, 
the winds of change blowing across Europe appeal for renewed questions about 
institutional resilience and adaptation (Olsen 2007; Trondal 2007). Following in 




questions relating to governance under crisis (Bátora and Fossum 2020; Piattoni 
2015; Riddervold et. al 2020; Saurugger 2014) and turbulence (Ansell et al. 2017; 
Baldersheim and Bátora 2012; Thomann et al. 2019). One question relates to how 
crisis, such as for instance the COVID-19 crisis and Brexit, affect the processes of 
(dis-)integration. Does crisis lead the EU towards more, less, or differentiated 
processes of integration? Another question pertains to the institutional 
sustainability of the EU: How resilient is the EU system, and its sub-components, 
when it faces situations that might shake the institutional core of the system? To 
what extent can the EU absorb, adapt, and muddle through crisis?  
 
Second, there is a shift from sui generis studies of European integration towards a 
broader comparative study of international bureaucracies. This study has coined 
the term international public administration (IPA), focusing on variation in policy 
styles, bureaucratic autonomy and behavioural logics among international civil 
servants16 (Bauer et al. 2016; Ege and Bauer 2013; Gänzle et al. 2019; Knill and 
Bauer 2016; Stone and Moloney 2019; Trondal et al. 2010; Trondal 2016).  
 
2.3 Summarizing chapter 2: Identifying the added value  
To begin with the big picture, while reform and change of political orders has been 
subjected to much scholarly attention, institutional emergence and effects have 
been relatively ignored (Padgett and Powell 2012). In particular, public 
administration scholarship discipline has paid little attention to wider debates on 
how administrations affect the rise and fall of political order (Trondal 2017: 8). 
Likewise, in studies of political order formation, administrative dimension has 
been largely neglected (Rokkan 1999). Following more recent efforts to rectify the 
ongoing debate on the emergence and implications of political orders, this thesis 
aligns with literature that spotlights the administrative dimension of order 
formation (Bauer and Trondal 2015; Egeberg 2006; Olsen 2007). Key questions 
include: what is a political order and how can it be explained? How do they 
function and what are the mechanisms that make organizations and orders 
function? To what extent do international political orders transform basic logics of 
pre-existing national, regional, and local political orders? (Trondal 2017: 4) Along 
                                               
 
16 For a review on the evolution of research on international bureaucracies see, for instance, Eckhard and 




such lines of inquiry, this thesis examines how a relatively new political order (the 
EU) challenges an existing one (the nation-state).  
 
As substantiated in the literature review, a golden thread can be traced through the 
institutionalist perspective on the EU, is the idea that the ‘EU effect’ is filtered and 
mediated through pre-existing domestic institutions, norms, and cultures (Héritier 
et al. 2001; Lægreid et al. 2004; Trondal 2007: 967). However, following Bauer 
and Trondal (2015), public administration scholars have so far imperfect and 
piecemeal understandings of the functioning of the supranational-national 
administrative nexus. In particular, the study of how organizational choices affect 
processes of integration and disintegration is of great importance to understand 
how administrations form political orders. This calls for studying processes 
between the EU and domestic level institutions (and also studies that include the 
international level of government), focusing on, among others, how domestic 
institutions interpret, process, and practice supranational policies.  
 
Moreover, there is a need for more studies on the systematic impact of 
organizational variables. Large-N studies, as provided by this thesis, are 
particularly limited in this regard. Though numerous case studies provide critical 
insights, there is a lack of comprehensive understanding of the bigger picture and 
the scope of ‘Europeanization’ across domestic governments.  
 
Additionally, the articles that comprise this thesis each speak to different research 
gaps. First, the impact of Europe on ministerial officials has been understudied 
compared to studies of agencies. At the same time, discerning how supranational 
institutions influence domestic administrations calls for an understanding of both 
‘frontline’ institutions.  Secondly, there is a lack of studies that consider the 
relationship between participation in organizational entities at the supranational 
level and actor-level identities more directly (but see Egeberg 1999a for an 
exception). Arguably, a shift in identities is a significant indicator of 
institutionalization of a common European order. Akin to the ‘thin-thick’ 
Europeanization binary (Vink 2003; Checkel 2001), a shift in identities implies an 
internalization of European perceptions, norms, and values that is likely to impact 
decision-making behaviour. Finally, Article III addresses the need for more studies 




and exercise European policies. Article III thereby also underscores the question 




































3. Theoretical framework 
 
This chapter is dedicated to organizational theory. It begins with a section aimed 
to (briefly) illuminate its heritage and rise to prominence. The second section 
discusses its causal component and outlines how the argument is applied in this 
thesis. The final section briefly reflects what the future might hold for 
organizational theory with a view to ongoing scholarly debates.  
 
3.1 Background  
Although ideas and debates on organization have arguably circulated since the 
earliest days of civilization (for instance, in Plato’s Republic17), most scholars 
consider the growth of industrial societies in the 19th century the beginning of 
classical organizational theory. As the name implies, it was the first theory of its 
kind and remains a nucleus for organizational schools of thought across numerous 
scholarly disciplines (Shafritz et al. 2005). Reflecting its sociological (Max 
Webers Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft18) and managerial (Frederick W. Taylors The 
Principles of Scientific Management19 and Henri Faylos General and Industrial 
Management20) origins, early organizational theory was concerned with analyzing 
organizational structures and tasks. It was primarily interested in describing 
hierarchical levels of authority and coordination along with horizontal 
differentiations between units. Inspired by Taylor and Fayol, Luther Gulick and 
Lyndall Urwick (Papers on the Science of Administration and Notes on the Theory 
of Organization by Gulick)21 later developed the classical theory of organization, 
                                               
 
17 Republic (approximately 375 BC) discusses justice and the order and character of the ideal city-state 
(‘Kallipolis’). He claims democracy is a danger due to excessive freedom and advocates rule by 
philosopher kings as the ideal form of governance.  
18 Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft (1921) by political economist and sociologist Max Weber is a broad 
sociological treatise that discusses relations and power between different societal actors. The book 
contains chapters on amongst others, social action, law and religion.  
19 In The principles of scientific management (1911) Frederick W. Taylor explains how productivity can 
be improved by applying the scientific method. The monograph consists of three parts: introduction, 
chapter 1: Fundamentals of scientific management, and chapter 2: The principles of scientific 
management. The latter introduces four core principles including science, harmony, cooperation and 
development.  
20 Henri Fayol became known with the publication of General and Industrial Management (1949). The 
article has originally been published in 1916 in French. In this work, Fayol presented his theory of 
management, known as Fayolism that included 14 principles of management.  
21 Papers on the Science of Administration is a collection of essays on administration, including Notes on 
the Theory of Administration, published in 1937. Amongst other, it introduced the acronym POSDCORB 
(planning, organization, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting) that refers to different 




also known as ‘administrative management theory’ (Prasad et al. 1991; Rabin and 
Miller 2000; Shafritz et al. 2016). Echoed by Henry Mintzberg (1979), these ideas 
emphasized formal authority and the role of hierarchical supervision. Nonetheless, 
principles put forward by Taylor/Fayol and later Gulick and Urwick were 
demystified by Herbert Simon in 1946 (Proverbs of Administration), who argued 
that rather than being scientific, these principles were more appropriately proverbs.  
 
Simon was antagonistic to the dominant idea of unbounded rationality conveyed 
by the images of ‘economic man’ and the ‘rational manager.’ As argued in 
Administrative Behavior (first published in 1947), individuals operate with limited 
information in an exceedingly complex world. Because it is impossible to obtain 
or process all the information needed to make rational decisions, individuals 
instead opt for ‘satisficing’ behavior that, that is, solutions that are good enough 
given what they know. Decision-making is thus the outcome of a simplification 
process rather than profit maximizing behaviour. It follows that different 
individuals and different organizations are likely to choose different solution 
depending on their frame of reference. As organizational analysis developed into 
a distinct field of inquiry in the 1940s, Herbert Simon’s ideas became the 
centerpiece of the Carnegie School, also represented by James G. March and 
Richard Cyert (see also Augier and March 2001; March 2007). An analogous 
theoretical camp that formed around the same time was sociological 
institutionalism, represented by Philip Selznick (Leadership in Administration: A 
Sociological Interpretation) (Hannan 2015). The latter was characterized by the 
study of the whole organization, and was particularly interested in social processes 
found within an organization (often referred to as ‘old’ institutionalism). Selznick 
(1957: 17) famously described institutionalization as a process whereby the 
organization becomes “infuse[d] with value beyond the technical requirements of 
the task at hand”.  During 1950s and 60s ‘behavioralism’22 gained ground as the 
core paradigm within political science and impinged on the popularity of 
organizational/institutional ideas. In response, organizational/institutionalist 
scholars began developing different analytical approaches to elucidate the role of 
                                               
 
22 Behavioralism, associated with scholars such as Stein Rokkan, viewed that the subject matter of 
political science should be limited to phenomena that are independently observable and quantifiable 
(Roskin 2016). In contrast to organizational/institutional scholars that saw institutions as crucial to 





institutions in the social and political process. Dominated by its organizational and 
sociological heritage, this new wave of organizational/institutional ideas was 
coined ‘new institutionalism’ and has been widely associated with James March 
and Johan P. Olsen.  
 
Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three main neo-institutionalist schools of 
thought: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and 
sociological institutionalism (see also Peters 1999). The latter arose in the late 
1970s within the sub-field of organizational theory and harbored two distinctive 
(and partly conflicting) perspectives: one that emphasizes exogenous factors 
(Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and one that accentuates 
endogenous factors (March and Olsen 1984; 1989). Anchored in Herbert Simons 
concept of bounded rationality, an endogenous focus views institution as 
“organizational arrangements that links role/identities, accounts of situations, 
resources and prescriptive rules and practices […]” (March and Olsen 2006a: 691). 
Effectively, this implies that institutions tend to impose certain worldviews, 
expectations and allegiances on its members (March and Olsen 1989) that 
ultimately skew decision-making behavior according to institutionalized practices 
of collectivity (‘logic of appropriateness’). Therefore, endogenous variables, such 
as rules, procedures, and norms, are considered crucial building blocks of 
appropriate behavior. Inspired by this approach, organizational theorists detail a 
set of variables and causal mechanisms that outline how organization might 
intervene in policy processes and eventually shape its outputs (Egeberg 2003: 
157): “ […] since policy makers base their choices of highly simplified models of 
the world, it becomes crucial to understand the operative selection mechanisms 
and filters. An organizational perspective highlights the role of decision makers 
organizational context in this respect […]”. Implicitly, the central recommendation 
of organizational theory is that organizing political life makes a difference. 
Organizational theory has been applied to private- and public-sector organizations 
alike (March 2007; Murdoch 2015), to explain processes within nation-states 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006) and more recently, processes across levels of 













Source: own compilation. 
 
3.2 An organizational approach to public governance: connecting across 
levels of governance 
Organizational theory relies on four independent variables: structure, demography, 
locus, and culture, and asks what difference they make in the governance process 
(dependent variable). While the former three are all relevant (albeit to varying 
degrees) in the enclosed articles, organizational culture is excluded from this 
thesis. According to the culture perspective, decision-making behavior tends to 
reflect informal norms and values rather than the formal structure (Egeberg and 
Trondal 2018). Culture is excluded for two main reasons: Firstly, culture requires 
time in order to fully develop. It is less amenable to deliberate change and thus 
differs from the three other independent variables (Selznick 1957; Egeberg and 
Trondal 2018). Secondly, the data material used to conduct the studies does not 
allow for inquiries into cultural aspects. As a result, organizational culture will not 
be in discussed in the proceeding section. 
 
 It is important to note that an organizational approach to public governance does 
not aim to explain particular policy choices or societal consequences. Instead, the 
impact of organizational factors is thought to have an indirect effect on policy 
choices through the policy process (Egeberg, forthcoming). Organizational factors 
can shape and bias processes, making certain outcomes more likely than others. 
Moreover, an organizational approach views the governance process as 
continuous. Organizational factors may influence different stages of the political 
New Institutionalism
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decision-making process: for instance, the ability to implement policy may be 
contingent upon the capacity of an organization, and policy development may 
depend on who is organized where according to what principles. Hence, this 
perspective questions how organizational factors impact decision-making 
behavior in the governance process. It also asks how organizational factors 
themselves may facilitate organizational change (meta-governance). For instance, 
merging departments, relocating whole organizations, or changing demographics 
likely impacts how these institutions ‘tick’ and thus, by extension, their outputs. 
In essence, the core message of organizational theory can be summed up in three 
words: organization is politics. The following sections will discuss the three 
independent variables, with an emphasis on organizational structure. The two 
remaining variables have been applied only intermittently and will be delineated 
according to their relevance in the articles.  
 
3.2.1 Organizational structure 
Empirically, structure has been the most studied organizational variable and its 
effects are well-documented (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). Structure is associated 
with the ‘classical organizational perspective’ represented by Gulick (1937), as 
well as with the ‘rational system perspective’ (Simon 1957) and the ‘instrumental 
perspective’ (Egeberg 1994). A frequently cited definition of organizational 
structure is Scott’s (1981) conceptualization of structure as a normative 
arrangement composed of rules and roles that specify who is expected to do what 
and how. It follows that a structure is never neutral (Hammond 1990): it codifies 
behaviour by broadly defining what interests and goals should be pursued and what 
alternatives and consequences should be considered relevant (Egeberg 2003: 158). 
An organizational structure thus represents mobilization of bias as it provides a 
framework of role expectations. When an individual is assigned to a specific 
position in an organization, it concomitantly invokes tacit codes of conduct by 
regulating what sources of information they are exposed to and whom they interact 
with.  
 
But for what reasons would we expect that individuals comply with role 
expectations? Firstly, as noted, bounded rationality does not allow for a full-range 
consideration of alternatives. Structure assists in simplifying the world by 
presenting a selection of options. Consequently, as anticipated by Simon (1957), 




becomes a mechanism that connects expectations to behaviour. Secondly, 
individuals may comply because is deemed appropriate (March and Olsen 1989), 
that is, they feel morally obligated. An important step in the development of 
political order is the acceptance of impersonal roles and ‘rationalized’ behaviour 
in organizational life. This allows individuals to separate their private interests 
from those emerging in their capacity as employees or representatives (Egeberg 
2003: 158). In the same vein, social control from peers are also thought to 
minimize deviant behaviour (ibid). Thirdly, individuals may be motivated by 
incentives (compliance as a means to serve own self-interests), such as career 
prospects or financial enticements.  
 
There are four dimensions of organizational structure of particular relevance for 
this study: horizontal specialization, vertical specialization, size, and affiliation.  
 
First, horizontal specialization asserts how tasks and responsibilities are divided 
both within and across organizations. It determines how different groups or sectors 
are linked together or decoupled from another, and thereby also unifies or separates 
different concerns and considerations. With his four basic principles of formal 
organization, Luther Gulick (1937) laid the groundwork for this analytical scheme. 
He pinpointed four fundamental ways in which tasks may be distributed 
horizontally among units (or organizations), namely according to territory, 
purpose, function (process), or clientele. Concerns and priority will accordingly be 
given based on a distinctive geographical area (such as a municipality, region or 
nation-state), a specific sector or policy area (such as environment or health), a 
specified function (such as human resources or legal affairs) or a specific group of 
people (such as senior citizens or people with disabilities). A central premise here 
is the link between horizontal specialization and coordination: areas that are 
encompassed by the same organizational context are more likely to be coordinated.  
 
Subsequently, vertical specialization outlines how tasks and responsibilities are 
allocated across the hierarchy. It is useful to distinguish between intra- and inter-
organizational vertical specialization where the former describes the formal 
relationship between different individuals within an organization (positions, rank) 
and the latter refers to formal relationships between different organizations (such 
as national ministries with subordinate agencies). Vertical specialization bears 




whether coordination should be collegial (discussion, voting, consensus) or 
hierarchical (command). It may also determine extent of hierarchical (e.g. 
political) control by linking some organizations more tightly, for instance, through 
mergers or boundary spanning units and positions. Conversely, organizations may 
become more decoupled and autonomous by organizing them at distance from the 
hierarchical centre. Additionally, what position an individual holds affects their 
concerns and considerations. Those at the top, for example, tend to hold a more 
general view and accentuate the bigger picture while lower ranked individuals 
have a more local outlook (Aberbach et al. 1981; Christensen and Lægreid 2009).  
 
Thirdly, organizational affiliation refers to different organizational engagements. 
A ‘primary affiliation’ is the organization in which an individual is expected to be 
full-time engaged, whereas ‘secondary affiliations’ are various part-time 
commitments such as committees, advisory boards or expert panels. Though it is 
generally established that the primary affiliation influences decision-making 
behaviour more vigorously (March 1994), secondary structures still expose 
individuals to alternative problems, ideas, and solutions that may merge with - or 
possibly replace - presiding decision-making logics. Finally, size, understood as 
the number of positions, gives indications of an organizations ability to initiate, 
develop, and enforce policies. A general argument is that large organizations have 
a greater capacity to influence public governance processes than smaller 
organizations. A frequent applied indicator of size is organizational duplication 
and overlap (Landau 1969). 
 
Organizational structure is applied as an independent variable in all three articles. 
Pertaining to cross-level administrative integration specifically, the relevance of 
the four dimensions materialize in distinctive manners: firstly, horizontal 
specialization encourages and enables sector-specific cooperation across territorial 
borders. Secondly, (inter-organizational) vertical specialization has allowed 
national agencies to decouple from their parent ministries and recouple into 
supranational organizational configurations. Thirdly, secondary affiliations at the 
supranational level, such as committees and agency networks, may influence 
national officials’ decision-making behaviour by adding an additional layer of 
considerations. Finally, the relevance of size is not as clearly emphasized, but may 
concern, for instance, the number and types of positions specifically allocated to 





3.2.2 Organizational demography 
Rooted in the theory of representative bureaucracy (Selden 1997; Meier and 
Capers 2012; Meier and Nigro 1976), organizational demography asks if 
background characteristics, such as ethnicity or education, matter in organizational 
decision-making (Pfeffer 1982; Lægreid and Olsen 1978; 1984). Diverse traditions 
(and contexts) accentuate diverse demographic attributes. For instance, some 
empirical studies conducted in the United States suggest a significant effect of 
ethnicity (Selden 1997; Meier and Capers 2012), while studies aimed at unpacking 
decision-making within the European Union have found little to no effects of 
classical demographic factors such as gender, age or even nationality (Suvarierol 
2008; Trondal et al. 2010). The impact of demographic variables has introduced 
one central controversy in the literature, namely if – and under what conditions – 
the effect of demographic attributes overpower the effect of organizational 
structure and vice versa. Organizational scholars generally view structure as the 
most influential variable and argue that demographical profile is less relevant in 
comparison. An exception here is educational background (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2009; Egeberg and Stigen 2018) and previous work experience (Egeberg 
and Stigen 2018). It is assumed that the impact of education in particular may be 
explained by appertaining tenets that privilege certain factors, variables, and 
consequences. Building on organizational sociology, this has been translated into 
the effects of ‘pre’- and ‘re’-socialization (see also for instance Checkel 2005). 
Socialization usually means that values, norms, and role expectations have become 
internalized (Egeberg 2003: 160). The idea of pre-socialization maintains that, 
when entering an organization, individuals already retain an inherent bias 
emanating from previous socialization experiences (such as education, age or 
nationality). According to the ‘representative’ view, officials’ decision-making 
will not reflect their organizational position, but rather their demographic 
background. Conversely, organizational re-socialization (occurring with 
increasing length service) occurs when individuals internalize the values and 
norms of their organization.      
 
Organizational demography is applied in Article III. For scholarship interested in 
European multi-level administration, education and nationality has been a 
principal subject of scholarly interest. Underpinned by the continuous 




(Suvarierol 2008). At the same time, administrative integration has been catalysed 
by the accumulation of experts (educational backgrounds) from different levels of 
government, resulting in burgeoning epistemic communities transcending 
territorial borders and regimes. 
 
3.2.3 Organizational locus  
While organizational structure and demography mainly rely on cognitive 
processes, locus is the only variable that examines the physical ramifications of 
organizational life. It is important to note that this perspective does not include 
architecture, design, symbolic structures or individual working spaces, but solely 
revolves around the actual location of an organization and whether geographical 
placement matters for decision-making. The idea is that decision-makers’ 
informational basis is not only shaped by the organizational position or 
demographic background, but also by the location in the physical space (Egeberg 
and Trondal 2018). Physical location may assist in separating private and 
professional roles and may also help to separate organizational roles where 
decision-makers hold multiple organizational affiliations (Egeberg 2003). 
Moreover, there appears to be an inverse relationship between distance and degree 
of contact and coordination within government organizations (Egeberg 1994; Hult 
1987; Jacobsen 1989). Two types of contacts are sensitive to physical location: 
first, due to increased cost (time and money), distance may affect formal (face-to-
face) meetings. Second, distance also affects the frequency of informal meetings 
(Egeberg 1994). A study by Egeberg and Trondal (2011b) did not find any 
significant effect of physical location on agency-ministry contact and coordination 
(between government organizations). One explanation here is that agencies located 
in the political center are also located at a distance from their parent ministries, 
which in practice prevents unplanned encounters. Nonetheless, overall 
organizational locus remains less emphasized in the literature (but see Jacobsen, 
forthcoming). Organizational locus is applied as an independent variable in Article 
III.  
 
3.2.4 A note on the relative importance of structure, demography, and site  
In a larger context, the question effectively becomes the extent to which politics 
are driven by routines and administrative structures (organizational structure), 
their environments (organizational demography) and/or their geographical 




organizational scholars generally view structure as the most influential 
independent variable (Christensen and Lægreid 2009; Lægreid and Olsen 1984; 
Scharpf 1977; Stigen 1991; Trondal et al. 2008, see also Egeberg 2003 for a review 
of empirical examples). Notwithstanding, the effect of structure may be 
overshadowed if for instance, the organization is relatively small or if the 
organization is largely fueled by trust rather than rules. It is also likely that high 
degrees of politicization may interfere with structural effects on decision-making 
behaviour. Additionally, the effect of the two remaining variables (demography 
and site) may be amplified under certain conditions. A recurring concern of 
organizational scholarship has thus been to examine what independent variables 
matter most under what conditions (Egeberg and Trondal 2018).  
 
Table 3. Independent variables with dimensions and sub-dimensions 
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For instance, demographical characteristics may matter more if decision-makers 
have substantial room for discretion, i.e. in less rule-driven situations (Cohen et al. 
1972; Weick 1976). Likewise, demography could play a role if there is a strong 
representational linkage (the decision-maker shares the same demographical 
attributes as the group for which they are responsible) (Selden 1997). A third 
scenario may be an organization with a critical mass, for example, if a gender or 
ethnicity is underrepresented. Finally, demography is likely to filter through more 
strongly in situations where there is a societal culture that does not differentiate 
between personal life and impersonal roles (Egeberg and Trondal 2018: 12). In the 
same vein, the effect of location may be amplified if there are limited degrees of 
formalization, making decision-making more likely to be contingent upon frequent 
(formal and informal) encounters. Secondly, in turbulent or urgent situations (such 
as crisis) location is likely to matter more than in everyday ‘low-tempo’ 
governance processes. 
 
3.3 Bridging craft and science: A broader debate on organizational 
theory   
There have been concerns that political science has disengaged from practical 
affairs by excessively focusing on rigor rather than relevance (Densch 2019). It is 
argued that political scientists should not only understand the problem, but also fix 
it. At the heart of this debate lies the question of how we should motivate the study 
of political science: to what extent should it be motivated solely by literature 
(‘pure’ science) and to what extent should it be motivated by societal problems 
(‘instrumental’ science)? Moreover, can these two interests be consolidated, and if 
so, how?  Such questions have been an enduring theme that regularly re-surface 
on the research agenda. For organizational scholarship, this debate has been 
translated into the question of organizational (re-) design (Greenwood and Miller 
2010; March 1965; Lægreid 2018). Asserting that “[…] the pursuit of knowledge 
is not necessarily the enemy of the pursuit of relevance” (Egeberg and Trondal 
2018: 129), this perspective expands the organizational horizon by highlighting 
the design implications of the causal mechanisms at play. Following this, 
organizational theory may be envisioned as proceeding in two consecutive steps 
where the first one is to establish causality, and the second one is to apply causality 









4. Methodology  
 
The aim of a methodology chapter is to establish a clear relationship between 
means (research question) and ends (data and analysis). This includes the broader 
philosophical underpinnings of the research question and the ensuing methods 
employed to assess the theoretical conjectures on which the study is built. 
‘Methods’ describe the tools and techniques applied to conduct the research, while 
‘methodology’ refers to the philosophical infrastructures that underpin and inform 
those tools and techniques (Haverland and Yanow 2012: 402). This chapter is 
organized into three main sections. The first section concerns the methodological 
principles guiding the research. The second section adopts a more pragmatic focus 
accounting for the specific methods and cases that have been applied. Finally, the 
third section critically evaluates and discusses the overall methodological 
approach.  
 
4.1 Methodology and methods of organizational theory 
This section starts by briefly reviewing three main methodological positions of 
social science before describing the ontological and epistemological foundations 
of organizational theory more specifically (section 4.1.1). It is followed by a 
reflection on the research methods implicated by the methodological framework 
(section 4.1.2). 
 
4.1.1 The philosophical underpinnings of organizational theory 
Methodology describes the principles associated with a branch of knowledge and 
constitutes the ontological (the study of being) and the epistemological (the study 
of the nature of knowledge) positions of the researcher. It encapsulates the 
researcher’s worldview, and how it influences the perceived relative importance 
of aspects of reality. A main cleavage has formed between objectivist (positivist) 
and constructivist (interpretivist) positions. The former views reality as existing 
independently of the observer and holds that it therefore can be known objectively. 
The positivist paradigm is thus constructed on a realist ontology and an objective 
epistemological position. In contrast, the interpretivist paradigm assumes that 
reality is not singular and objective but shaped by individuals’ subjective 
experiences. Social realities are thus socially constructed ideas that do not exist as 
independent, objective realities. Accordingly, interpretivism adopts an inter-




constructed (Haverland and Yanow 2012; Marsch and Furlong 2002). A middle 
ground is found in critical realism (Ongaro 2017; Oomsels 2016; Pollitt and 
Bouckhart 2009; Talbot 2010). Bridging the long-standing divisions between 
positivist and constructivist ideas, critical realism is grounded on ‘ontological 
realism’ (reality exists independently) and ‘epistemological relativism’ 
(knowledge is socially produced) (Bashkar 2013; Sorrell 2018). Table 4 
summarizes these three main philosophies of science. 
 
Table 4. Competing philosophies of social science  







and objective, but in part 
subjectively constructed 
through social interaction) 
Socially constructed 
Epistemology Objective 
(knowledge generated by 
causal relationships) 
Objective/inter-subjective 
(objective knowledge can 
expand knowledge, but 
knowledge cannot be 
separated from subjective 




(knowledge created by 
interpreting subjective 
meanings of subjects 
according to their own 




Deductive Deductive/inductive Inductive 






No particular preference, 
depends on research 
question and nature of 
relevant entities. Mixed 
methods encouraged. 
Qualitative methods such 
as ethnography. 
Interpretations of 
language and texts. 
Ambitions Generalisations about 
stable cause-and-effect 
relationships (predict) 
Small and medium-sized 
generalizations applicable 
across a limited number of 
clearly specified contexts 
(explain) 
Local understandings, 






Source: Based on Oomsels (2016); Pollitt and Bouckhart (2009); Sorrell (2018). 
 
Though public administration is characterized by a multitude of theories, methods, 




influenced by the positivist paradigm. Studies anchored in a positivist 
methodological framework are generally geared towards testing theoretical 
propositions by employing deductive logics of inquiry. Theories and hypotheses 
are built on concepts that require precise meanings and definitions. Moreover, 
because the concepts are merely abstractions from the real world, they need to be 
operationalized by translating them into indicators (Haverland and Yanow 2012: 
404). Organizational scholarship largely adheres to this positivist blueprint: it 
assumes that organizational factors exist independently of the observer (realist 
ontology) and that knowledge can be obtained by testing causal relationships 
(objectivist epistemology) through either quantitative or qualitative methods. By 
his own account, Herbert Simon was a heavily influenced by logical positivism 
(Simon 1991;1947). Positivistic principles have continued to undergird 
organizational research as seen in the works of Egeberg (2003; 2006). At the same 
time, organizational (and institutional) scholarship generally accept the critical 
realist argument that reality in part is also subjectively constructed through social 
interaction. Evident in, for instance, the idea of logic of appropriateness (March 
and Olsen 1989), though the external reality of an organization is embedded in 
objective (observable) structures, the social structures are continuously 
interpreted, reformulated and reshaped through social interactions. Hence, 
institutions partly exist also by the virtue of inter-subjective mechanisms (Ackroyd 
2009). It follows that we expect actors’ interpretations of these social structures to 
affect outcomes. In order to understand institutions, we thus need to identify and 
understand both the ‘external’ reality as well as the social construction of that 
reality (Marsch and Furlong 2002: 31). Inferred then is an understanding of 
organizations informed by objective measures and positivistic research, but not 
completely separated from the subjective worldviews held by the respondents or 
the researcher (see also Oomsels 2016). 
 
4.1.2 Researching administrative integration in a positivist methodological 
tradition  
Though positioned in the positivist-critical realist intersection, organizational/ 
institutional scholarship has primarily drawn on positivist research methods. 
Positivist methodology is populated by quantitative and qualitative research 




integration23 have principally been characterized by large-n studies (e.g. Bach et 
al. 2015; Egeberg and Trondal 2009b; 2011a; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2011) and 
case studies24 (e.g. Busuioc 2016; Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014; Martens 2010; 
Vestlund 2015) that seek to establish causal relationships between dependent and 
independent variables. 
 
As noted in the introduction, the governance process is the overarching dependent 
variable of public administration scholarship. Different PA perspectives have in 
turn emphasized different aspects of this process. For instance, literature on 
networks may ask to what extent they contribute to democratic governance 
(Sørensen and Torfing 2016), while scholars interested in reforms and changing 
administrative doctrines may ask what consequences such changes entail for 
various public sector processes (Lægreid and Verhoest 2010). By the same token, 
studies along the lines of MLA25 ask what difference organizational and 
institutional factors (independent variables) make in processes of administrative 
integration (dependent variable). Administrative integration has been 
operationalized in different ways. Broadly speaking, three main clusters of 
indicators can be identified (table 4). The majority of studies have perceived 
administrative integration as processes of coordination and cooperation between 
different administrative entities at the national and supranational level. March 
(1991: 143, quoted in Martens 2010: 7) notes “[w]e imagine a world consisting of 
set of parts. At least integration is gauged by some measure of the density, intensity 
and character of the elements of that set” (see also Olsen 2007: 96 and Egeberg 
2005). A second group of studies examine administrative integration through the 
lens of institutional autonomy. A predominant interest in this regard is the de facto 
independence of national regulatory agencies. Finally, a third group of studies 
perceive administrative integration as an instigator of changes or shifts in personal 
attitudes, role perceptions and loyalties. This is sometimes also conceived as so-
called ‘behavioural logics’ (see for instance Trondal et al. 2010). Table 5 
summarizes the three blocks of administrative integration indicators. Moreover, 
the three articles comprising this thesis each apply a different indicator (see table 
1). 
                                               
 
23 ‘Administrative integration’ in this context denotes a broad understanding of studies that discuss 
aspects and interlinkages between national and supranational public institutions.  
24 Limited to references mentioned in section 2.2 





Table 5. Three indicators of administrative integration 









Patterns of coordination, cooperation 
and conflict between various 
administrative entities (within and 
between levels of government) 
Bach et al. 2016; Busuioc 2016; 
Egeberg and Trondal 2009b; Egeberg 
and Trondal 2015; Heidbreder 2015. 
Lægreid et al. 2004; Martens 2010; 
Mastenbroek and Princen 2010; 
Ruffing 2017; Sverdrup 2000; Trein 
and Magetti 2019; Vestlund 2015.  
Autonomy vis-à-vis other 
administrative entities (within and 
between levels of government) 
Bach and Ruffing 2013; Danielsen and 
Yesilkagit 2014; Magetti 2007; 
Yesilkagit 2011. 
 Variation in attitudes, role 
perceptions, loyalties and identities  
 
 
Beyers and Trondal 2004; Egeberg 
1999a; Egeberg et al. 2003; 
Suvaerierol 2008; Trondal et al .2008; 
Trondal and Veggeland 2003.  
Source: own compilation 
 
4.2 Analyze this! Research design and case 
A research design signifies the methods employed to collect and analyze variables 
deduced from the research question. The main source of data in this thesis is 
quantitative questionnaire data from the Central Administration Surveys. 
Additionally, this data has been supplemented by qualitative interview data 
conducted in the Norwegian Communications Authority (Ncom) and the 
Norwegian Medicines Agency (NoMA). The sections below provide further 
information on methods (section 4.2.1) and case selection (4.2.2).  
 
4.2.1 Researching administrative integration through quantitative and 
qualitative methods 
Data has been collected through questionnaires and interviews. The study is 
quantitatively driven with qualitative data supplemented to provide more complex 
answers to the research question. Thus, the questions posed in the semi-structured 
interviews were largely analogous to questions posed in the questionnaire. Both 
methods come with distinct advantages: while quantitative data allows for 
descriptive broadness and generalizability, qualitative data provides depth and 
detail. Combining and integrating data through mixed methods approach 
(Tashakorri and Creswell 2007) provides broadness and depth, and offsets 






Quantitative data collection: surveys 
The Central Administration Surveys are a comprehensive set of studies conducted 
every 10th year among Norwegian agency and ministerial officials. The study was 
introduced in 1976 as part of the Norwegian Power Study (1976-82), led by project 
leader Gudmund Hernes and Johan P. Olsen. A decade later, a similar study was 
conducted under the umbrella of The Norwegian Research Councils priority area 
‘management, organization and governance systems’ (abbreviated ‘LOS’ in 
Norwegian). It was also extended to include national agencies. Equivalent studies 
in 1996 and 2006 were directed by ARENA – Centre for European Studies in 
cooperation with the Departments of Political Science at the University of Oslo 
(UiO) and at the University of Bergen (UiB). Similarly, the 2016 surveys were 
administered by the UiO in cooperation with the University of Agder (UiA) and 
the UiB. Project leaders for the most recent set of studies were Professors Morten 
Egeberg (UiO), Tom Christensen (UiO), Per Lægreid (UiB) and Jarle Trondal 
(UiO/UiA).26 
 
The surveys have stayed identical over the years for comparative purposes, albeit 
with a few necessary adjustments. Participants are asked about their backgrounds, 
careers, contact patterns, perceptions of power, and internationalization. From 
1996 and onwards, the surveys also included a section on European integration. 
The objective of this specific inquiry was to scrutinize the extent of involvement 
of European actors and possible implications therein. Over the years, the surveys 
have been distributed to every ministerial official and every third agency official. 
The first agency survey in 1986 set the standard by randomly selecting one third 
of agency officials. Initially, this decision was made due to the comprehensive 
number of employees and from that point forward it was maintained to ensure 
consistency. Additional selection criteria for the respondents are (i) a-level 
positions27 and (ii) minimum of one year’s experience in the ministry or agency 
                                               
 
26 I contributed to data collection in the 2016-surveys. Access to the data was granted by the project 
leaders.  
27 A-level in this context is applied to describe positions that usually require a university degree. Over the 
years, these positions have been labelled differently, however, the key characteristic should be some 




(see also Christensen et al. 2018: 23-24). Surveys were only distributed to 
employees in agency headquarters.   
 
Compared to similar studies, response rates have been high during the past 
decades. However, as indicated in table 5, responds rates have dropped steadily 
from 72 percent from 1976-1996 to 60 percent in 2016. Prior to 2006, the surveys 
were distributed by postal mail, whereas in 2006 and 2016 they were conducted 
electronically. Likely causes of decreasing response rates are linked to change in 
survey technology as well as general fatigue amongst respondents towards 
surveys. The latter is also illustrated through systematic increase in ‘missing 
values’ towards the end of the survey (Egeberg and Stigen 2018). Nonetheless, 
‘missing values’ are not associated with particular characteristics of the 
respondents (Bjurstrøm 2017) and is hence not likely to significantly distort the 
representativeness of the survey. All data is made available at the Norwegian 
Centre for Research Data (NSD).28  
 
Table 6. Response rates, the Central Administration Surveys 1972-2016 
 Ministries Agencies 




























7662 69 5511 63 
Source: Christensen et al. (2018: 24) 
 
The articles included in this thesis have been limited to include only those officials 
who report being affected to the EU/EEA/Schengen to a “small extent” or more.29  
 
Qualitative data collection: interviews 
The survey dataset was triangulated with the help of 11 semi-structured interviews 
conducted in two Norwegian agencies in 2019. All interviews were conducted in- 
person. Additional data was collected to corroborate patterns observed in the 
quantitative dataset as well as for a greater in-depth understanding of the inner 
                                               
 
28 See https://nsd.no/polsys/forvaltning/sentraladmsurvey.html 
29 Original question: “To what extent is your policy-field affected by EU/EEA/Schengen?” Articles apply 
variable 1-4 on the following five-point scale (1) To a very large extent (2) To a large extent (3) 




workings of government agencies. The interviews are thus intended to be a 
supplement to the main dataset. The selection criteria of interviewees mirror those 
of the survey data, that is: (i) a-level officials, (ii) minimum one year of experience 
in the agency and (iii) involvement in preparing, implementing and/or practicing 
EU legislation. The table below summarizes the respondent sample.  
 
Table 7. Informants, Norwegian Communications Authority, and Norwegian 
Medicines Agency 
Informant Agency Position* Date Place Processed 
A Ncom Senior adviser Dec 2018 Lillesand, NO Transcribed 
B Ncom Special adviser Jan 2019 Lillesand, NO Transcribed 
C Ncom Senior adviser Feb 2019 Kristiansand, NO Transcribed 
D Ncom Senior adviser Jan 2019 Lillesand, NO Transcribed 
E NoMA Senior adviser Feb 2019 Oslo, NO Transcribed 
F NoMA Senior adviser Feb 2019 Oslo, NO Transcribed 
G NoMA Senior adviser Feb 2019 Oslo, NO Transcribed 
H NoMA Senior adviser Feb 2019 Oslo, NO Transcribed 
I NoMA Senior adviser Feb 2019 Oslo, NO Transcribed 
J NoMA Senior adviser Feb 2019 Oslo, NO Transcribed 
K NoMA Senior adviser Feb 2019 Oslo, NO Transcribed 
* Senior adviser or equivalent   
 
4.2.2 Case selection 
Three cases have been employed in total: the Norwegian central administration 
(comprising all agencies and ministries) constitutes the empirical basis of the 
quantitative database, while the qualitative database consists of two Norwegian 
agencies (Ncom and NoMA). This section outlines the main characteristics of the 
three cases as well as reasons for selecting them.  
 
The Norwegian Central Administration 
The Norwegian central administration is comprised of core-executive ministries 
(currently 16)30 and subordinate agencies and other administrative bodies 
(currently approximately 60).31 The latter is subjected to political control and 
administrative accountability from the responsible minister and not primarily from 
a government collegium. Similar to the Commission and EU agencies, the 
Norwegian central administration is organized according to the principles of 
purpose and function (see Gulick 1937). Whereas the ministries function as 
secretariats for the political leadership with planning and coordinating functions 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2009), the agencies are mainly responsible for advising 
                                               
 
30 Includes 14 sector ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Prime Minister’s Office 
(PMO). See https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dep/id933/ for full list.  




the ministries as well as preparing, implementing, and administrating policies.32 
The ministries are led by the responsible minister (temporary position), while the 
agencies are led by a director-general (permanent position). The total number of 
employees within the central administration33 was approximately 22 800 in 2018, 
of which 4500 were employed in the ministries and 18 300 were employed in the 
agencies (DiFi 2019: 16). Approximately two thirds of the agencies are located in 
Oslo, whereas the remaining third are located elsewhere in Norway.  
 
Christensen et al. (2018:13) list three main motivations for studying central 
administrations: firstly, the central administration (the ministries in particular) are 
the executive nucleus of government activities and are thereby responsible for 
maintaining political order through the steering of society. Secondly, the central 
administration holds significant political influence and power, as seen in, for 
instance, the preparation of policies. Finally, organization and recruitment 
procedures of the central administration are directly linked to efficiency and good 
governance. In a nutshell, a well-functioning public sector is a prerequisite for a 
well-functioning society. Exploring how the central administration functions—and 
the attendant circumstances and consequences—better equips us to both improve 
but also to build resiliency in the face of internal and external pressures. Selecting 
the central administration as a case provides unique insights into how 
supranational institutions affect the whole government apparatus. This allows for 
theoretical and empirical conclusions valid across sectors and policy areas. 
Norway’s status as an integrated third country provides ancillary empirical 
motivation to apply data from the central administration as it tests the effects of 
administrative integration beyond the territorial boundaries of the EU. 
 
The Norwegian Communications Authority (Ncom) 
The Norwegian Communications authority is a semi-autonomous agency under 
the Ministry of Local Government and Modernization. Ncom supervises providers 
of “[…] post and telecommunications services, manages frequencies and 
numbering resources, investigates ex ante competition problems in the electronic 
communications markets and makes decisions pursuant to the Electronic 
                                               
 
32 See also https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/statlig-forvaltning/forvaltningsutvikling/hva-er-
statsforvaltningen/id2397949/ 




Communications Act and the Norwegian Postal Services Act. Ncom also manages 
the duty of confidentiality in electronic communications and works on security and 
readiness” (Ncom 2019a). The agency has approximately 160 employees, of which 
140 are located at their headquarters in Lillesand, Norway.34 The agency is 
organized into five departments with subordinate units (figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Organizational chart, Norwegian Communications Authority 
(2019) 
 
Source: Ncom (2019b) 
 
Ncom was selected as a case study due to its frequent and extensive involvement 
in various EEA/EU-related institutions. Information on frequencies and forms of 
supranational cooperation is accessible through the online calendar (Ncom 2019c). 
Additionally, documents pertaining to supranational cooperation may be 
downloaded from their website (Ncom 2019d). The latter includes a guidance 
document for EEA-related tasks, an overview of international – and supranational 
fora in which Ncom participates as well as an overview of EEA-contact persons 
within the agency. A supporting reason for selecting Ncom is a lack of academic 
case studies on EU involvement. Additionally, it was selected due to the 
geographical component, located approximately 300 kilometres outside the 
political centre (Oslo) in Lillesand, Norway.  
 
                                               
 




































The Norwegian Medicines Agency (NoMA) 
The Norwegian Medicines Agency, located in Oslo, is a semi-autonomous agency 
under the Ministry of Health and Care Services. The core mission of NoMA is to 
“[…] evolve and safeguard public and animal health by ensuring efficiency, 
quality and safety of medicines and to administer and enforce the medical devices 
regulation” (NoMA 2019b). NoMA has four areas of responsibility (equivalent to 
departments) with subordinate units (figure 7). The total number of employees is 
approximately 320, including full-time positions allocated to supranational policy-
making.  
 




Source: NoMA (2019a) 
 
NoMa was selected due to its extensive degree of integration into EU regulatory 
networks, as evidenced by Vestlund (2015). NoMA actively participates in all 
seven scientific committees35 in the European Medicines Agency (EMA) (NoMA 
2019c). It is worth noting that the European medicines regulatory cooperation 
pools resources conveyed through routinely interaction and exchange of valuable 
assets such as knowledge, information, practices, and experiences amongst 
                                               
 
35 There are approximately 50 working groups in total under the seven scientific EMA committees. 
NoMA participates in approximately 25 of these.  
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participants. Additionally, there is a routinized division of labour within the 
network where the participants mutually adapt and specialize in different tasks and 
fields of expertise (Vestlund 2017: 63). The benefits of cooperation are also 
emphasized on the NoMA website: “[Through European medicines regulatory] 
cooperation, smaller countries such as Norway may actively contribute with 
expertise […] and influence decision-making. At the same time, this enables us to 
increase own competences by benefitting from the knowledge of others”36 (NoMa 
2019c). 
 
4.3 Evaluation and limitations 
This thesis does not circumvent the general limitations and methodological 
difficulties in social sciences. The standard disclaimers apply (for both methods):  
one general limitation is linked to the possibility of self-selection bias. Though this 
may never be completely eliminated, the large number of respondents in the 
quantitative dataset will increase the likelihood of a representative sample. The 
qualitative dataset is not equally robust. There is a relatively low number of 
interviewees (Article III) in this thesis, however, combining datasets and 
comparing results partly compensates for this limitation. Furthermore, respondents 
may also provide answers that present themselves in a favourable manner, or they 
may provide inaccurate answers due to boredom, a lack of time and/or memory.37  
The former may be partly tackled by introducing proxies; a strategy that was 
necessarily adopted in both datasets. The use of proxies implies masking the 
original interest by framing questions in a more accessible and/or neutral manner. 
For instance, in order to unveil how influential another institution may be in a 
decision-making process, one may inquire on various indicators such as 
type/frequency of contact or weight assigned to different external steering signals.   
 
On a broader note, a researcher should acknowledge that there is an imminent 
potential of spurious correlations (Elster 1999). To some extent, this may be 
counteracted through a theoretically sound argument coupled with carefully 
                                               
 
36 Author’s own translation. Original quote: «Legemiddelsamarbeidet gjør at små land som Norge kan 
bidra med mye kunnskap og stille viktige spørsmål, og dermed påvirke beslutningen. Samtidig øker vår 
egen kompetanse på legemidler ved at vi drar nytte av andres kunnskap, som også er helt nødvendig for 
den nasjonale legemiddelforvaltningen.» 
37 This is difficult to control for, yet an analysis of missing values did indicate some degree of fatigue as 
the survey progressed (Bjurstrøm 2017). The missing values did not appear to be related to particular 




selected control variables. Moreover, qualitative research methods are particularly 
sensitive to personal dynamics in that the interviewer may subconsciously 
influence the interviewee (‘interviewer effects’). A conscious interviewer should 
thus strive to standardize the interview process through a systematic approach that 
includes nondirective probing as well as to refrain from interpreting, paraphrasing 
or interfering in respondent opinion or behaviour (Kreuter 2011).  There are also 
pragmatic limitations tied to amount of time and resources applied to conduct data 
collection. Access, arrangements, and completion of both questionnaire data and 
semi-structured interviews for this thesis required a significant amount of time and 
effort. Survey data was collected in cooperation with other researchers as well as 
NSD, while the latter was conducted independently.  
 
Secondly, this study needs to be seen in light of case-specific limitations. Firstly, 
as regards the questionnaire data that forms the qualitative base of the study, two 
main shortcomings need to be addressed: (i) the survey questions were 
predetermined and fixed to fit into the larger set of surveys. In effect, this means 
the research was adapted to the data rather than the data to the research. 
Consequently, room for expansion and/or inclusion of new, innovative variables 
was limited. For instance, the agency surveys included more EU-related questions 
than the ministry surveys which impinged on the possibilities to analyze the EU 
effect in the ministries as well as comparisons between agencies and ministries 
(however, Article I does inquiry on variables at the ministerial level). In general, 
the questions (variables) were designed with a view to classic organizational 
variables. This fits well into the frame of the thesis, but simultaneously restricts 
the possibility for pursuing alternative variables and/or theoretical avenues. As 
pointed to earlier, the rationale for employing such a rigorous scheme is primarily 
linked to comparability across time. Effectively, the survey also needs to sustain 
the balance between different research interests and origins. (ii) In addition to 
national-level data, data from European-level institutions would have been a 
valuable source of information. This would have allowed for broader insights and 
more robust conclusion on the reciprocal effects. The thesis, and Article I in 
particular, could have benefitted from, for instance, linking variables at different 
levels of government. Secondly, there are also drawbacks associated with the 
qualitative dataset. As mentioned, the sample size should ideally be larger (in 
particular in Ncom). It can also be argued that it could be more diverse given that 




For example, more agencies could have been included, such as agencies not as 
closely linked to the EU. 
 
Despite the methodological limitations, the thesis benefits from a comprehensive 
large-N dataset and semi-structured interviews that overall provide unique insights 


































5. Main findings and analysis 
 
This section introduces the three articles that constitute this thesis. It proceeds to 
discuss the implications of these articles and draws some main conclusions with a 
view to the research question posed in section 1.2.  
 
5.1 Article 1. European integration and the administrative state. A 
longitudinal study on self-reinforcing administrative bias 
The first article is motivated by an interest in how and to what extent ministerial 
decision-making is affected by supranational institutions. Drawing on one of the 
core assumptions of MLA, the study examines how the EU-effect is mediated by 
organizational variables at the national level. The empirical focus is therefore 
centred on the intersection of levels: what happens when one level of government 
‘meets’ the other, and how can organizational variables contribute to explain 
variation on such processes? The study also benefits from three comparable 
datasets (1996-2006-2016), which allows for robust conclusions over time. 
 
Methodologically, the study applies data from the ministries (N=3562) that is 
statistically analyzed primarily through frequency distributions and bivariate 
correlations. The thesis takes advantage of an array of variable types to 
operationalize administrative integration, most of which are linked to 
cooperation/coordination. In addition, the study also examines 
preferences/loyalties in case of conflict. Organization structure (organizational 
specialization and organizational affiliation) is employed as an independent 
variable.  
 
Article I demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing administrative 
bias due to domestic-level organizational factors. It suggests that strong European 
integration without membership strengthens a politico-administrative gap that 
expands over time. This therefore demonstrates that horizontal organizational 
fragmentation (arising in consequence of organization according to the sector 
principle), along with vertical organizational specialization, effectively reduces 
national political control. From this it may be inferred that the EU contributes to 
fortify the administrative state through strong unintended assimilation effects. The 




serve two authorities. Two main conclusions are drawn from the study: 
theoretically, Article I reaffirms the role of organization in explaining and 
understanding processes of political order formation and conservation. 
Empirically, it demonstrates that national ministries are also firmly nested within 
the European administrative order.   
 
5.2 Article 2. Secondary, but not second-tier: The differentiated impact 
of organizational affiliations 
The motivation for this study is to ‘unpack’ organizational affiliation (more 
precisely secondary structures) and examine its effect on actor-level identities. In 
organization studies, organizational affiliation has predominantly resided in the 
shadow of horizontal/vertical specialization and has received limited scholarly 
attention.  
 
Two main questions underpin this article: First, what is the effect of secondary 
structures on actor-level identity? Organizational scholarship assumes that 
decision-making is informed by the experiences an individual accumulates from 
participating in organizational platforms. However, less is known about the extent 
to which individuals attach - and integrate - secondary affiliations in their daily 
operations. Article II argues that identity is a strong indicator of internalization of 
values. Thus, understanding identities provide a better understanding of which 
institutions ultimately affect decision-making.  
 
Secondly, what accounts for the differentiated effects of secondary institutions? In 
light of the overarching agenda of the thesis, Article II contrasts both national- and 
supranational secondary structures. It assumes that secondary structures matter, 
and that officials participating in such structures at the supranational level are more 
likely to be biased towards the supranational level as compared to equivalent 
structures at the national level. The study introduces a focus on loosely coupled 
structures that provide organized ambiguities to the actors (national officials), as 
an explanatory factor for the differentiated impact of secondary structures. It also 
draws on established assumptions on horizontal compatibility. The study benefits 
from a large-N study (N=1963) of officials from 45 government agencies. The data 






Article II finds that administrative integration across levels of governance induces 
changes of identity among national officials. Moreover, it recognizes the 
differentiated effects of secondary structures and argues that organizational 
scholarship would benefit from escaping the current ‘tyranny of dichotomies’ by 
adopting a more diverse understanding of organizational affiliations. Two main 
implications are drawn from the study: First, decision-making behaviour may be 
substantively influenced by supranational-level institutions. It is likely that 
institutions that create a deeper imprint on identities are also more influential in 
general, particularly in ambiguous and vague decision-making situations. Second, 
it demonstrates the profound effects of EU-level institutions and administrative 
integration more generally.  
 
5.3 Article 3. Institutional overlaps and agency autonomy: Examining 
ministerial influence on national agencies’ EU affairs 
While Article I examined how the EU influence ‘enters’ at the ‘intersection’ 
between levels, and Article II examined how it ‘enters’ through secondary 
structures at the supranational level, Article III closely examines how inter-
organizational relationships at the national level may influence the ‘EU-effect’. 
Specifically, it asks what factors affect ministerial control over agency’s practicing 
of EU-related tasks, i.e., what extent do overlaps in public administration matter 
for agency autonomy? Inspired by studies documenting the effect of organizational 
duplication (see section 3.2), the article outlines three variables that have survived 
controlled tests in previous studies, and explores if they are able to account for 
variation in agency autonomy when handling EU legislative acts. These variables 
are based on different theoretical ideas: autonomy deriving from structural factors 
(organizational structure), autonomy deriving from demographic variables 
(organizational demography), and finally, autonomy related to physical distance 
(organizational locus).  
 
Article III argues that ‘institutional overlaps’ increase the likelihood of ministerial 
control over agencies. Drawing on a large-N study (total N=1031) conducted in 
2016, three such overlaps are tested: organizational overlap between ministries and 
agencies (similar units and divisions), demographic overlap (similar expertise), 
and geographical overlaps (same location). Control variables include participation 




policy field. The study is supplemented with qualitative interview data collected 
in two Norwegian agencies (N=11).  
 
The study reaffirms the explanatory value of organizational overlap but does not 
show any significant effects of demographic or geographical overlap. 
Interestingly, the strongest effect relates to participation in secondary structures at 
the ministerial level (control variable). It also shows a significant effect of 
politicization (control variable). These patterns are observed both in the 
quantitative and qualitative dataset. Additionally, the latter gives nuance to some 
observations drawn from the former, most notably it brings attention to the 
reciprocal effects of organizational duplication. Hence, overlap of capacity implies 
a potential for top-down influence, however, this presupposes that the ministry has 
a relatively clear agenda or ambition. Instead, Article III suggests that 
organizational duplication encourages mutual discussions and consultation, where 
the agencies are often also instrumental in providing recommendations to the 
ministries.  
 
5.4 Connecting the dots  
A question remains at the heart of this inquiry: what are the overall conclusions 
and lessons drawn here? In this section, the three articles are evaluated conjointly 
with a view to the overarching research questions. The research questions 
examined throughout were (i) how do organizational factor affect governance 
processes, and (ii) how do supranational institutions influence decision-making 
processes within domestic public administrations? The discussion will be 
sequenced accordingly. Therefore, section 5.4.1 mainly speaks to the theoretical 
observations. The key question addressed in this section is what difference do 
organizational variables make in the governance process generally, and in 
processes of administrative integration more specifically? Section 5.4.2 addresses 
the empirical implications. This section reiterates empirical observations with 
special reference to the case of affiliated third countries (such as Norway) in a 
European political order.  
 
5.4.1 Organized interconnectedness: how organization affects public 
governance 
This thesis aimed to add to the existing literature on organization theory. 




outlining a set of causal relationships. Consequently, organization theory can also 
be applied to design processes of public governance. It follows that the more 
knowledge gained on causal relationships between organizational variables and 
governance processes, the better equipped one is to design desired policy 
outcomes. This responds to calls for a ‘re-discovery’ of political science as a 
practical discipline by accentuating its applied potential while at the same time 
safeguarding long-term ‘pure’ scientific ambitions.  
 
All three papers choose different dimensions of organizational structure as 
independent variables. Three main conclusions can be highlighted in this regard:  
Firstly, the domestic organization of public governance (horizontal/vertical 
specialization) biases how the fourth level of government is received and 
integrated (Egeberg 1980). Moreover, these effects appear to expand over time. 
Two observations stand out: (i) Horizontal specialization contributes to cement 
sectoral cleavages over time. This is evidenced in Article I primarily through the 
notable difference in patterns of administrative integration between sector 
ministries (organization according to purpose) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(organization according to territory) as well as patterns of inter- and intra-
ministerial coordination. Article II also alludes to the importance of horizontal 
specialization by demonstrating its impact on actor-level identities. (ii) Intra-
organizational vertical specialization compiles EU expertise among lower ranked 
officials. Lower ranked officials in the ministries consistently report higher 
degrees of involvement in EU-related work (Article I). This indicates increased 
differentiation of competences as well as the continued emergence of specialized 
‘eurocrats’ within the ministries (see also Geuijen et al. 2008). These observations 
run parallel to observations on inter-organizational vertical specialization where 
agencies are seen as the EU-experts vis-à-vis their parent ministries. Vertical 
specialization contributes to increase the gap between the distribution of 
competences (specialized vs. generalized). The thesis thus aligns with previous 
literature that emphasizes the importance of domestic organizational variables and 
adds to these observations by highlighting the self-reinforcing properties of 
organizational specialization. Aside from locking in modes of operation, Article II 
supports the assumption that another effect of specialization appears to be shifts or 
additional layers of allegiances. Consequently, it may be inferred that 
specialization and loose coupling of structures that encourage and facilitate an 




observation because it illustrates how ‘Europe’ permeates national domestic 
administration through a series of interconnected processes. Moreover, it 
illustrates synergistic effects created by different organizational variables.  
 
Second, a general observation made in both Article II and III concerns the 
significance of secondary organizational affiliations. Both articles suggest that 
these structures are important sources of decision-making premises. As shown in 
Article II, secondary structures at the supranational level strongly impact on 
identities of national officials. Moreover, these effects appear to be stronger than 
those observed at equivalent structures at the national level. It is suggested that 
officials develop a stronger attachment to secondary structures at the supranational 
level because matching competences, and moreover, because these structures are 
more loosely coupled to the primary organizational affiliation. More specifically, 
it is argued that participation in secondary structures at the supranational level are 
not as strongly ‘filtered’ by primary institutions. Consequently, secondary 
structures at the supranational level are arguably in a better position to influence 
national officials. Similar ideas have been outlined in literature on epistemic 
communities (Haas 1992), studies of loose and ambiguous structures (Cohen et al. 
1972; Weick 1976) as well as literature on competing behavioural logics (Trondal 
et al. 2010). Governance through secondary structures reinforces the 
administrative bias and hence sustains the ‘administrative state’ by facilitating 
sectoral hubs transcending national borders. Additionally, it permits a greater 
diversity of behavioural logics within domestic public institutions. This 
observation underscores the differentiated effects of secondary structures. It is 
moreover suggested that to account for the effect of organizational affiliations, 
organizational scholarship would benefit from adopting a more diversified 
understanding of organizational affiliations. Against the empirical backdrop of 
domestic inter-organizational relations (ministry-agency), an observation made in 
Article III indicates that secondary structures under some circumstances may also 
be used as tools to keep subordinate units ‘on a leash’. This effectively implies that 
secondary platforms (such as advisory boards), that include officials from 
subordinate units, provide parent institutions with an alternative path to gain 
influence (than for instance an increase in administrative capacities to control and 
monitor subordinate agencies). In sum, secondary affiliations have two chief 
implications: (i) Officials adopt a more diverse set of allegiances and loyalties. The 




characteristics. (ii) Secondary structures may be utilized as a strategic tool to 
control and integrate the subunits into larger organizational configurations. 
 
Third, Article III suggests a causal link between organizational capacity and inter-
organizational coordination and, potentially, control. Organizational capacity in 
this context signifies overlapping administrative capacities in ministries and 
agencies (similar positions, units or departments), but it is likely that these 
observations hold true also for other organizational constellations. An important 
caveat relates to the latent assumption that more capacity equals more control. 
Based on Article III, capacity appears to be linked to cooperation rather than 
control. This is likely to be contingent on the ministerial agenda: if there are no 
political incentives to forge an independent agenda in the ministries, the agencies 
have considerable room to influence their parent ministry. In sum, Article III 
shows that (i) organizational duplication (sufficient administrative capacity in the 
ministries) increases coordination and interaction between agencies and ministries. 
(ii) This implies that it is a potential design instrument for organizations to 
influence subordinate units. (iii) At the same time, it also allows subordinate units 
to provide input to their parent institution. Moreover, an additional effect appeared 
to be parallel occurrences of informal contact patterns between agency and 
ministry officials.   
 
In sum, the thesis suggests that organizational structure is a significant explanatory 
variable for decision-making behaviour. The study did not find any effects of 
organizational demography or organizational locus. This may, however, be due to 
the research design more than to the explanatory effect of the variables in general. 
Some interrelated observations should be noted: Implicitly, Article II does suggest 
an effect of demography by demonstrating horizontal compatibility grounded in 
educational and professional backgrounds. As illustrated, secondary structures at 
the supranational level are analogous to the demography perspective precisely 
because of the implicit demographical component (education). Although Article 
III could not establish any demographic effect, this thesis does suggest that 
different forms of demographics overlaps - primarily in terms of educational and 
professional backgrounds (expertise) - play a significant role in actively sustaining 
and amplifying the ‘administrative state’. Pooling expertise, both within an across 
levels of government, is an inherent consequence of horizontal specialization. 




specific policy sub-systems with an ensuing set of values, perceptions, and codes 
of conduct.  
 
Supporting previous observations (Egeberg and Trondal 2011), the study did not 
find any effect of organizational locus for ministry-agency relations. However, 
given that the ministry-agency relationship represents one of the strongest inter-
organizational relationships of public governance, this observation is hardly 
surprising. Conversely, Article III did give some indication that location may 
affect relationship to other stakeholder institutions. For instance, it may be the case 
that cultivating relationships to the ministry comes at the cost of cooperation with 
other agencies or industries that hold a more peripheral role. However, based solely 
on this study, no solid conclusion may be drawn on the effects of organizational 
locus.  
 
5.4.2 Multi-level interconnectedness: domestic administrations in a European 
political order 
This study examined the administrative dimension of political orders with special 
reference to European integration. Table 8 shows a small, but steady overall 
increase in officials who report being affected by EU/EEA/Schengen-related 
matters. From 1996 to 2016, the number of ministerial officials who reported being 
affected to a very large or large extent increased from 23 to 26 percent (3 percent 
increase), while equivalent numbers for agency officials shows a 12 percent 
increase in the same time period. This indicates a substantial increase in actual 
numbers given that there are approximately three times as many agency officials 
than ministerial officials. Moreover, it implies currently that approximately one 
third of the central administration is significantly affected by supranational 
institutions. Correspondingly, the data also shows an overall decrease in officials 
that report not being affected: in 2016 one fifth of ministerial officials, and one 










Table 8. Percentage of officials who report being affected by 
EU/EEA/Schengen-related matters, 1996-2016. * 
 Ministry officials Agency officials 
 1996 2006 2016 1996 2006 2016 
To a very large extent 11 13 14 9 18 21 
To a large extent 12 12 12 12 13 12 
To some extent 23 18 23 22 17 20 
To a fairly small 
extent 
27 21 31 23 15 22 
Not affected 27 37 20 34 37 25 












*Missing values not included. 
 
This thesis posed the question of how and with what consequences do 
supranational institutions affect national civil servants. It is important to note that 
European integration of the ‘administrative state’ does not run counter to the 
stronghold or persistence of the nation-state. The three articles illustrate that the 
nation-state continues to hold a relatively firm grip on the national administration. 
For instance, table 8 in Article I shows that ministerial officials deem primary 
structures at the national level significantly more important than secondary 
structures at the supranational level. Similarly, Article II shows that 47 percent of 
agency officials report strong/very strong identification with the central 
administration as a whole, while 21 percent express strong/very strong 
identification at the supranational level. This is corroborated by the qualitative 
dataset applied in Article III in which respondents stress the primary role of 
national authorities. Conceptually expressed as ‘double-hattedness’ (Egeberg 
2006), the supranational level does not replace the national level but rather 
provides additional premises for decision-making likely to blend with, and 
influence, national governance processes and structures. The study shows that 
most ministerial (84 percent) and agency officials (68 percent) are double-hatted 
(illustrated in article I, table 9). Among officials that are ‘single-hatted,’ the data 
shows that agency officials lean slightly more towards the supranational level 
while ministerial officials are more inclined to prioritize national authorities. This 
aligns with the established literature that shows the national orientation of 
ministerial officials (due to structural proximity to political leadership). For the 
same reason, however, the number of ‘double-hatted’ officials in the ministries is 




shows politicized policy areas spark stricter controls and steering from national 
authorities.  
 
At the same time, national officials are strongly influenced by the supranational 
institutions. Public governance structures largely favour expertise over territory 
leading to evolution and consolidation of the ‘administrative state’ both within, 
and in particular, across levels of government. As suggested by table 8, the 
Norwegian central administration, and in particular agency officials, thereby 
become ever more integrated into the European administrative system. This thesis 
has shown that officials may be influenced by European institutions at three main 
‘intersections’: First, supranational policies and steering signals are received and 
processed by ‘frontline’ institutions (ministries and agencies). Inter- and intra-
organizational coordination mechanisms (including coordination arrangements 
such as coordination committees and political supervision) are important 
checkpoints in processing supranational policies into domestic politics. The thesis 
suggests that horizontal specialization of national ministries greatly influences 
coordination at the national level, i.e. processing of EU policy is largely in the 
hands of the administration while there is relatively little political interference. 
While this is expected to some extent, it raises questions in regards to political 
control over national executive branch of government.  
 
Second, supranational institutions may also influence domestic government 
officials by mobilizing them directly into policy-making process in supranational 
platforms (secondary structures). As evidenced by article II, this appears to have 
significant implications for actor-levels identities and may thus arguably be the 
most significant point of influence. Moreover, this thesis illustrates an overlap 
between participation in various EU-related platforms both at the national and 
supranational level. In a similar vein, observations from the qualitative dataset (not 
reported in the papers) also indicate a significant correlation between participation 
in various supranational and international secondary structures. Echoing 
observations by Vifell (2006) and Geujien et al. (2008), this implies tendencies of 
specialized ‘eurocrats’ or ‘enclaves’ who are tightly integrated in supranational 
(and international) institutions. The data also reveals that in some instances these 
primarily lower-level officials have been given formal positions or responsibilities 
allocated to supranational policy-making. For instance, the qualitative data found 




related matters. Another observation is that these officials are principally tasked 
with ensuring convergence and coherency within their own sector and to a less 
extent between sectors. This pattern is reflected in the overall thesis that finds 
increased levels of sectorization and less coordination between sectors. For 
instance, Article I shows that formal coordination of EU/EEA/Schengen-related 
tasks between ministries appears to have decreased (table 4, Article I).  It follows 
that the central administration displays a growing reliance on sector ministries and 
sector specialists and less dependence on the generalists, such as officials from the 
foreign office, in handling EU/EEA-related tasks.  
 
Third, the influence of EU institutions and policies are biased by inter-
organizational relationships at the national level. Article III testifies that 
overlapping administrative units in agencies and ministries increases the likelihood 
of formal, as well as informal, interactions between these groups. Consequently, 
EU policy may also be indirectly influenced through national-level structural 
arrangements. 
 
In short, national officials are tightly integrated and influenced by European 
institutions. However, it is important to note that this does not replace national 
steering, but rather adds another layer to the institutional complexity of national 


















































6. Conclusion and outlooks 
 
Finally, it is worth contemplating some of the big questions that this thesis has 
dealt with: what role does organization play in shaping and sustaining political 
order such as the EU? Is the EU really the nemesis of the nation-state? Does 
administrative convergence across levels of government undermine the contested 
role of statehood? Rather than to withdraw to the trenches, it may be convincingly 
argued that public governance is not hardwired for one type of government only. 
While the political nucleus for the European political order remains confined to 
territorial lines (nation-states), new and border-spanning challenges has led its 
administrative counterpart to increasingly channel attention along sectoral lines 
both within and across levels of government.   
 
This study makes two key contributions: First, it adds to the study of organization 
and to the literature on public administration by drawing attention to the role of 
national administrations in interconnected political orders. A principle feature of 
the ‘administrative state’ has been the pooling of expertise across levels of 
governance, which has led to division of loyalties and interests between a national 
political authority and a supranational sectoral authority. This thesis demonstrates 
that sectoral cleavages are sustained and reinforced over time and that ‘Europe’ 
has subsequently become integral to daily operations in the nation-state’s central 
administration. It appears the more EU-related tasks become routine, the less need 
there is for coordination. The main responsibility for handling EU affairs is largely 
in the hands of specialized ‘eurocrats’ that benefit from considerable flexibility in 
their daily operations. This study also suggests that loose coupling of structures 
across governmental levels may enhance those discretionary powers. By virtue of 
organization, political orders (such as the EU) may thus be seen as two-
dimensional with a political (territorial) and an administrative (sectoral) branch, in 
which the latter follows sectoral logics while the former adheres to territorial 
logics. 
 
Secondly, this thesis offers a public administration approach to the literature on 
European integration and differentiation. As evidenced here, patterns and the 
extent of integration may vary considerably between the political and the executive 
branch of government. They also may function relatively independently from one 




(administrative) connections take on a life of their own. This may hold particularly 
true for affiliated non-members states, such as Norway, that do not have strong 
incentives to coordinate political positions vis-à-vis the EU. This study shows that 
Norwegian officials remain firmly integrated with EU administrative institutions 
and policy processes. Moreover, relatively low degrees of national political 
interference suggest that administrative integration is not subject to political 
accountability. 
 
This work thus highlights the role of administration in developing and sustaining 
political orders by examining the interplay between two levels of government, 
notably the national-supranational nexus. This perspective could be expanded to 
include additional levels of government, such as the local and international level 
(see for instance Gulbrandsen 2012). Future research should therefore look to 
unravel administrative connections and interdependencies across multiple levels 
of government. A possible point of departure in this regard is combining the study 
of IPAs and European integration (see for instance Trondal et al. 2010). As 
mentioned, another promising avenue of future research relates to administrative 
integration in times of crisis and uncertainty (Riddervold et al. 2020). While 
political hardships tend to invoke tendencies toward intergovernmentalism, more 
studies are needed on institutional resilience and adaptation as well as the 
consequences of administrative integration and the national politico-
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Article 1. European integration and the administrative state. A 
longitudinal study on self-reinforcing administrative bias.  
 
Abstract 
The study demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing 
administrative bias due to domestic-level organizational factors. Strong European 
integration without membership reinforces a politico-administrative gap and this 
gap expands over time. The paper applies an extreme case of high integration 
without formal EU membership represented by Norway. The findings suggest that 
the EU contributes to reinforce the administrative state through strong unintended 
assimilation effects. The findings are probed by a novel and comprehensive 
longitudinal data-set consisting of a large-N single case (N= 3562) questionnaire 
study among government officials at three points in the Norwegian central 
administration: 1996, 2006 and 2016. Theoretically, the paper examines the role 
of organizational factors in administrative integration and how the impact of the 
EU is mediated by organizational variables at the national level.  
 
Keywords: Administrative integration; administrative state; central administration; 
Norway; organizational approach  
 
Introduction 
The ‘Administrative State’, originally coined by Dwight Waldo, emphasizes the 
central role of public administration in democratic governance (March and Olsen 
1984: 741; Olsen 2018; Waldo 1947). This paper presents a single case study that 
shows the profound and rising role of public administration in the multilevel 
governing system of the European Union (EU). A recent branch of literature has 
documented an emergent European multilevel administrative system (MLA) 
consisting of strongly interconnected administrative bodies across levels of 
governance (cf. Bauer and Trondal 2015). Administrative capacity-building by 
stealth at the EU-level is seen as challenging administrative autonomy among the 
member-state governments (e.g. Knill and Bauer 2016; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 
2014; Trondal 2010). These studies also suggest how the an organizationally 
heterogeneous EU sends a plethora of differentiated ‘signals’ to the member-states, 
for example how the Council fuels strong member-state coordination and 
perceptions of national preferences whereas the Commission fuels a circumvention 




et al. 2003; Knill 2001; Trondal and Veggeland 2003). This paper makes two 
contributions to this literature:  
 
• Theoretically, it examines the role of organizational factors in 
administrative integration and thus advances an organizational approach to 
public governance (Egeberg and Trondal 2018; Olsen 2018). This 
theoretical approach emphasizes how organizational factors bias 
governance processes. By biasing and nudging actors’ attention towards 
certain problems and solutions, certain policy outcomes become more 
likely than others. Administrative integration, this paper argues, is nudged 
by ‘favorable’ organizational conditions at the domestic level of 
government.  
• Empirically, the paper demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-
reinforcing administrative bias due to domestic-level organizational factors. 
Strong European integration without membership reinforces a politico- 
administrative gap and this gap expands over time. The paper applies an 
extreme case of high integration without formal EU membership rep- 
resented by Norway. The data suggests that the EU contributes to reinforce 
the administrative state through strong unintended assimilation effects. To 
demonstrate how essential parameters of domestic public governance are 
profoundly influenced by the EU even in a non-EU member-state, the paper 
presents a novel longitudinal data-set consisting of a large-N (N = 3562) 
questionnaire study collected among government officials at three points in 
time in the Norwegian central administration: 1996, 2006 and 2016. The 
self-reinforcing administrative bias is illuminated by Norwegian 
government officials. The data shows that the EU is increasingly loosely 
coupled to the political level and that officials are  (surprisingly) and tightly 
interwoven and influenced by EU institutions.  
 
The paper contributes to a ‘public administration turn’ in EU studies (e.g. Bauer 
and Trondal 2015; Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2007). Essential to this turn has been to 
understand the role of administrative actors in political- administrative life of the 
EU (Olsen 2018). The inherent state prerogative of preparing policy-making and 
getting things done has been challenged by the rise of independent and integrated 
administrative capacities at the EU level. The supply of organizational capacities 




enabled an emergent EU-level executive order to act independently of domestic 
government institutions (Egeberg and Trondal 2017). Moreover, organizational 
capacities of EU-level administrative actors supply them with a capacity to 
influence non-majoritarian institutions (agencies) at domestic level (e.g. Egeberg 
2006). This paper shows how the impact of the EU is mediated by organizational 
variables at the national level. Moreover, this study provides novel data from the 
core-executive level of government (ministerial departments), and thereby adds to 
a literature that empirically has been dominated by studies of agencies. 
Methodologically, the empirical probe is “hard” by examining the government 
administration of a formally non-EU-member state – the Norwegian central 
administration. As such, the paper contributes to studies of external differentiation 
of the EU and the external effects of EU norms and rules beyond EU borders (see 
Rittberger and Blauberger 2018). Still, compared to contemporary instances of EU 
external governance, Norway is by far the most strongly integrated EU non-
member through a dense web of institutionalized relations (Egeberg and Trondal 
1999; Fossum and Graver 2018; Lavenex 2011). This affiliated status grants the 
Norwegian central administration privileged access to most parts of the EU 
administration, which in turn paves the way for deep administrative integration. 
Moreover, administrative integration might go even further in affiliated non-
member states than in member states due to their exclusion from political 
representation at EU level. This paper shows how a lack of political representation 
in the Council (and the European Parliament) mobilizes an administrative bias in 
the core-executive of government. Consequently, integration may happen more 
easily by stealth in affiliated states such as Norway – even though the official 
position is not to become a political member (Majone 2005).  
 
The paper is presented as follows: The following section outlines an organizational 
approach to administrative integration beyond membership. The next section 
presents the data-set and methodology succeeded by a presentation and discussion 
of empirical findings. The paper concludes with key findings and some 
suggestions for future research.  
 
An organizational approach to administrative integration 
Public administration is not a technical apparatus or tool in the hands of shifting 
governments. An organizational approach emphasizes that public administration 




grounded on the assumption that internal organizational characteristics of public 
administration may explain how it works and changes. Consequently, 
organizational factors help explaining just how domestic ministries ‘adopt’ the 
influence of the EU – and thus how integration may happen even without formal 
EU membership and affect the pursuit of domestic public governance (Egeberg 
and Trondal 2015; Egeberg et al. 2016; March and Olsen 1989; Olsen 2009: 24; 
Trondal and Bauer 2017).   
 
The literature harbours competing ideas on the extent to which actual decision 
behaviour reflects the organization structure within which actors are embedded – 
such as public choice theories, organizational sociology, and representative 
bureaucracy (see Meier and Capers 2012; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Niskanen 
1971). While some observers ascribe lack of government action to political 
leaders’ lack of will, this paper advocates that political will is profoundly shaped 
endogenously by organizational positions which also enable (and constrain) 
action. This paper follows what Johan Olsen (2018) recently coined the ‘Bergen 
approach’ in political science, emphasizing the organizational dimension of 
politics. An organizational approach posits that organizational factors are not 
merely an expression of symbol politics (Brunsson 1989; Meyer and Rowan 1977) 
but create systematic bias in human behaviour and decision-making processes by 
directing and nudging choice and attention towards certain problems and solutions, 
i.e. making certain outcomes more likely than others (Bækgaard 2010; Gulick 
1937; Hammond 1990; Thaler and Sunstein 2009). Contemporary organization 
theory literature focuses on the explanatory power of organizational factors 
(Egeberg 2012; Egeberg and Trondal 2018). Two reasons are given for focusing 
on organizational structure: First, empirical studies demonstrate the systematic and 
significant effect of organization structure on decision-making behaviour (e.g. 
Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Egeberg et al. 2016; Trondal 2006). Secondly, 
organization structure, compared to other factors that intervene in the policy 
process, is likely to be more prone to deliberate change and may thus be an 
important design instrument in public governance (Egeberg et al. 2016; Thaler and 
Sunstein 2009).  
 
An organization structure is a normative structure composed of rules and roles 
specifying, more or less clearly, who is expected to do what, and how (Scott and 




defines the interests and goals that are to be pursued, delimits types of 
considerations and alternatives that should be treated as relevant, and establishes 
action capacity by assigning certain tasks to certain roles. It influences decision-
making behaviour by providing individuals with a systematic and predictable 
selection of problems, solutions and choice opportunities (March and Olsen 1976). 
Whilst organizational structure does not necessarily predict nor determine actual 
decision-making behaviour, it does make some choices become more likely than 
others (Egeberg and Trondal 2018). This happens by regulating actors’ access to 
decision situations, mobilizing attention to certain problems and solutions, 
structuring patterns of conflict and cooperation (and thus influencing power 
relationships), and enabling coordination and steering along certain dimensions 
rather than others. This entails that organizational factors do not impact directly 
on society; rather, societal consequences can normally only occur via governance 
processes and public policies. Bounded rationality (Simon 1957) is one of three 
key mechanisms that connect role expectations to actual behaviour; organizational 
structure helps simplify actors’ cognitive worlds by directing attention towards a 
selection of possible problems and solutions and ways to connect them. This 
concept holds that decision-makers operate under three limitations: limited 
information about possible solutions and alternatives, limited cognitive capacity to 
evaluate and process information, and limited time to make decisions. 
Consequently, actors opt for a selection of satisfactory alternatives instead of 
optimal ones and often turn to their immediate surroundings and readily available 
data and knowledge to find suitable choices (ibid). The second mechanism, the 
logic of appropriateness, views human action as driven by internalized perceptions 
of what is perceived as appropriate (March and Olsen 1989). Lastly, actors may 
find that rule and role compliance is in accordance with their own self-interest. 
Organizations are thus seen as incentive systems that administer rewards and 
punishments (e.g. Ostrom and Ostrom 2015). In sum, these mechanisms may 
explain why structural characteristics within central administrations bias how the 
EU ‘hits’ domestic government institutions. Essential to this paper is examining 
how different structural characteristics of core-executive institutions matter in this 
respect. Three such structural variables are outlined in the following: horizontal 







Horizontal specialization  
Horizontal specialization refers to how tasks or portfolios are divided horizon- 
tally within and between organizations. Those policy areas that are encompassed 
by the same organizational unit are supposed to be more coordinated than those 
that belong to different units. Luther Gulick (1937) contemplated four fundamental 
principles of horizontal specialization, namely specialization according to (i) 
territory, (ii) sector/purpose, (iii) function/ process and (iv) clientele. He also 
emphasized the mutual relationship between specialization and coordination; 
dossiers that are encompassed by the same organizational unit are more likely to 
be coordinated than those belonging to different units. Accordingly, empirical 
studies show that while an overwhelming majority of officials finds coordination 
to work effectively within their own unit, this holds only for a minority between 
departments (Kassim et al. 2013: 188–89). Therefore, the departmental affiliation 
of various policy units could make a significant difference. In the same vein, 
cleavages of conflict were assumed to reflect these principles of specialization. For 
example, specialization according to purpose is likely to mobilize sectoral lines of 
cooperation and conflict and thereby foster policy consistency within its respected 
field. We thus expect that officials that are embedded in organizations that are 
primarily specialized by purpose would coordinate more strongly within their 
respective policy domains than across domains. In the case of government 
ministries, we thus expected that officials in sector ministries report stronger intra-
ministerial than inter-ministerial coordination. Yet, domestic public administration 
in the EU is part of a larger politico-administrative order. Consequently, 
organizational compatibilities within such an order might matter. Though 
transnational cooperation on issue-specific tasks and practices has existed for 
decades, the EU executive center has emerged as a more challenging actor within 
regulatory networks (e.g. Dehousse 1997; Egeberg and Trondal 2015; Joosen and 
Brandsma 2017; Levi-Faur 2011; Majone 1996). Essentially, the executive center 
at the EU-level, concentrated at the Commission and EU agencies (e.g. Bauer and 
Trondal 2015; Egeberg 2006), is mainly specialized according to purpose (sector) 
and function (process), and hence largely compatible to national central 
administrations. Arguably, organizational compatibility is likely to facilitate 
sectoral allegiances and cooperation across levels of governance. Studies have 
shown that organizations that are specialized according to similar organizational 
principles tend to align more easily across levels of governance than those 




2010). Hence, the effects of organizational principles at one level of governance 
may be conditioned by the degree of organizational compatibility across levels 
(e.g. Cowles et al. 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; March and Olsen 1995). 
Commission DGs and their system of expert committees are largely organized 
similarly as domestic sector ministries (purpose). By contrast domestic ministries 
of foreign affairs (MFA) are mainly specialized according to territory and thus 
organizationally compatible to the core structure of the Council of Ministers 
(Council). This suggests that domestic sector ministries are likely to align with the 
Commission DGs more than with the Council structure. Moreover, the continuous 
expansion of scope and content in the EEA agreement (from 1994 onwards) gives 
reasons to believe this pattern, if anything, has expanded over time. The following 
propositions are derived: 
  
P1: Due to organizational compatibility, officials in sector ministries are more 
likely to interact with the Commission than with other EU institutions.  
 
P2: The coordination of EU-related work is relatively lower between than within 
ministries.  
 
Vertical specialization  
Vertical specialization denotes division of responsibility and labour within and 
between levels of authority. This paper focuses empirically on the effect of 
hierarchy – or vertical specialization – within ministerial departments. Hierarchy 
between organizations provides certain decision inputs, e.g. a more general view 
in hierarchical superior units compared to lower ranked units, that cannot easily be 
achieved through purely horizontal arrangements. Vertical specialization between 
organizations means to modify hierarchy by installing an organizational boundary 
between a superior and a subordinate unit. Agencification, the process whereby 
regulatory tasks are hived off from ministerial departments into semi-independent 
regulatory bodies, is a topical example. The New Public Management (NPM) wave 
that swept across OECD states during the 1980s and -90s made pleas for greater 
autonomy, fragmentation and proliferation of public administration institutions 
and systems. As a result, vertical specialization in the form of structural devolution 
became a major reform trend across Europe (in public administration terms: 
agencification; in organizational terms: inter-organizational vertical 




more degrees of autonomy at both the national and the EU levels (e.g. Bezes et al. 
2013; Lægreid et al. 2010). Hierarchy within ministries – or intra-organizational 
vertical specialization – is measured in this article by official’s rank within their 
respective ministry. Within organizations, it has been demonstrated that leaders 
identify with a larger part of the organization than those at lower levels. Leaders 
also interact more frequently across organizational units and are exposed to 
broader flows of information than their subordinates. Higher ranked staff in both 
ministries and subordinated agencies are more attentive to political signals than 
lower ranked personnel (e.g. Christensen and Lægreid 2009; Egeberg and Sætren 
1999). This implies that leaders are better equipped to take into consideration a 
wider set of goals, alternatives and consequences when making choices (Egeberg 
and Trondal 2018). Studies show that top-ranked staff tend to identify more 
frequently with organizations as wholes than staff located at lower echelons 
(Egeberg and Sætren 1999). Additionally, these officials are exposed to a broader 
range of information than lower level staff and thus may be more attentive to 
broader organizational perspectives than lower ranked personnel (Egeberg and 
Trondal 2018). It follows that government officials with lower ranks are more 
loosely coupled to the political leadership and have a more local perspective on 
task execution compared to higher ranked staff. This has one important 
implication: a relative degree of insulation from political leadership makes lower-
ranked officials more eligible receivers of impulses from EU-level institutions and 
processes. The following proposition is derived:  
 
P3: Ministerial officials at higher ranks are less likely to be strongly involved in 
EU- related work and thereby less likely to interact with EU institutions compared 
to ministerial officials at lower ranks.  
 
Organizational affiliation  
Organizational affiliations consist of primary and secondary structures. A ‘primary 
structure’ is defined as the structure to which participants are expected to devote 
most of their loyalty, time and energy. A typical example would be a bureaucratic 
unit like a ministry. A ‘secondary structure’ is defined as the structure to which 
participants are expected to be part-timers. It follows that secondary structures are 
unlikely to shape actors’ decision behaviour to the same extent as primary 
structures. Secondary structures include collegial bodies, committees and 




of a set of interconnected organizations at different levels of authority. Ministerial 
officials that operate within this frame are likely to be exposed to several 
behavioural premises from their primary and secondary affiliations. Empirical 
studies show that inter-departmental committees, regional councils, and public-
private governing arrangements enhance interaction and coordination, and create 
trust-relationships among the participants, however, the effects are moderate 
(Ansell and Gash 2008; Jacobsen 2015; Lægreid et al. 2016; Stigen 1991). 
Moreover, a logic of primacy suggests that the primary affiliation is likely to affect 
behaviour more extensively than the secondary (March 1994). The following 
propositions are derived:  
 
P4: When taking part in both primary and secondary structures, ministerial 
officials are likely to attend to and emphasize signals from both structures, albeit 
most strongly from primary structures.  
 
P5: When in conflict, ministerial officials are more likely to emphasize signals 
from primary than from secondary affiliations.  
 
Data and methods 
The study benefits from a unique data set on the role of central administration in 
the public governance process. Over the last forty years, a group of Norwegian 
scholars has regularly conducted surveys in the Norwegian central administration 
(1976, 1986, 1996, 2006 and 2016). The data sets include questions about the civil 
servants’ background, careers, contact patterns, priorities, perceptions about 
power, reforms and internationalization. From 1996 the surveys included questions 
about the central administration’s relations with the EU. This article contains data 
from 1996, 2006 and 2016, giving an overall number of respondents of 3562. The 
survey was sent to all officials at the level equivalent to the ‘A-level’ with a 
minimum of one year in office. Appointment at this level usually requires a 
university degree. Hence, the sample of this survey is the total universe of ‘A-
level’ civil servants in Norwegian ministries (see the appendix 1 for an overview 
of ministries included). These surveys represent the most thorough screening of 
the Norwegian central administration, and thus the most comprehensive data-base 
on the effects of European integration on national government administrations (see 
also Geuijen et al. 2008). To allow for comparisons, the questionnaires are kept 




from 1996 was distributed to the respondents by postal mail, the 2006 and 2016 
surveys were conducted as online surveys by the Norwegian Centre for Research 
Data (NSD). All data sets have been stored and made publicly available by NSD. 
The overall response rate is solid and the total response rates have decreased only 
marginally during this 20 years’ period. The drop in response rates from 1996 to 
2016 may only partly stem from a change of survey technology from postal survey 
to online survey. The main explanation for decreasing response rates is a general 
fatigue among respondents towards surveys.  
 
Two caveats should be mentioned: Firstly, studies that rely on respondents own 
behavioural perceptions do not observe directly public governance processes or 
behaviour. Respondents may exaggerate or downplay own role or the role of 
others. Yet, the use of three large-N surveys does, however, substantially increase 
the likelihood of robust conclusions. Moreover, the use of multiple proxies 
increases the validity of measurement. Secondly, the use of cross-sectional data 
may be biased by individual variations in perceptions or that it fails to consider 
concurring factors that may influence outcome. Ideally, in order to draw robust 
conclusions on causal effects, research on developments over time should benefit 
from longitudinal panel data. Nonetheless, this does not mean that cross-sectional 
data cannot provide useful and interesting insights as regards continuity and 
change. 
 
Table 1. Sample size and response rates, by year. 
 1996 2006 2016 
N 1497 1874 2322 
Response rates 72% 67% 60% 
 
 
Administrative integration without membership 
This section demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing 
administrative bias in extreme cases of high integration without membership. Over 
time, this administrative bias shows a self-reinforcing effect: Norwegian officials 
dealing with the EU are increasingly far from the political level and are strongly 
‘Europeanized’ by being tightly interwoven and influenced by EU institutions.  
This partly reflect the dynamic character of the EEA agreement which requires 
Norwegian law to continuously adjust to new EU legislation. The agreement is 




acts have been incorporated into the agreement (Fossum and Graver 2018: 47). 
The agreement covers the Single Market acquis and a number of additional policy 
fields – making it the most extensive form of agreement between the EU and a 
non-member as regards regulatory scope and the legal obligations resulting from 
the contractual relations (Fossum and Graver 2018; Lavenex 2011). At the same 
time, the agreement blocks Norwegian governments qua state from political 
representation in the Council. Nonetheless, whereas Norway’s associated status 
does not grant Norway formal access to EU’s decision-making institutions, it 
provides for administrative participation at various stages of EU’s legislative 
process. Norwegian ministries and agencies are represented in Commission expert 
committees and comitology committees, sit on most EU agencies boards and 
committees, and are entitled to second national experts to the Commission. 
Norwegian civil servants are thus granted privileged access to the EU 
administrative system and are largely responsible for handling everyday 
relationships with EU institutions – in up-stream processes (the agenda setting 
processes) and particularly in down-stream processes (the implementation and 
practicing of EU law). Thus, whereas Norway is politically side-lined in EU 
decision-making processes, the Norwegian national central administration is 
granted favoured access to the EU bureaucratic apparatus, quite similar to that of 
EU member states  
 
The launch of the EEA agreement in 1994 marked the beginning of a new area of 
dense administrative integration between EU institutions and the Norwegian 
central administration. At the time the EEA agreement was viewed as a prelude 
and an interim-period towards full EU membership as the prospects of such were 
both open as well as vigorously pursued by the then-government. However, the 
following rejection of EU membership in a heated national referendum 
reintroduced the EEA agreement as Norway’s foundational connection to the EU 
in the years to come. Additionally, close historical and cultural ties as well as 
common interests in a host of policy areas led to subsequent agreements in areas 
outside the framework of the EEA agreement (Meld. St. 5 (2012–13)). There are 
numerous agreements between the Norway and the EU, with the EEA and 
Schengen being the most encompassing. In effect, while the form of affiliation has 
remained stable during the past 20 years, the scope of the affiliation has undergone 
significant expansion – partly in response to policy progressions in the EU, partly 




Norway signing ever-more sectoral agreements with the EU. In sum, this has 
increased the subsequent likelihood of Norwegian government institutions and 
governance processes being affected by EU-level institutions and processes.  
 
Quite similar to the Commission and EU agencies, the Norwegian central 
administration is organized according to the principles of purpose and function. 
From an organizational perspective, this has two critical implications: it is likely 
to firstly, encourage sectoral allegiances and integration across levels of 
governance, and secondly, to underpin national inter-ministerial fragmentation. 
Moreover, as far as policy harmonization is concerned, the form of affiliation does 
in fact warrant EEA countries the same level of integration as full member states. 
Since Norway is not subjected to political representation in the Council, it has been 
argued that Norwegian sector ministries are likely to be even more strongly ‘hit’ 
by the Commission than member states’ ministries (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; 
Trondal 2002). This assumption, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Like most core executives, the Norwegian central administration is organized into 
core-executive ministries and subordinated agencies. The system is characterized 
by a ministerial primacy where subordinated agencies are subject to political 
control and administrative accountability from the responsible minister and not 
primarily from a government collegium. The total number of employees within the 
central administration1 has increased from around 13000 in 1994 to 21000 in 2015 
of which 4600 are employed in the ministries and the remaining 16400 are 
employed in subordinate agencies (DiFi 2015). Whilst Norwegian ministries are 
secretariats for the political leadership with planning and coordinating functions 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2009), agencies are mainly responsible for advising 
ministries and being technical helpers, but are also essential ingredients in the 
political processes of preparing policies and implementing and administering 
policies.  
 
Our survey asked ministerial officials how, in general, affected they are by the 
EU/EEA/Schengen in their daily work. Table 2 displays an overall stability in this 
                                               
 






regard over time, yet with a small increase during the last decade. In the remaining, 
only those officials who report being affected (to a fairly small degree, or more) 
by the EU/EEA/Schengen are included in the analysis.  
 
Table 2. Percentage of officials who report being affected by the 
EU/EEA/Schengen, by year.  
 1996 2006 2016 
To a very large extent 11 13 14 
To a large extent 12 12 12 
To some extent 23 18 23 
To a small extent 27 21 31 
Not affected 27 37 20 
N 100 (1463) 100 (1704) 100 (1773) 
 
 
Ministry officials were asked about their contacts and participation in EU- level 
institutions. Table 3 reveals two main patterns: First, stability over time in multi-
level participation and secondly how organizational affiliation matter in this regard 
(P1). First, whilst we observe increased contact between sector ministries, the 
Commission, expert committees and comitology committees from 1996 to 2006, 
these patterns remain stable during the last decade. This suggests that Norwegian 
ministries have experienced a threshold in its access to the EU administration.  
Correspondingly, the gap between the sector ministries and the MFA shows a 
notable increase between 1996 and 2006, and then remains stable from 2006 to 
2016. This gap reflects organizational compatibility between sector ministries and 
the EU administration (P2). One additional explanation is that the EEA agreement 
makes the Commission the main interaction partner for sector ministries, thus 
biasing the access structure for Norwegian ministries vis-à-vis EU institutions. 
Also, worth noting is that whereas contacts towards the Commission have 
remained stable during the past decade, sector ministries’ contacts towards EU 
agencies have decreased. This reflects the fact that national agencies have acquired 
a larger position as access-points for EU agencies (see Egeberg and Trondal 2015). 
Secondly, the data shows that ministry affiliation matters (P1) since Table 3 
reveals a substantial difference between staff affiliated to sector ministries and 




sector ministries are consistently more involved with EU-institutions, even the 
Council.  
 
Table 3. Percentage of officials who report contact with* and/or participation 
in** EU-level institutions, by year and ministerial affiliation (sector 
ministries (SM)/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)) 
 1996 2006 2016  
 SM MFA SM MFA SM MFA N 
























































































































































* The “contact” variables combine values 1 and 2 on the following four-point scale: (1) App. every week, 
(2) app. every month, (3) a few times, (4) never. 
** The “participation” variables apply value 1 on the following three-point scale: (1) several times, (2) 





Moreover, reflecting compatible principles of organization, officials from sector 
ministries tend to concentrate attention towards the Commission, EU agencies and 
Commission expert committees, whereas officials from the MFA give more 
attention to the Council. As mentioned above, this patterns also reflect the access 
structure embedded in the EEA agreement.  
 
Next, respondents were asked about their coordination behaviour. Table 4 reveals 
an overall low level of coordination of EU-related work and an increasing reliance 
on intra-ministerial coordination over time. In support of P2, coordination is 
slightly higher within ministries than between ministries at all three points in time. 
Moreover, the gap between intra-ministerial and low-level inter-ministerial 
coordination appears to increase over time. Since the Foreign Office chairs the 
high-level inter-ministerial coordination committee, these data also testify the 
declining role of the FO over time. This in sum shows rising reliance on sector 
ministries and sector specialists and less on the generalists from the FO. Also worth 
noting is the general decrease in this type of coordination behaviour, particularly 
from 2006 to 2016. One important caveat should be noted though: Although a 
common assumption is that the primary objective of coordination committees is to 
coordinate, studies have shown low level of substantial coordination in inter-
ministerial coordination committees (Trondal 2001).  
 
Table 4. Percentage of officials who have met in ministerial coordination 
committees, by year*  
 1996 2006 2016 
Intra-ministerial coordination committees** 18 18 13 
Low-level inter-ministerial coordination 
committees*** 
17 15 9 
High-level inter-ministerial coordination 
committees**** 
5 7 5 






* This table applies value 1 on a three-point scale: (1) multiple times, (2) once, (3) never. 
** These committees are established to pursue intra-ministerial coordination of EU-related work. 
*** These committees are headed by the responsible sector ministry to coordinate across affected sector 
ministries.  
**** This committee is headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate those dossiers that the low-





Table 5. Percentage of officials who report contact with* or participation in** 
the following EU-level institutions, by year and rank (lower level officials 
(L)***/medium and higher-level officials (MH)**** (percentage) 
 1996 2006 2016  
 L MH L MH L MH N 




74 26 63 37 76 24 100 
(115) 




- - - - 90 10 100 (8) 




- - - - 100 0 100 (20) 
Contact with EU 
agencies 
 















- - - - 80 20 100 (10) 
Participation in 
committees, 
boards etc. in EU 
agencies 
- - - - 72 28 100 (18) 
* The ´contact´ variables combine values 1 and 2 on the following four-point scale: (1) App. every week, 
(2) app. every month, (3) a few times, (4) never. 
** The ´participation’ variables apply value 1 on the following three-point scale: (1) several times, (2) 
once, (3) never. 
*** Lower level officials include the following ranks:  1996: executive officer, higher executive officer, 
principal officer, assistant director. 2006: executive officer/adviser, principal officer/adviser, assistant 
director/adviser. 2016: adviser/senior adviser, specialist director/special adviser or equivalent. 
**** Medium and higher-level officials include the following ranks: 1996: director, director general, 
positions higher than director general. 2006: director/adviser, director general/adviser, positions higher 





These committees are characterized by mutual inter-ministerial information-
sharing but low level of coordination of tasks, policies and positions. Moreover, 
bearing in mind that EU-affectedness has remained stable over time (Table 2), one 
may contemplate that the decrease in coordination behaviour reflect EU-related 
work becoming more routinized, which in turn diminishes needs for formal 
dialogue through committees.  
 
As proposed (P3), Table 5 confirms that officials’ rank is negatively associated 
with interaction with EU-level institutions. The finding is robust since the pattern 
unfolds consistently over time both with regards to contacts with various EU-
institutions and participation in EU committees – including those under EU 
agencies. In other words, coordination is consistently exercised by low-level 
bureaucrats, thus reinforcing a politico-administrative gap. Interestingly, Table 5 
shows a 10 to 15 percent increase of interaction with EU-level institutions for low-
level officials from 2006 to 2016 and a corresponding decrease in interaction for 
medium and high-level officials on all variables. This provides further support to 
the assumption of a self-reinforcing politico-administrative gap. Moreover, the 
sheer increase in interaction is also fostered by an increasing number of agreements 
between Norway and the EU, affecting ever more policy areas and government 
officials.  
 
A similar analysis (Table 6, see appendix 2) on the effect of rank on coordination 
behaviour reveals a similar pattern: A negative correlation between rank and 
participation in coordination committees and a parallel negative correlation 
between rank and those reporting that their ministry’s work has been subject to 
coordination from the Prime Minister’s Office, the MFA, other ministries, the 
parliament, and/or interest groups. Officials at low ranks score consistently higher 
on these variables than do officials at medium and high ranks. This finding is also 
consistent over time, supporting the observation of a self-reinforcing politico-
administrative gap. This behaviour, we argue, measures degrees of involvement in 
EU-work, not merely coordination as such. It follows that lower level officials will 
enjoy a more comprehensive view of their ministry’s EU-related work compared 
to higher level officials. Supporting these findings in greater detail, Table 6 
displays increased participation in high-level coordination committees from 




2006 to 2016 our data shows an average of 11 percent increase in participation of 
lower level officials in the three types of coordination committees. A similar 
pattern can be found when examining modification/change due to coordination 
with other actors: from 2006 to 2016 we see an average of 16 percent increase in 
lower level officials reporting that their ministry’s work had been modified or 
changed due to the actors listed above.  
 
Table 7 (see appendix 3) examines whether various types of coordination 
behaviour are mutually supplementary or contradictory and thus deemed important 
by the same officials. To merely probe patterns, Table 7 applies two sets of 
variables from the 2016 survey: The degree to which officials participate in intra- 
and inter-ministerial coordination committees (variables 1 to 3) and the extent to 
which they report that own ministry’s position in EU related work are modified 
due to coordination with various other institutions (variables 4 to 8). The findings 
suggest that different coordination behaviour tend to be mutually supplementary, 
but also that that substantive coordination is weakly associated with participation 
in coordination committees. From the latter we infer that coordination committees, 
albeit meeting actively, are not instrumental coordinating devices in EU related 
work.  
 
Next, Table 8 illustrates the perceived importance of both primary and secondary 
structures (P4). Two main findings are displayed: As proposed, primary structures 
are deemed significantly more important than secondary structures. Moreover, this 
pattern is robust over time. The most noteworthy change is the increased 
importance ascribed to national agencies from 1996 to 2016. This finding reflects 
the ‘agencification’ wave in Norway, as in most OECD countries, during the same 
time period (e.g. Verhoest et al. 2010) and the parallel ‘agencification’ of the EU 
administration (Egeberg and Trondal 2017). Whilst Table 3 revealed decreasing 
contacts between sector ministries and EU agencies, Table 8 shows a 
corresponding decrease in perceived importance of EU agencies. This finding 
reflects the increased importance of national agencies, and not ministerial 
departments, as national access-points for EU agencies. Studies have demonstrated 
a tendency for EU agencies to bypass the ministerial level and interact directly 
with the national agencies contributing to a ‘direct’ multilevel administrative 
structure (e.g. Egeberg and Trondal 2009a). This may have off-loaded some EU-







Table 8. Percentage of officials who report that the following institutions are 
important* when making decisions on their own policy area, by year 


















































*This table combines values 1 and 2 on a five-point scale: (1) very important, (2) fairly important, (3) 
somewhat, (4) fairly unimportant, (5) very unimportant (6) Do not know/not relevant 
 
Finally, to probe P5, respondents were asked to reflect on conflict behaviour: They 
were questioned how they prioritize when conflicts appear between the wishes of 
their political leadership and the requirements of EU law in their EU-related work. 
Table 9 demonstrates that, when in conflict, most ministerial officials seek to 
compromise between the wishes of their political leadership and the requirements 
of EU law. This suggests that ministry officials, not only agency officials as 
studied by Egeberg and Trondal (2009b), are ‘double hatted’ in their EU-related 
work. Moreover, Table 9 illuminates the intrusiveness of the ‘double-hatted’ 
national central administrations since ministry officials seem to serve ‘two 
masters’. This observation is an even stronger probe of the idea a national ‘double 
hatted’ central administration, given that ministry officials are less likely to ‘go 
Brussels’ than agency officials simply by being more strongly bound by national 
political steering. Among the few respondents reporting being ‘single hatted’, their 
primary structures (the wishes of own political leadership) is deemed slightly more 






Table 9. Percentage of officials who report the following priorities if conflicts 
occur between the wishes of their national political leadership and the 
requirements of EU law* 
 Ministry Agency 
Primarily follow the wishes of own political leadership 
 
11 15 
Try to combine the wishes of own political leadership 
and EU law 
84 68 
Primarily follow the requirements of EU law 
 
5 17 
N 608 (100) 476 (100) 
* The table includes those officials who incorporate and/or practice EU legislation within own policy field. 
The category “not relevant/not occupied with such tasks” are excluded.  
 
Conclusion 
The paper has made two main contributions: Theoretically, it examines the role of 
organizational factors in public governance in general and in administrative 
integration in particular. The data suggests that administrative integration is 
promoted and nudged by ‘favourable’ organizational conditions at the domestic 
level of government. Moreover, the paper highlights how strong integration 
without political membership in the EU fuels the ‘administrative state’. Following 
the public administration turn in EU studies, one might also envisage that while a 
member-state withdraws from political member- ship in the EU, domestic agencies 
might find themselves somehow integrated with EU administrative networks. 
Moreover, the observed mechanism may play out more generally in other 
(member) states: i.e. the observed general EU coordination techniques could also 
be expected to have similar effects in member states, especially the higher 
involvement of lower ranks than involvement of higher (more political) levels. The 
general theoretical idea is captured by the public administration approach to 
European integration that sees the EU as consisting of interconnected sets of 
agencies, ministries and regulatory networks.  
 
Empirically, this study demonstrates how the EU contributes to a self-reinforcing 
administrative bias in domestic core executives. To do so, the article applies an 
extreme case of high integration without formal EU membership. Over time, this 
administrative bias develops a self-reinforcing effect: Norwegian officials dealing 
with the EU are increasingly far from the national political level (low-ranked staff) 




influenced by EU institutions. In greater detail, the data consistently displays a 
relatively high degree of interaction between sector ministries and EU-level 
executive institutions (P1). It also affirms a higher level of coordination within 
than between ministries (P2) and that officials of lower ranks are more extensively 
involved at the EU-level than officials of higher ranks (P4). Finally, the importance 
of primary organizational structures is affirmed (P4) and the data demonstrates a 
strong tendency of ‘double-hattedness’ amongst ministerial officials (P5). Future 
longitudinal studies are needed that document continuity and change in patterns of 
































Ansell, C., and Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18 (4), 543–71. 
Bauer, M., and Trondal, J. (Eds.) (2015). The Palgrave handbook of the European 
administrative system. Cheltenham: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bezes, P., Fimreite, A. L., Lidec, P. L., and Lægreid, P. (2013). Understanding 
organizational reforms in the modern state: Specialization and integration in 
Norway and France, Governance, 26(1), 147-175. 
Brunsson, N. (1989). The Organization of Hypocrisy. New York: John Wiley. 
Bækgaard, M. (2010). The impact of formal organizational structure on politico-
administrative interaction: Evidence form a natural experiment, Public 
Administration, 89 (3), 1063-1080. 
Christensen, T., and Lægreid, P. (2007) The whole-of-government approach to 
public sector reform, Public Administration Review, 67 (6),1059-1066. 
Christensen, T., and Lægreid, P. (2009) Living in the Past? Change and Continuity 
in the Norwegian Central Civil Service, Public administration review, 69 (5), 951-
961. 
Cowles, M. G., Caporaso, J. A., and Risse-Kappen, T. (2001). Transforming 
Europe: Europeanization and domestic change. Ithaka: Cornell University Press. 
Dehousse, R. (1997). Regulation by networks in the European Community: the 
role of European agencies, Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (2), 246-261. 
DIFI (2015) Ansatte i staten. Retrieved February 2017 from 
https://www.difi.no/rapporter-og-statistikk/nokkeltall-og-statistikk/ansatte-i-
staten  
Egeberg, M. (Ed.) (2006). Multilevel Union Administration. Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Egeberg, M. (2012). How bureaucratic structure matters: An organizational 
perspective, in Peters B.G and Pierre J. (Eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Public 
Administration. London: SAGE, 116-127. 
Egeberg, M., Gornitzka, Å. and Trondal, J. (2016). Organization Theory, in Ansell 
C., and Torfing J. (Eds.) Handbook on Theories of Governance. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 32-45.  
Egeberg, M., and Sætren, H. (1999). Identities in Complex Organizations: A study 
of ministerial bureaucrats, in Egeberg, M. and Lægreid, P. (Eds). Organizing 
Political Institutions. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 93-108.  
Egeberg, M., Schaefer G.F and Trondal, J. (2003). The many faces of EU 




Egeberg, M., and Trondal, J. (1999). Differentiated integration in Europe: The case 
of EEA country, Norway, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37 (1), 133-142. 
Egeberg, M., and Trondal, J. (2009a). National agencies in the European 
administrative space: government driven, commission driven or networked?, 
Public Administration, 87 (4), 779-790. 
Egeberg, M., and Trondal, J. (2009b). Political leadership and bureaucratic 
autonomy: Effects of agencification, Governance, 22 (4), 673-688. 
Egeberg, M., and Trondal, J. (2015). Why strong coordination at one level of 
government is incompatible with strong coordination across levels (and how to 
live with it): The case of the European Union, Public Administration, 94 (3), 579–
592. 
Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2017). Researching European Union Agencies. What 
have we learned (and where to go from here?), Journal of Common Market Studies, 
55 (4), 675-690. 
Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2018). An Organizational Approach to Public 
Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fossum, J.E. and Graver, H.P (2018). Squaring the Circle on Brexit. Bristol: 
Bristol University Press. 
Genschel, P. and Jachtenfuchs, M. (Eds.) (2014). Beyond the Regulatory Polity. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Geuijen, K., Hart, P.T, Princen, S. and Yesilkagit, K. (2008) The New Eurocrats: 
National Civil Servants in EU Policy-Making. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press. 
Gulick, L. (1937). Notes on the Theory of Organization, in L. Gulick and L. 
Urwick (Eds.) Papers on the Science of Administration. New York: Institute of 
Public Administration. 
Hammond, T. (1990). In defence of Luther Gulick´s “Notes on the Theory of 
Organization”, Public Administration, 68 (2), 143-173. 
Jacobsen, D. I. (2015). Regional Governance Networks: Filling in or Hollowing 
Out?’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 38 (2), 115–36. 
Joosen, R. and Brandsma, G. (2017). Transnational executive bodies: EU 
policyimplementati on between the EU and member state level, Public 
Administration, 95, 423–436. 
Kassim, H., Peterson, J., Bauer, M. W., Connolly, S., Dehousse, R., Hooghe, L. 
and Thompson, A. (2013). The European Commission of the Twenty-First 
Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Knill, C. (2001). The Europeanisation of National Administration. Cambridge: 




Knill, C. and Bauer, M. W. (2016). Policy-making by International Public 
Administrations: Concepts, Causes and Consequences, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 23 (7), 949-959. 
Knill, C., and Lehmkuhl, D. (1999). How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms 
of Europeanization, European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 3(7), Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=302746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.302746  
Lavenex, S. (2011). Concentric circles of flexible “European” integration: A 
typology of EU external governance relations, Comparative European Politics, 9 
(4/5), 372-393.  
Levi-Faur, D. (2011). Regulatory networks and regulatory agencification: towards 
a Single European Regulatory Space, Journal of European Public Policy, 18 (6), 
810-829. 
Lægreid, P., Randma-Liiv, T., Rykkja, L. H., and Sarapuu K. (2016). Coordination 
Challenges and Administrative Reforms, in G. Hammerschmid, S. Van de Walle, 
R. Andrews, and P. Bezes (Eds.) Public Administration Reforms in Europe: The 
View from the Top. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Lægreid, P., Rolland, V. W., Roness, P. G., and Ågotnes, J. E. (2010). The 
structural anatomy of the Norwegian state: Increased specialization or a pendulum 
shift?, in P. Lægreid and K. Verhoest (Eds.) Governance of public sector 
organizations. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Majone, G. (1996). Regulating Europe. London: Routledge. 
Majone, G. (2005). Dilemmas of European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
March, J.G. (1994). A Primer on Decision-Making. New York: The Free Press. 
March, J. G., and Olsen, J. P. (1976). Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations. 
Bergen: Universitetsforlaget. 
March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1984). The New Institutionalism: Organizational 
Factors in Political Life, American Political Science Review 78, 734-749. 
March, J. G., and Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The 
Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press.  
March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1995). Democratic Governance. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Martens, M. (2010) Organized Administrative Integration. ARENA Report No. 2. 
Meier, K. J. and Capers, K. J. (2012). Representative Bureaucracy: Four 
Questions, in Peters B.G and Pierre J. (Eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Public 
Administration. London: SAGE, 420-431. 
Meld. St. 5 (2012–13) The EEA Agreement and Norway’s other agreements with 






Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal 
structure as myth and ceremony´, American Journal of Sociology, 83 (2), 340-363. 
Niskanen, W. (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government. New York: 
Aldine. 
Olsen, J.P. (2009). Change and Continuity: an Institutional Approach to 
Institutions of Democratic Government, European Political Science Review, 1 (1), 
3-32.  
Olsen, J.P. (2018), The Bergen approach to public administration and political 
organization, Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift, 34 (4), 188-206.  
Ostrom, E. and Ostrom, V. (Eds.) (2015). Choice, Rules and Collective Action. 
Colchester: ECPR Press.  
Rittberger, B. and Blauberger, M. (2018). Introducing the debate section: “The EU 
in crisis: EU studies in crisis?”’, Journal of European Public Policy, 25 (3), 436-
439. 
Scott, W. R. and Davis, G. F. (2016). Organizations and Organizing: Rational, 
Natural and Open System Perspectives. London: Routledge. 
Simon, S.A. (1957) Administrative Behavior. New York: The Free Press. 
Stigen, I. (1991). Avbyråkratisering og Modifisert Forhandling? Om Bruk av 
Prosjektorganisasjon i Norsk Sentraladministrasjon’, Norsk Statsvitenskapelig 
Tidsskrift, 7 (3), 173–191. 
Thaler, R. H. and C. R. Sunstein (2009). Nudge: Improving Decisions on Health, 
Wealth and Happiness. London: Penguin Books.  
Trondal, J. (2001). Administrative integration across levels of governance. 
Doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, Oslo: University of Oslo. 
Trondal, J. (2002). Beyond the EU membership-non-membership dichotomy? 
Supranational identities among national EU decision-makers, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 9 (3), 468-487. 
Trondal, J. (2006). Governing at the frontier of the European Commission: The 
case of seconded national officials, West European Politics, 29 (1), 147-160. 
Trondal, J. (2007). The public administration turn in integration research, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 14 (6), 960-972. 
Trondal, J. (2010). An Emergent European Executive Order. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Trondal, J., and Bauer, M. W. (2017). Conceptualizing the European multilevel 
administrative order: capturing variation in the European administrative 
system´, European Political Science Review, 9 (1), 73-94.  
Trondal, J., and Veggeland, F. (2003). Access, voice and loyalty. The 
representation of domestic civil servants in EU committees, Journal of European 




Verhoest, K., Roness, P. G., Verschuere, B., Rubecksen, K., and MacCarthaigh, 
M. (2010). Autonomy and Control of State Agencies. Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Waldo, D. (1947) The Administrative State. A Study of the Political Theory of 



























List of ministries included in the survey (2016) 
1. Office of the Prime Minister 
2. Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
3. Ministry of Children and Equality 
4. Ministry of Climate and Environment 
5. Ministry of Culture 
6. Ministry of Defense 
7. Ministry of Education and Research 
8. Ministry of Finance 
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
10.  Ministry of Health and Care Services 
11.  Ministry of Justice and Public Security 
12.  Ministry if Labour and Social Affairs 
13.  Ministry of Local Government and Modernization 
14.  Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
15.  Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 











Table 6. Percentage of officials who report the following coordination behaviour*, by year and rank (lower level officials 
(L)**/medium and higher-level officials (MH)***). 
 1996 2006 2016  
 L MH L MH L MH N 
Participation in intra-ministerial coordination committees 
 
71 29 62 38 73 27 100 (181) 
Participation in low-level inter-ministerial coordination 
committees 
 
83 17 75 25 84 16 100 (116) 
Participation in high-level inter-ministerial coordination 
committees 
 
56 44 55 45 69 31 100 (61) 
Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work 
due to coordination with the Prime Minister’s Office  
63 38 48 52 70 30 100 (35) 
Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work 
due to coordination with the MFA 
63 37 54 46 73 27 100 (60) 
Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work 
due to coordination with other ministries 
65 35 64 37 69 31 100 (82) 
Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work 
due to coordination with the National Parliament 
83 17 60 40 77 23 100 (20) 
Modified/changed own ministry’s position in EU-related work 
due to coordination with interest groups 
76 24 58 42 77 23 100 (27 
 
* This table applies value 1 on the following three-point scale: (1) multiple times, (2) once, (3) never 
** Lower level officials include the following ranks: 1996: executive officer, higher executive officer, principal officer, assistant director. 2006: executive officer/adviser, 
principal officer/adviser, assistant director/adviser. 2016: adviser/senior adviser, specialist director/special adviser or equivalent. 
*** Medium and higher-level officials include the following ranks: 1996: director, director general, positions higher than director general. 2006: director/adviser, director 












Table 7. Inter-correlation matrix on coordination behaviour (Pearson’s r, 2016 data).  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. N 
1. Participation in intra-ministerial 
coordination committee 
 
 .49** .45** .16** .32** .26** .17** .16** 684 
2. Participation in low-level inter-ministerial 
coordination committees 
 
  .41** .07 .22** .25** .10 .15** 568 
3. Participation in high-level inter-ministerial 
coordination committees 
 
   .17** .31** .33** .17** .19** 396 
4. Modified/changed own ministry’s position 
in EU-related work due to coordination with 
the Prime Minister’s Office 
    .71** .62** .62** .36** 359 
5. Modified/changed own ministry’s position 
in EU-related work due to coordination with 
the MFA 
     .73** .49** .49** 362 
6. Modified/changed own ministry’s position 
in EU-related work due to coordination with 
other ministries 
      .53** .60** 359 
7. Modified/changed own ministry’s position 
in EU-related work due to coordination with 
the National Parliament 
       .69** 351 
8. Modified/changed own ministry’s position 
in EU-related work due to coordination with 
interest groups 























































































































































































































































List of ministries (2016) 
 
Office of the Prime Minister  
Ministry of Agriculture and Food  
Ministry of Children and Equality 
Ministry of Climate and Environment  
Ministry of Culture  
Ministry of Defense  
Ministry of Education and Research  
Ministry of Finance  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Ministry of Health and Care Services  
Ministry of Justice and Public Security  
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs  
Ministry of Local Government and Modernization  
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy  
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries  






























































































































































List of agencies (2016) 
 
Agency for Public Management and eGovernment (Direktoratet for forvaltning og IKT) 
Arts Council Norway (Kulturrådet) 
Civil Aviation Authority Norway (Luftfartstilsynet) 
Directorate for Building Quality (Direktoratet for Byggkvalitet) 
Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (Direktoratet for 
Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap) 
Directorate for Cultural Heritage (Riksantikvaren) 
Directorate for Emergency Communication (Direktoratet for Nødkommunikasjon) 
Directorate for Fisheries (Fiskeridirektoratet) 
Directorate for Integration and Diversity (Integrerings – og Mangfoldsdirektoratet) 
Directorate of Norwegian Customs (Tolldirektoratet) 
Directorate of Public Roads (Vegdirektoratet) 
Directorate of Taxes (Skattedirektoratet) 
Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Finanstilsynet) 
NAV – Directorate of Labour (Arbeids- og velferdsdirektoratet) 
The Directorate of Mining with the Commissioner of Mines at Svalbard (Direktoratet for 
Mineralforvaltning med Bergmesteren for Svalbard) 
National Police Directorate (Politidirektoratet) 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Direktoratet for Utviklingssamarbeid 
NORAD) 
Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (NOKUT) 
Norwegian Agricultural Authority (Landsbruksdirektoratet) 
Norwegian Board of Health Supervision (Statens helsetilsyn) 
Norwegian Coastal Administration (Kystverket) 
Norwegian Communications Authority (Nasjonal kommunikasjonsmyndighet) 
Norwegian Competition Authority (Konkurransetilsynet) 
Norwegian Country of Origin Centre (Landinfo) 






Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs (Barne-, ungdoms- og 
familiedirektoratet) 
Norwegian Directorate for Correctional Services (Kriminalomsorgsdirektoratet) 
Norwegian Directorate for Health (Helsedirektoratet) 
Norwegian Directorate of Education and Training (Utdanningsdirektoratet) 
Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet UDI) 
Norwegian Environment Agency (Miljødirektoratet) 
Norwegian Food Safety Authority (Mattilsynet) 
Norwegian Gaming and Foundation Authority (Lotteri – og stiftelsestilsynet) 
Norwegian Government Agency for Financial Management (Direktoratet for 
Øknomistyring) 
Norwegian Industrial Property Office (Patentstyret) 
Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (Direktoratet for Arbeidstilsynet) 
Norwegian Media Authority (Mediatilsynet) 
Norwegian Metrology Service (Justervesenet) 
Norwegian National Rail Administration (Jernbaneverket) 
Norwegian National Security Authority (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet) 
Norwegian Martime Authority (Sjøfartsdirektoratet) 
Norwegian Medicines Agency (Statens legemiddelverk) 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (Oljedirektoratet) 
Norwegian Railway Authority (Jernbanetilsynet) 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (Norges vasdrags – og 
energidirektorat) 
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Petroleumstilsynet) 











































































































Hvilket departement er du ansatt i?  
 Arbeids- og sosialdepartementet  
 Barne,- likestillings-, og inkluderingsdepartementet  
 Finansdepartementet  
 Forsvarsdepartementet  
 Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet  
 Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet  
 Klima- og miljødepartementet  
 Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet  
 Kulturdepartementet  
 Kunnskapsdepartementet  
 Landbruks- og matdepartementet  
 Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet  
 Olje- og energidepartementet  
 Samferdselsdepartementet  
 Utenriksdepartementet  
 Statsministerens kontor  
 
Hvilken avdeling arbeider du i?  
 
Fyll inn:  
 
Hva er ditt nåværende stillingsnivå?  
 Rådgiver/seniorrådgiver  
 Fagdirektør/spesialrådgiver  
 Avdelingsdirektør  
 Ekspedisjonssjef og over  
 
Innenfor hvilken av de følgende oppgavene faller hovedtyngden 
av ditt arbeid? 
 Lønns- og personalforvaltning  
 Organisasjonsutvikling, (om)organisering  
 Utarbeidelse / endring av lover, forskrifter, avtaler og konvensjoner  
 Budsjettering  
 Annen utredning og planlegging  
 Enkeltvedtak (saker som angår bestemte personer, bedrifter, institusjoner o.l.)  
 Kontroll, tilsyn, oppfølging av offentlige tiltak, regnskap  
 Resultatrapportering  
 Samordning, koordinering  






Hvordan vil du vurdere den administrative kapasiteten til 
















Få iverksatt vedtak og tiltak  
Kontrollere at ulike aktører etterlever  
reguleringer  
Få aktører til å samhandle og 
samarbeide  
Gi råd og informasjon om fremtidig  
utvikling  
 
I hvilken grad arbeider du med saksområder som krever 
samarbeid på tvers av forvaltningsnivå og 
departementsområder?  
 I meget stor grad  
 I nokså stor grad  
 Både og  
 I nokså liten grad  
 I meget liten grad  
 
Finnes det klare regler eller veletablert praksis mht. utførelsen av 
dine arbeidsoppgaver? 
 Meget klare regler / praksis  
 Nokså klare regler / praksis  
 Både og  
 Må selv utøve nokså stort skjønn  
 Må selv utøve meget stort skjønn  
 
Hvilken vekt tillegger du hvert av følgende hensyn ved utførelsen 












Signaler fra politisk ledelse (regjering, 
statsråd, statssekretær, politisk rådgiver)  
Lojalitet overfor nærmeste overordnede   
Faglige/profesjonelle hensyn  
Signaler fra brukergrupper, klienter, særlig  
berørte parter i samfunnet  
Signaler fra tjenestemannsorganisasjoner i 
staten  
Kostnadseffektivitet, produktivitet   
Forsvarlig saksbehandling  
Fornyelse og omstilling   
Kontinuitet og langsiktighet  
Hensynet til sentral kontroll og samordning   
Hensyn til samfunnsmessige konsekvenser,  
resultat og effekter  






Hvor viktig mener du, generelt sett, at følgende faktorer er for å 
forstå dine kollegers handlemåte, prioriteringer o.l.?  
Meget Nokså Både og  Nokså Meget Vet ikke 
viktig viktig uvesentli uvesentli / ikke 
  g g relevant  
Stilling/organisasjonsmessig plassering  
Utdanningsbakgrunn   
Tidligere yrkeserfaring  
Geografisk bakgrunn   
Kjønn  
Alder   
Politiske holdninger og oppfatninger  
 
Hvor viktig mener du det følgende er i arbeidet ditt?  
Meget Nokså Både og  Nokså Meget Vet ikke 
viktig viktig uvesentli uvesentli / ikke 
  g g relevant  
Mulighet for egen karriere,  
forfremmelse, inntekt  
Mulighet for å gjøre noe nyttig for  
samfunnet  
 
Hvor viktig er følgende kriterier når det utnevnes toppleder 
(ekspedisjonssjef eller høyere) i ditt departement?  
Meget Nokså Både og  Nokså Meget Vet ikke 
viktig viktig uvesentli uvesentli / ikke 
  g g relevant  
utdanningsbakgrunn  
jobberfaring; oppnådde resultater i  
tidligere stillinger  
ansiennitet  
likestilling mellom kjønn   
likestilling mellom etniske grupper  
partipolitisk tilhørighet/sympati  
 
Hvor viktig er følgende kriterier når mellomledere og 
saksbehandlere skal utnevnes/ansettes i ditt departement?  
Meget Nokså Både og  Nokså Meget Vet ikke 
viktig viktig uvesentli uvesentli / ikke 
  g g relevant  
utdanningsbakgrunn  
jobberfaring; oppnådde resultater i  
tidligere stillinger  
ansiennitet  
likestilling mellom kjønn   
likestilling mellom etniske grupper  






Hvor ofte hender det at en på ditt saksområde henter forbilder fra 
andre land og/eller internasjonale organisasjoner når nye tiltak / 
oppgaver skal forberedes?  
 Meget ofte  
 Nokså ofte  
 Av og til  
 Nokså sjelden  
 Meget sjelden/aldri  
 
 
Kontaktflater i arbeidet  
Så følger noen spørsmål om dine kontaktflater i arbeidet  
 
Dersom du tenker på gjennomsnittskontakten på årsbasis, 
omtrent hvor ofte har du hatt kontakt med henholdsvis statsråd, 
statssekretær(er) og politisk(e) rådgiver(e) siste året?  
Stort sett Stort sett Noen få 





Statsråden   
Statssekretær(er)/politisk(e) rådgiver(e)  
 
Hvor ofte vil du anslå at du det siste året har hatt kontakt med de 
instanser / grupperinger som er listet nedenfor:  
Stort sett Stort sett Noen få Aldri 






Administrativ ledelse i eget departement 
(departementsråd, egen ekspedisjonssjef)  
Andre avdelinger i eget departement   
Andre departementer  
Stortinget og dets organer   
Egne direktorater, tilsyn, 
forvaltningsbedrifter og lignende  
Statsaksjeselskaper, statsforetak, stiftelser  
under eget departement  
Regionale og lokale etater under eget 
departement  
Fylkesmannsembetet   
Etater, direktorater og tilsyn under andre 
departement  
Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning  
 
 
Stort sett Stort sett Noen få 







Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv   






Hvor ofte vil du anslå at du det siste året har hatt kontakt med 
instanser/grupperinger i utlandet som er listet nedenfor?  
Stort sett Stort sett Noen få 





Norges faste delegasjon til EU  
EU-kommisjonen   
Rådet i EU  
EU-Parlamentet   
EU-byråer (Agencies)  
Nordiske statlige samarbeidsorganer   
Andre internasjonale statlige organisasjoner  
Myndigheter i andre land  
 





Ja en gang Nei  
 
Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. innenfor eget 
departementet  
Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. på tvers av  
departement  
Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. med 
underliggende etater  
Offentlig oppnevnt utvalg   
Nordisk komite, arbeidsgruppe og lignende  
Komite, arbeidsgruppe under internasjonale (globale)  





I hvilken grad benyttes følgende IKT-verktøy i ditt daglige 
arbeid?  
I meget I nokså Både og I nokså I meget Benyttes 
stor grad stor grad liten liten ikke  
grad grad  
IKT-baserte rapporteringssystemer for 
dokumentasjon av resultater / aktiviteter  
IKT baserte verktøy for  
informasjonsutveksling og samordning 
på tvers av departementsområder eller  
forvaltningsnivå  
IKT baserte verktøy for 
informasjonsutveksling og samordning  
innenfor eget departementsområde  
Elektronisk debattforum, sosial media  








Internasjonale saker  
Vi går nå over til å stille noen spørsmål om ditt arbeid med internasjonale saker  
 
Hvor stor del av din arbeidstid har gått med til internasjonale 
saker siste året? 
 Helt dominerende andel  
 Nokså stor andel  
 En del  
 Nokså liten andel  
 Arbeider ikke med slike saker/helt ubetydelig 
 
Har du det siste året arbeidet med internasjonalt (nordisk, 
europeisk, globalt) lovsamarbeid (dvs. harmonisering av 
nasjonale lovverk og regelverk, standardisering og lignende)?  
 Ja  




Vi vil så gå over til å stille noen spørsmål knyttet til EU / EØS / 
Schengen spesielt  
 
I hvilken grad berører EU, EØS-avtalen og / eller Schengen ditt 
saksområde? 
 I meget stor grad  
 I nokså stor grad  
 I noen grad / en del  
 I nokså liten grad  
 Ikke berørt 
 
Har du i løpet av det siste året deltatt i noen av de følgende 
sammenhenger i forbindelse med EU- / EØS- / Schengen-
arbeidet?  
Flere ganger En gang Aldri   
Møtt i internt koordineringsutvalg (eget departement)  
Møtt i ett eller flere spesialutvalg (interdepartementalt)   
Møtt i koordineringsutvalget (interdepartementalt)  
Møtt i forberedende komite/ekspertkomite (og lignende)  
under EU-kommisjonen  
Møtt i komitologikomite (iverksettingskomite)  
Møtt i komite i Rådet   






Har det på ditt saksområde, i løpet av det siste året, forekommet 
at ditt departements standpunkter i EU- / EØS- / Schengen-saker 
har blitt endret /modifisert som følge av samordning eller 







Vet ikke  
ganger   
Statsministerens kontor  
Utenriksdepartementet   
Andre departementer  
Stortinget   
Interesseorganisasjoner  
 
Har du det siste året vært involvert i følgende aktiviteter? 
 
Ja Nei   
Utarbeiding av nytt EU-regelverk/endring av EU-regelverk  
Inkorporering av EU-regelverk i norsk regelverk   
Praktisering/anvendelse av EU-regelverk  
 
Dersom det ved <u>inkorporering</u> eller <u>praktisering</u> 
av EU-regler på ditt saksområde oppstår konflikt mellom politisk 
ledelses ønsker og EU-reglenes krav; hvordan vil du da forholde 
deg?  
 Primært ivareta politisk ledelses ønsker  
 Søke å ivareta både politiske ledelses ønsker og EU-reglenes krav  
 Primært ivareta EU-reglenes krav  






Innflytelsesforhold mellom instanser  
Vi går så over til å stille noen spørsmål om innflytelsesforholdet mellom ulike instanser  
 
Kan du si hvor viktige følgende instanser eller grupperinger er 
når sentrale beslutninger treffes innenfor ditt saksområde:  
Meget Nokså Både og  Nokså Meget Vet ikke 
viktig viktig uvesentli uvesentli / ikke 
  g g relevant  
Eget departement  
Egne direktorater, tilsyn,  
forvaltningsbedrifter  
Egne regionale og lokale etater  
Andre departementer   
Fylkeskommunal og kommunal 
forvaltning  
Stortinget   
Regjeringen  
Tjenestemanns-organisasjonene i  
staten  
Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv 
ellers  
Konsulentbyråer/ tenke-tanker   
Private bedrifter  
Forskningsinstitusjoner   
Massemedia  
EU-kommisjonen   
Rådet i EU  
EU-Parlamentet   
EU-byrå (Agencies)  
Andre internasjonale statlige  
organisasjoner 
 
Hvordan vil du karakterisere samordningen på ditt saksområde 
langs følgende dimensjoner:  
Meget Nokså Både og Nokså Meget Ikke 
god god dårlig dårlig aktuelt  
Samordning mellom ulike statlige 
myndigheter innenfor eget  
departementsområde  
Samordning med statlige myndigheter i  
andre sektorer  
Samordning med kommunale / 
fylkeskommunale myndigheter  
Samordning med overnasjonale /  
internasjonale organisasjoner  







Hvor godt forberedt er man på ditt saksområde til å forebygge og 
håndtere krisesituasjoner, ulykker og katastrofer? 
(For eksempel ras, flom, orkan; fly-, jernbane-, eller skipsulykker, 
epidemier; terroristangrep) 
 Meget godt forberedt  
 Nokså godt forberedt  
 Både og  
 Nokså dårlig forberedt  
 Meget dårlig forberedt  
 Vet ikke / Ikke aktuelt  
 

















Redusere risiko (forebygge) for store  
ulykker og katastrofer  
Håndtere store ulykker og katastrofer  
 
Hvor villig er du til å akseptere at ivaretakelse av samfunnets 
sikkerhet går på bekostning av enkeltindividers frihet (for 
eksempel personvern og rett til privatliv)? 
Siden dette er et nytt spørsmål, og dere har ikke brukt en "villig-skala" ennå, kommer jeg 
med en anbefaling. Jeg ville heller spurt "I hvilken grad er du villig til..:" og så ha "I meget 
stor grad" osv som kategorier. 
 Meget villig  
 Nokså villig  
 Litt villig  
 Ikke villig i det hele tatt  
 
I hvilken grad synes du din avdeling har lykkes i å få sine 


















Stortinget   
Eget departement  
Andre departementer   
Egne underliggende etater  








I hvilken grad vil du si at eget saksområde er preget av enighet 
eller uenighet? 
 Meget stor grad av enighet  
 Nokså stor grad av enighet  
 Både og  
 Nokså stor grad av uenighet  
 Meget stor grad av uenighet  
 
I hvilken grad er de saker som du arbeider med gjenstand for 
offentlig debatt? 
 I meget stor grad  
 I nokså stor grad  
 Både og  
 I nokså liten grad  
 I meget liten grad  
 
Har en det siste året lagt til side programforslag, utkast til lover, 
forskrifter m.v. innenfor ditt saksområde, fordi det oppsto strid 
om disse?  
 Meget ofte  
 Nokså ofte  
 En del ganger  
 Nokså sjelden  
 Meget sjelden / aldri  
 Vet ikke  
 
Er det innenfor ditt saksområde lett eller vanskelig å vite hvilke 
saker som bør forelegges den politiske ledelsen? 
 Meget lett  
 Nokså lett  
 Både og  
 Nokså vanskelig  
 Meget vanskelig  
 Vet ikke  
 
Har en det siste året unnlatt å ta opp et problem/sak innenfor ditt 
saksområde, fordi man har antatt/forutsett at det ville oppstå strid 
om det i den politiske ledelsen?  
 Meget ofte  
 Nokså ofte  
 En del ganger  
 Nokså sjelden  
 Meget sjelden / aldri  






Hvor vanlig/uvanlig er det at din(e) overordnete foretar endringer 
av mer prinsipiell karakter i de forslag/utkast som du utarbeider? 
 Meget vanlig  
 Nokså vanlig  
 Hender av og til  
 Nokså uvanlig  
 Meget uvanlig  
 Vet ikke  
 
Vil du sende oppover et forslag du personlig mener er riktig 
dersom du samtidig vet (eller antar) at forslaget vil støte på 
betenkeligheter/innvendinger hos din(e) overordnete?  
 Ja, som regel  
 Bare i spesielle tilfeller  
 Nei, aldri  
 Vet ikke  
 
Hender det at du må forberede eller iverksette tiltak du personlig 
er uenig i? 
 Meget hyppig  
 Nokså hyppig  
 Av og til  
 Nokså sjelden  
 Meget sjelden / aldri  
 
Hvordan vil du karakterisere det gjensidige tillitsnivået mellom 
eget departement og underliggende etater og virksomheter på 
ditt saksområde?  
 Meget godt  
 Nokså godt  
 Både og  
 Nokså dårlig  
 Meget dårlig  
 Vet ikke  
 
Nedenfor vil vi be deg om å angi hvor sterk eller svak din 
tilhørighet og identifikasjon er med følgende 
organisasjonsenheter  
Meget Nokså Både og Nokså Meget 




Egen avdeling  
Eget departement som helhet   
Sentral-forvaltningen generelt  






I forbindelse med moderniserings- og fornyingsarbeidet i staten 
er det lansert en rekke reformer og tiltak. Hvor stor betydning har 


















Endring i tilknytningsform for 
underliggende virksomheter  
Offentlig/privat samarbeid   
Regelforenkling / deregulering/redusere 
tidstyver / Lean organisering  
Økt fleksibilitet / fristilling i lønns-,  
personal- og budsjettsaker  
Evaluering/ resultatmåling, nye kontroll- 
og rapporteringsrutiner,  
resultatoppfølging  
Verdibasert ledelse, etiske retningslinjer   
Kunnskapsbasert politikkutforming  
Klarere skille mellom roller som for  
eksempel eier, bestiller og utfører  
Risikostyring  
Digital og elektronisk forvaltning   
Transparens og åpen forvaltning  
Samordning mellom offentlige aktører   
Konkurranseutsetting  
Etatstyringssystem, tildelingsbrev   
Målformulering/målkonkretisering  
 
Hvor enig eller uenig er du i følgende påstander om mål- og 
resultatstyringssystemet i staten på ditt saksområde slik det 
kommer til uttrykk i etatsstyringen, tildelingsbrevet og 
styringsdialogen mellom departementet og underliggende 
etater?  












Utforming av mål og resultatindikatorer 
skjer i samarbeid mellom overordnede 
og underordnede myndigheter  
Det er først og fremst et kontroll- og  
styringsverktøy for overordnet  
myndighet  
Det gir stor fleksibilitet og autonomi til 
underliggende organer  
Det fremmer læring og forbedring i  
forvaltningen  
Det er lite egnet til å håndtere 
problemer og oppgaver som går på 
tvers av departementsområder eller på  








Hvor godt tilpasset er forvaltningsloven innenfor ditt 
arbeidsområde til følgende hensyn og utviklingstrekk: 













Effektiv saksbehandling  
Den enkeltes rettsikkerhet   
Økt antall «uavhengige» forvaltningsorganer  
Økt samarbeid med mellom det offentlige og  
private  
Økt bruk av IKT-verktøy 
 
 
I hvilken grad skaper følgende regler i forvaltningsloven 
problemer i praksis på ditt saksområde: 
Vil her anbefale å enten bruke en grad skala eller en ofte/sjelden skala, ikke 
en hybridløsning  
I meget 
stor grad  
 
I nokså stor I nokså 




Lovens virkeområde  
Definisjonen av «enkeltvedtak»   
Definisjonen av «part»  




I hvor stor grad er taushetsplikt til hinder for ønskelig 
informasjonsutveksling mellom forvaltningsorganer innenfor ditt 
saksområde?  
 I meget stor grad  
 I nokså stor grad  
 Både og  
 I nokså liten grad  
 I meget liten grad  
 
Bør klager i større grad gå til uavhengige klagenemnder enn til 
overordnet forvaltningsorgan? 
 Ja  






Yrkeskarriere og bakgrunn  
Så går vi til slutt over til noen spørsmål angående din yrkeskarriere og bakgrunn 
 
Kom du til dette departementet (inkl. også departementet slik det 
var før eventuell deling eller sammenslåing) fra: 
 Utdanning  
 Annet departement  
 Egne underliggende etater  
 Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning  
 Annen offentlig virksomhet  
 Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv  
 Internasjonale statlige organisasjoner  
 Private / halvoffentlige bedrifter  
 Annet 
 
Hvis du har tidligere yrkeserfaring, i hvilken av de overnevnte 
typene har du arbeidet lengst? 
 Annet departement  
 Egne underliggende etater  
 Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning  
 Annen offentlig virksomhet  
 Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv  
 Private / halvoffentlige bedrifter  
 Internasjonale statlige organisasjoner  
 Annet  
 Ikke relevant (nyutdannet)  
 
På hvilket nivå var din første departementsstilling?  
 Førstekonsulent eller lavere stilling  
 Rådgiver/seniorrådgiver  
 Fagdirektør/spesialrådgiver  
 Avdelingsdirektør  
 Ekspedisjonssjef  
 Stilling over ekspedisjonssjef  
 
Hvor lenge har du vært ansatt i:  
 
Nåværende stilling:  
 
Nåværende departement:  
 
Departementene samlet:  
 
Har du i dag planer, eventuelt ønsker, om å forlate departementet 
for å gå over til annen virksomhet? 
 Ja  
 Nei  






Hvis ja, til hvor  
Flere svar mulig  
Til underliggende etater   
Til annen off. virksomhet   
Til privat virksomhet  
 
Har du i løpet av det siste året fått noen direkte 
tilbud/henvendelser angående nye stillinger? 
 Ja  
 Nei  
 
Hvis ja, fra hvor:  
Flere svar mulig  
Fra underliggende etater   
Fra annen off. virksomhet   
Fra privat virksomhet  
 
Alder, hva er din alder  
 Under 25 år  
 25-34 år  
 35-44 år  
 45-54 år  
 55-64 år  
65 år og mer  
 
Kjønn  
 Mann  
 Kvinne  
 
Hvilken utdanning har du?  
 Juridisk, høyere grad/master  
 Økonomisk, høyere grad/master  
 Samfunnsvitenskap, høyere grad/master  
 Statsvitenskap, høyere grad/master  
 Historisk/filosofisk, høyere grad /master  
 Matematisk/naturvitenskaplig, teknologisk, o.l. høyere grad/master  
 Cand. mag./bachelor  
Annen utdanning  
 
Har du utdannelse i utlandet av minst ett års varighet?  
 Ja  






Hvilken målform benytter du til daglig?  
 Riksmål  
 Bokmål  
 Nynorsk  
 Andre  
 
Hvor har du bodd det meste av oppvekstårene? 
 






Hvor har du bodd det meste av ditt yrkesaktive liv? 
 






Hva var din hovedforsørgers yrke i den tiden du vokste opp?  
 Gårdbruker  
 Fisker  
 Arbeider, håndverker  
 Funksjonær i privat virksomhet  
 Ansatt i sentraladministrasjonen  
 Ansatt i annen offentlig virksomhet  
 Selvstendig næringsdrivende  
 Annet yrke  
 
Hvilken utdanning hadde din hovedforsørger?  
 Grunnskole  
Yrkes-, handels-, fagskole og lignende. Realskole, middelskole, artium eller 
økonomisk gymnas  
 Universitets- eller høyskoleeksamen  
Annen utdanning  
 
Er du i dag, eller har du vært, medlem av noe politisk parti?  
 Ja, er medlem  
 Ja, har vært medlem  
 Nei  
 
Har du i dag, eller har du hatt, tillitsverv i noe politisk parti?  
 Ja, har tillitsverv  
 Ja, har hatt tillitsverv  
 Nei  
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Har du noen gang vært nominert som kandidat for noe parti ved 
et kommune- / fylkestings- / Stortingsvalg? 
 Ja, kommune- / fylkestingsvalg  
 Ja, stortingsvalg  
 Ja, begge deler  
 Nei  
 
Er du medlem av en arbeidstaker- og yrkesorganisasjon som er 
tilknyttet følgende hovedorganisasjoner: Landsorganisasjonen i 
Norge (LO), Akademikerne, Yrkesorganisasjonenes 
sentralforbund (YS), eller UNIO?  
 Ja  
 Nei  
 
Skriv inn eventuelle kommentarer i feltet under: 
 































































































































































Arbeidsområde og arbeidssituasjon  
Vi begynner med noen spørsmål som har med ditt arbeidsområde og 
din arbeidssituasjon å gjøre 
 
Hvilken instans (direktorat, tilsyn, verk o.l.) er du ansatt i? 
 






Hvilken avdeling arbeider du i? 
 






Hva er ditt nåværende stillingsnivå?  
 Rådgiver/seniorrådgiver  
 Fagdirektør/spesialrådgiver  
 Seksjonssjef  
 Avdelingsdirektør og over  
 
 
Arbeidsområde / arbeidssituasjon  
På de neste sidene i skjemaet vil vi nå stille en del spørsmål knyttet til dine 
arbeidsoppgaver, kontaktflater, samarbeidsrelasjoner og lignende. Ikke alle spørsmål vil 
være like relevante, men vi ber deg likevel om å fylle ut skjemaet etter beste evne. 
 
Innenfor hvilken av de følgende oppgavene faller hovedtyngden 
av ditt arbeid? 
 Lønns- og personalforvaltning  
 Organisasjonsutvikling, (om)organisering  
 Utarbeidelse / endring av lover, forskrifter, avtaler og konvensjoner  
 Budsjettering  
 Annen utredning og planlegging  
 Enkeltvedtak (saker som angår bestemte personer, bedrifter, institusjoner o.l.)  
 Kontroll, tilsyn, oppfølging av offentlige tiltak, regnskap  
 Resultatrapportering  




I hvilken grad arbeider du med saksområder som krever 
samarbeid på tvers av forvaltningsnivå og 
departementsområder?  
 I meget stor grad  
 I nokså stor grad  
 Både og  
 I nokså liten grad  
 I meget liten grad  
 Vet ikke  
 
Hvordan vil du vurdere den administrative kapasiteten til 
















Få iverksatt vedtak og tiltak  
Kontrollere at ulike aktører etterlever  
reguleringer  
Få aktører til å samhandle og 
samarbeide  
Gi råd og informasjon om fremtidig  
utvikling  
 
Finnes det klare regler eller veletablert praksis mht. utførelsen av 
dine arbeidsoppgaver? 
 Meget klare regler / praksis  
 Nokså klare regler / praksis  
 Både og  
 Må selv utøve nokså stort skjønn  
 Må selv utøve meget stort skjønn  
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Hvilken vekt tillegger du hvert av følgende hensyn ved utførelsen 







Både og Nokså lite Meget lite 
viktig viktig  
Lojalitet overfor nærmeste overordnede  
. Signaler fra politisk ledelse (regjering,  
statsråd, statssekretær, politiske rådgivere)  
Signaler fra toppledelsen i etaten  
Signaler fra departement (embets- og  
tjenestemenn)  
Faglige/profesjonelle hensyn  
Signaler fra brukergrupper, klienter, særlig  
berørte parter  
Signaler fra tjenestemannsorganisasjoner i 
staten  
Kostnadseffektivitet, produktivitet   
Forsvarlig saksbehandling, gjeldende rett  
Fornyelse og omstilling   
Kontinuitet og langsiktighet  
Hensynet til den offentlige opinion   
Hensyn til uavhengige kontroll- og 
tilsynsorgan, ombud  
Hensynet til sentral kontroll og samordning   
Hensyn til samfunnsmessige konsekvenser, 
resultat og effekter  
Hensynet til åpenhet og innsyn  
 
Hvor viktig mener du, generelt sett, at følgende faktorer er for å 

















Stilling/organisasjonsmessig plassering  
Utdanningsbakgrunn   
Tidligere yrkeserfaring  
Geografisk bakgrunn   
Kjønn  
Alder   
Politiske holdninger og oppfatninger  
 







Både og  Nokså Meget 





Mulighet for egen karriere,  
forfremmelse, inntekt  




Hvor viktig er følgende kriterier når det utnevnes/ansettes 







Både og  Nokså Meget 






jobberfaring; oppnådde resultater i  
tidligere stillinger  
ansiennitet  
likestilling mellom kjønn   
likestilling mellom etniske grupper  
partipolitisk tilhørighet/sympati  
 
Hvor viktig er følgende kriterier når andre ledere og 







Både og  Nokså Meget 






jobberfaring; oppnådde resultater i  
tidligere stillinger  
ansiennitet  
likestilling mellom kjønn   
likestilling mellom etniske grupper  
partipolitisk tilhørighet/sympati  
 
Finnes det i <u>departementet</u>, som etaten sorterer under, 
bestemte enheter / stillinger knyttet til <u>ditt eget 
saksområde?</u>  
 Ja, avdeling(er)  
 Ja, seksjon(er) og lignende  
 Ja, enkelt(e) stilling(er)  
 Nei, ingen bestemte enheter / stillinger knyttet til eget saksområde  
 
Hvor ofte hender det at en på ditt saksområde henter forbilder fra 
andre land eller internasjonale organisasjoner når nye tiltak / 







Av og til Nokså Meget sjelden 
sjelden / aldri  
Fra andre land   
Fra internasjonale organisasjoner  
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Hvor ofte vil du anslå at du det siste året har hatt kontakt med de 
instanser / grupperinger som er listet nedenfor:  














måned   
Toppledelsen i egen etat  
Andre avdelinger i egen  
sentraladministrative etat  
Politisk ledelse i departement som etaten / 
saksområdet sorterer under  
Embets- og tjenestemenn i departement  
som etaten / saksområdet sorterer under  
Andre departementer (politisk ledelse og / 
eller embets- / tjenestemenn)  
Andre direktorater og lignende   
Egen ytre etat (hvis slik etat finnes)  
Andre ytre etater   
Statsaksjeselskap, statsforetak, stiftelser  
Fylkeskommunal og / eller kommunal  
forvaltning  
Stortinget og dets organer  
Tjenestemanns-organisasjon(er) i staten   
Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv 
ellers  
Private bedrifter  
 
Er det innenfor ditt saksområde lett eller vanskelig å vite hvilke 
saker som bør forelegges eget departement? 
 Meget lett  
 Nokså lett  
 Både og  
 Nokså vanskelig  
 Meget vanskelig  
 Vet ikke / ikke relevant  
 
Har du i løpet av det siste året deltatt i følgende sammenhenger?  
Ja, flere  
ganger  
 
Ja, en gang Nei  
 
Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. innenfor eget  
departementet  
Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. på tvers av  
departement  
Arbeids-/prosjektgruppe, råd, forum o.l. med 
underliggende etater  
Offentlig oppnevnt utvalg   
Nordisk komite, arbeidsgruppe og lignende  
Komite, arbeidsgruppe under internasjonale (globale)  
statlige organisasjoner og lignende  
 
 218 
Hvor ofte vil du anslå at du det siste året har hatt kontakt med 
instanser/grupperinger i utlandet som er listet nedenfor?  
Stort sett Stort sett Noen få Aldri 
hver uke hver ganger  
eller oftere måned    
Norges faste delegasjon til EU  
EU-kommisjonen   
Rådet i EU  
EU-Parlamentet   
EU-byråer (Agencies)  
Nordiske statlige samarbeidsorganer   
Andre internasjonale statlige organisasjoner  
Myndigheter i andre land  
 
 
Internasjonale saker  
Vi går nå over til å stille noen spørsmål om ditt arbeid med internasjonale saker 
 
Hvor stor del av din arbeidstid har gått med til internasjonale 
saker siste året? 
 Helt dominerende andel  
 Nokså stor andel  
 En del  
 Nokså liten andel  
 Arbeider ikke med slike saker/helt ubetydelig 
 
Har du det siste året arbeidet med internasjonalt (nordisk, 
europeisk, globalt) lovsamarbeid (dvs. harmonisering av 
nasjonale lovverk og regelverk, standardisering og lignende)?  
 Ja  





I hvilken grad benyttes følgende IKT-verktøy i ditt daglige 
arbeid?  
I meget I nokså I noen I nokså I meget Benyttes 
stor grad stor grad grad / en liten liten ikke 
  del grad grad   
IKT-baserte rapporteringssystemer for 
dokumentasjon av resultater / aktiviteter  
IKT baserte verktøy for  
informasjonsutveksling og samordning 
på tvers av departementsområder eller  
forvaltningsnivå  
IKT baserte verktøy for 
informasjonsutveksling og samordning 
innenfor departementsområder eller  
forvaltningsnivå  
Elektronisk debattforum, sosial media  





Vi vil så gå over til å stille noen spørsmål knyttet til EU / EØS / Schengen spesielt 
 
I hvilken grad berører EU, EØS-avtalen og / eller Schengen ditt 
saksområde? 
 I meget stor grad  
 I nokså stor grad  
 I noen grad / en del  
 I nokså liten grad  
 Ikke berørt 
 
Har du i løpet av det siste året deltatt i noen av de følgende 
sammenhenger i forbindelse med EU- / EØS- / Schengen-
arbeidet?  
Flere ganger En gang Aldri  
Møtt i forberedende komite/ekspertkomite (og lignende) 
under EU-kommisjonen  
Møtt i komitologikomite (iverksettingskomite)   
Møtt i komiteer i Rådet  
Møtt i komiteer, styrer o.l. under EU-byråer (agencies)  
 
Har det på ditt saksområde, i løpet av det siste året, forekommet 
at din etats standpunkter i EU- / EØS- / Schengen-saker har blitt 












Overordnet departement  
Andre departementer   
Andre departementer  
 
Har du det siste året vært involvert i følgende aktiviteter?  
Ja Nei   
Utarbeiding av nytt EU-regelverk/endring av EU-regelverk  
Inkorporering av EU-regelverk i norsk regelverk   
Praktisering/anvendelse av EU-regelverk  
 
Dersom det ved <u>inkorporering</u> eller <u>praktisering</u> 
av EU-regler på ditt saksområde oppstår konflikt mellom politisk 
ledelses ønsker og EU-reglenes krav; hvordan vil du da forholde 
deg?  
 Primært ivareta politisk ledelses ønsker  
 Søke å ivareta både politiske ledelses ønsker <u>og</u> EU-reglenes krav  
 Primært ivareta EU-reglenes krav  
 Ikke relevant/arbeider ikke med slike saker  
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Hvor viktige er følgende instanser eller grupperinger når det 
gjelder å påvirke ditt direktorats/tilsyns (og lignende) 
<u>praktisering av EU-lovgivning på ditt saksområde?</u>  
Meget Nokså Både og  Nokså Meget 





Overordnet departement  
Eget direktorat / tilsyn eller lignende   
EU-kommisjonen  
ESA   
EU-byrå (Agency)  
«Søster-direktorater / -tilsyn» i andre  
land  
Bruker- / interessegrupper  
EU-nettverk av reguleringsmyndigheter  
 
Nasjonale direktorater, tilsyn o.l. er ofte knyttet sammen på tvers 
av landegrensene gjennom EU-nettverk. I hvilken grad mener du at 
EU-nettverk på ditt saksområde kan føre til:  
I meget I nokså Både og  I nokså I meget Vet 
stor grad stor grad liten liten ikke/ikke 
  grad grad relevant  
Mer harmonisert praktisering av EUs 
lovgivning og politikk på tvers av land  
Mer arbeidsdeling og samkjøring  
(«pooling») av administrative ressurser  
på tvers av land  
Mer faktisk uavhengighet for 
direktoratet, tilsynet o.l. i forhold til eget  
departement  
Spredning av god styring og  
forvaltningspraksis på tvers av land  
Mindre rom for nasjonal 
forvaltningspolitikk (f.eks. innlemming  
av direktoratet i departementet)  
Uklare ansvarsforhold  
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Innflytelsesforhold mellom instanser  
Vi går så over til å stille noen spørsmål om innflytelsesforholdet mellom ulike instanser 
 
Kan du si hvor viktige følgende instanser eller grupperinger er 
når sentrale beslutninger treffes innenfor ditt saksområde:  
Meget Nokså Både og  Nokså Meget Vet ikke 
viktig viktig uvesentli uvesentli / Ikke 
  g g relevant  
Egen sentraladministrativ etat  
Departementet som  
etaten/saksområdet sorterer under  
Egen regional og lokal etat  
Andre departementer og etater   
Fylkeskommunal og kommunal 
forvaltning  
Stortinget   
Regjeringen  
Tjenestemanns-organisasjonene i  
staten  
Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv 
ellers  
Private bedrifter   
Forsknings- / undervisningsinstitusjoner  
Massemedia   
EU-kommisjonen  
EU-byråer (Agencies)   
Andre internasjonale statlige 
organisasjoner  




Hvordan vil du karakterisere samordningen på ditt saksområde 
langs følgende dimensjoner:  
Meget Nokså Både og  Nokså Meget Ikke 
god god dårlig dårlig aktuelt  
Samordning mellom ulike statlige 
myndigheter innenfor eget saksområde  
/ egen sektor  
Samordning med statlige myndigheter i  
andre sektorer  
Samordning med kommunale / 
fylkeskommunale myndigheter  
Samordning med overnasjonale /  
internasjonale organisasjoner  
 
Hvor godt forberedt er man på ditt saksområde til å forebygge og 
håndtere krisesituasjoner, ulykker og katastrofer? 
(For eksempel ras, flom, orkan; fly-, jernbane-, eller skipsulykker, 
epidemier; terroristangrep) 
 Meget godt forberedt  
 Nokså godt forberedt  
 Både og  
 Nokså dårlig forberedt  
 Meget dårlig forberedt  
 Vet ikke / Ikke aktuelt  
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Hvor gode eller dårlige mener du myndighetene er til det 
følgende?  
Svært Nokså Både og  Nokså Svært Vet ikke 
gode gode dårlige dårlige  
Redusere risiko (forebygge) for store  
ulykker og katastrofer  
Håndtere store ulykker og katastrofer  
 
Hvor villig er du til å akseptere at ivaretakelse av samfunnets 
sikkerhet går på bekostning av enkeltindividers frihet (for 
eksempel personvern og rett til privatliv)?  
 Svært villig  
 Nokså villig  
 Litt villig  
 Ikke villig i det hele tatt  
 Vet ikke  
 
Hvordan vil du karakterisere det gjensidige tillitsnivået mellom 
egen etat og overordnet departement? 
 Meget godt  
 Nokså godt  
 Både og  
 Nokså dårlig  
 Meget dårlig  
 Vet ikke  
 
I hvilken grad synes du din etat har lykkes i å få sine synspunkt 

















Stortinget   
Departement som etaten / saksområdet 
sorterer under  
Andre departementer og etater   
Egne underliggende virksomheter  
Fylkeskommunal og kommunal  
forvaltning  
EU-kommisjonen  
EU-byrå( agency)/-nettverk  
 
I hvilken grad vil du si at eget saksområde er preget av enighet 
eller uenighet? 
 Meget stor grad av enighet  
 Nokså stor grad av enighet  
 Både og  
 Nokså stor grad av uenighet  
 Meget stor grad av uenighet  
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I hvilken grad er de saker som du arbeider med gjenstand for 
offentlig debatt? 
 I meget stor grad  
 I nokså stor grad  
 Både og  
 I nokså liten grad  
 I meget liten grad  
 
Har en det siste året lagt til side programforslag, utkast til lover, 
forskrifter m.v. innenfor ditt saksområde, fordi det oppsto strid 
om disse i politisk ledelse?  
 Meget ofte  
 Nokså ofte  
 En del ganger  
 Nokså sjelden  
 Meget sjelden / aldri  
 Vet ikke  
 
Har en det siste året unnlatt å ta opp et problem/sak innenfor ditt 
saksområde, fordi man har antatt/forutsett at det ville oppstå strid 
om det i politisk ledelse?  
 Meget ofte  
 Nokså ofte  
 En del ganger  
 Nokså sjelden  
 Meget sjelden / aldri  
 Vet ikke  
 
Hvor vanlig/uvanlig er det at din(e) overordnete foretar endringer 
av mer prinsipiell karakter i de forslag/utkast som du utarbeider? 
 Meget vanlig  
 Nokså vanlig  
 Hender av og til  
 Nokså uvanlig  
 Meget uvanlig  
 Vet ikke  
 
Vil du sende oppover et forslag du personlig mener er riktig 
dersom du samtidig vet (eller antar) at forslaget vil støte på 
betenkeligheter/innvendinger hos din(e) overordnete?  
 Ja, som regel  
 Bare i spesielle tilfeller  
 Nei, aldri  
 Vet ikke  
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Hender det at du må forberede eller iverksette tiltak du personlig 
er uenig i? 
 Meget hyppig  
 Nokså hyppig  
 Av og til  
 Nokså sjelden  
 Meget sjelden / aldri  
 
Nedenfor vil vi be deg om å angi hvor sterk eller svak din 
tilhørighet og identifikasjon er med følgende 
organisasjonsenheter  
Meget Nokså Både og  Nokså Meget 




Egen avdeling  
Egen etat som helhet   
Sentralforvaltningen generelt  
Egen profesjon/utdanning   
EU-nettverk av reguleringsmyndigheter  
 
I forbindelse med moderniserings- og fornyingsarbeidet i staten 
er det lansert en rekke nye reformer og tiltak. Hvor stor 


















Endring i tilknytningsform for egen etat  
Offentlig/privat samarbeid   
Regelforenkling / deregulering / 
redusere tidstyver / Lean organisering  
Økt fleksibilitet / fristilling i lønn,-  
personal- og budsjettsaker  
Evaluering/resultatmåling, nye kontroll- 
og rapporteringsrutiner,  
resultatoppfølging  
Verdibasert ledelse, etiske retningslinjer   
Kunnskapsbasert politikkutforming  
Klarere skille mellom roller som for  
eksempel eier, bestiller og utfører  
Risikostyring  
Digital og elektronisk forvaltning   
Transparens og åpen forvaltning  
Samordning mellom offentlige aktører   
Konkurranseutsetting  




Hvor enig eller uenig er du i følgende påstander om mål- og 
resultatstyringssystemet i staten på ditt saksområde slik det 
kommer til uttrykk i tildelingsbrevet og styringsdialogen mellom 
departementet og underliggende etater?  












Utforming av mål og resultatindikatorer 
skjer i samarbeid mellom overordnede  
og underordnede myndigheter  
Det er først og fremst et kontroll og  
styringsverktøy for overordnet  
myndighet  
Det gir stor fleksibilitet og autonomi til 
underliggende organer  
Det fremmer læring og forbedring i  
forvaltningen  
Det er lite egnet til å håndtere 
problemer og oppgaver som går på 
tvers av departementsområder eller på  
tvers av statlig og kommunalt nivå  
 
Hvor godt tilpasset er forvaltningsloven innenfor ditt 
arbeidsområde til følgende hensyn og utviklingstrekk: 
Kommentar til Per: Nytt spørsmål. Tror jeg vil anbefale å ha en god/dårlig skala i 
denne sammenheng. Ikke godt betyr ikke nødvendigvis det samme som dårlig, og det 
blir da vanskelig å fange opp de som mener dette.  







Effektiv saksbehandling  
Den enkeltes rettsikkerhet   
Økt antall «uavhengige» forvaltningsorganer  
Økt samarbeid med mellom det offentlige og  
private  
Økt bruk av IKT-verktøy  
 
I hvilken grad skaper følgende regler i forvaltningsloven 
problemer i praksis på ditt saksområde:  
I meget I nokså I noen I nokså Sjelden/al 
stor grad stor grad grad / en liten grad dri  
del  
Lovens virkeområde  
Definisjonen av «enkeltvedtak»   
Definisjonen av «part»  




I hvor stor grad er taushetsplikt til hinder for ønskelig 
informasjonsutveksling mellom forvaltningsorganer innenfor ditt 
saksområde?  
 I meget stor grad  
 I nokså stor grad  
 I noen grad / en del  
 I nokså liten grad  
 I meget liten grad  
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Bør klager i større grad gå til uavhengige klagenemnder enn til 
overordnet forvaltningsorgan? 
 Ja  
 Nei  
 
 
Yrkeskarriere og bakgrunn  
Så går vi til slutt over til noen spørsmål angående din yrkeskarriere og bakgrunn 
 
Kom du til nåværende (sentraladministrative) instans fra:  
 Utdanning  
 Departementet som etaten/eget saksområde sorterer under  
 Andre departementer og etater  
 Egne underliggende virksomheter  
 Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning  
 Annen offentlig virksomhet  
 Internasjonale statlige organisasjoner  
 Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv  
 Private / halvoffentlige bedrifter  
 Annet 
 
Hvis du har tidligere yrkeserfaring, i hvilken av de overnevnte 
typene har du arbeidet lengst? 
 Andre departementer og etater  
 Egne underliggende virksomheter  
 Fylkeskommunal og kommunal forvaltning  
 Annen offentlig virksomhet  
 Internasjonale statelige organisasjoner  
 Organisasjoner i arbeids- og næringsliv  
 Private / halvoffentlige bedrifter  
 Annet  
 Ikke relevant (nyutdannet)  
 
På hvilket nivå var din første jobb i denne etaten sentralt?  
 Førstekonsulent eller lavere stilling  
 Rådgiver/seniorrådgiver  
 Fagdirektør/spesialrådgiver  
 Seksjonssjef  
 Avdelingsdirektør eller over  
 
Hvor lenge har du vært ansatt i:  
(skriv inn antall år)   
Nåværende stilling:  
 
Nåværende etat sentralt:  
 
Sentraladministrasjonen samlet:  
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Har du i dag planer, eventuelt ønsker, om å forlate nåværende 
stilling for å gå over til annen virksomhet? 
 Ja  
 Nei  
 Vet ikke  
 
Hvis ja, til hvor?   
Til egen underliggende etat   
Til annen off. virksomhet   
Til privat virksomhet  
 
Har du i løpet av det siste året fått noen direkte 
tilbud/henvendelser angående nye stillinger? 
 Ja  
 Nei  
 
Hvis «ja», fra hvor:   
Fra egen underliggende etat   
Fra departement som etaten / saksområdet sorterer under   
Fra annen off. virksomhet   
Fra privat virksomhet  
 
Alder. Hva er din alder?  
 Under 25 år  
 25-34 år  
 35-44 år  
 45-54 år  
 55-64 år  
65 år og mer  
 
Kjønn:  
 Mann  
 Kvinne  
 
Hvilken utdanning har du?  
 Juridisk, høyere grad/master  
 Økonomisk, høyere grad/master  
 Samfunnsvitenskap, høyere grad/master  
 Statsvitenskap, høyere grad/master  
 Historisk/filosofisk, høyere grad/master  
 Matematisk/naturvitenskaplig, teknologisk, o.l. høyere grad/master  
 Cand. mag./bachelor  
Annen utdanning  
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Har du utdannelse i utlandet av minst ett års varighet?  
 Ja  
 Nei  
 
Hvilken målform benytter du til daglig?  
 Riksmål  
 Bokmål  
 Nynorsk  
 Andre  
 
Hvor har du bodd det meste av oppvekstårene? 
 






Hvor har du bodd det meste av ditt yrkesaktive liv? 
 






Hva var din hovedforsørgers yrke i den tiden du vokste opp?  
 Gårdbruker  
 Fisker  
 Arbeider, håndverker  
 Funksjonær i privat virksomhet  
 Ansatt i sentraladministrasjonen  
 Ansatt i annen offentlig virksomhet  
 Selvstendig næringsdrivende  
 Annet yrke  
 
Hvilken utdanning hadde din hovedforsørger?  
 Grunnskole  
Yrkes-, handels-, fagskole og lignende. Realskole, middelskole, artium eller 
økonomisk gymnas  
 Universitets- eller høyskoleeksamen  
Annen utdanning  
 
Er du i dag, eller har du vært, medlem av noe politisk parti?  
 Ja, er medlem  
 Ja, har vært medlem  
 Nei  
Har du i dag, eller har du hatt, tillitsverv i noe politisk parti?  
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 Ja, har tillitsverv  
 Ja, har hatt tillitsverv  
 Nei  
 
Har du noen gang vært nominert som kandidat for noe parti 
ved et kommune- / fylkestings- / Stortingsvalg? 
 Ja, kommune- / fylkestingsvalg  
 Ja, stortingsvalg  
 Ja, begge deler  
 Nei  
 
Er du medlem av en arbeidstaker- og yrkesorganisasjon 
som er tilknyttet følgende hovedorganisasjoner: 
Landsorganisasjonen i Norge (LO), Akademikerne, 
Yrkesorganisasjonenes sentralforbund (YS), eller UNIO?  
 Ja  
 Nei  
 
Skriv inn eventuelle kommentarer i feltet under: 
 

































































































































Interview guide, agency officials 
[Kort beskrivelse av mitt doktorgradsprosjekt]  
1. Innledning 
• Samtykke til opptak 
• Informasjonsskriv (NSD) 




2. Generelt: oversikt over organisasjon, arbeidsområde og arbeidssituasjon  
• Hva er du/din avdeling opptatt av nå? 
• Hva er din avdeling sitt ansvar og arbeidsoppgaver?  
• Egne oppgaver: Hva er dine arbeidsoppgaver, hva bruker du mest tid på generelt og 
hvordan er ditt arbeid organisert? Opplever du stor grad av frihet i stillingen, jobber du 
mye alene eller i team, hvordan er tilgangen på ressurser/bemanning? Hvilke 
begrensninger erfarer du i ditt daglige arbeid?  
• Eventuelt endringer over tid, reformer el. (i nær fortid), eventuelt har dette påvirket din 
arbeidshverdag/hvordan? 
 
3. Europeisk samarbeid 
• Hvordan vil du generelt beskrive [direktoratets] involvering i europeisk samarbeid?  
o Type aktivitet: Hvilke europeiske samarbeidsfora har du deltatt i?. Hva består 
denne aktiviteten i?  
o Omfang: Hvor mye av dette har du deltatt på det siste året? Hvor mye av 
arbeidstiden vil du anslå går med til denne type arbeid? (Forberedelser, 
deltakelse, etterarbeid, evt. avspasering) 
o Hvem andre deltar på disse aktivitetene? (Både fra egen organisasjon, 
departementer?) Er det i hovedsak de samme personer som deltar på møtene? 
Vil du si at det utvikles kollegialitet?  
• I hvor stor grad opplever du å bli koordinert i forhold til det internasjonale arbeidet, 
dvs. styrt av egen ledelse eller departement? Utarbeides det mandater, eller gjøres dette 
under tillit, eller på rent faglig grunnlag?  
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• Hvordan vil du karakterisere nytteverdi/utbytte av slik deltakelse? 
• Hvordan vil du karakterisere arbeidsdelingen innad i nettverkene? Hva fungerer 
bra/mindre bra? 
• Hvordan opplever du at forholdet til EU nettverk har utviklet seg de siste årene? 
 
4. Kontaktmønstre  
• Har du kontakt med, og hvordan vil du beskrive kontakten med ulike avdelinger og 
profesjoner i [direktoratet]?  
o Konfliktlinjer og samarbeidsmønstre?  
• Har du kontakt med, og hvordan vil du beskrive kontakten med departementet som 
[direktoratet] sorteres under, eventuelt andre departement (hvilke)? 
o Konfliktlinjer og samarbeidsmønstre? Kontaktpersoner? 
• Hvem vil du karakterisere som de viktigste kontaktene for deg?   
o Overordnet departement, andre departementer/nasjonale myndigheter, 
o EU-byrå eller søsterbyråer i andre land som jobber med det samme som deg? 
(Helt konkret hvilke enheter det er snakk om) Andre sentrale aktører? Hvem 




• Hvem oppfatter du som de viktigste premissleverandørene for ditt arbeid? Hvem tar du 
hensyn til i ditt daglige arbeid? Hvilke aktører opplever du har innflytelse innenfor ditt 
saksområde? Hvem er ansvarlige for både suksess og feil? 
• Hvem setter agendaene for ditt arbeid? 
• Hvilke signaler/premisser fra departementene/politisk ledelse viktig for deg i ditt 
daglige arbeid? I hvilken grad må departementer godkjenne det du/dere gjør? Har 
departementet faste personer du/dere forholder dere til, eller noen som regelmessig 
kommer til dere? Finnes det avdelinger i overordnet departement som overlapper med 
din avdeling (duplikasjon)?  
• Hvem spør du om råd, hvem lytter du til og hvem opplever du som viktige for at du 
skal gjøre en god jobb? Hvorfor akkurat disse?  
• Hvordan går dere fram når dere skal implementere nye lover, regler, prosedyrer eller 
annet? Hvem bestemmer hva, hvordan og når noe skal implementeres?  




6. Konsekvenser av overnasjonalt samarbeid: lojaliteter, tillitt, autonomi 
• Hvordan vil du karakterisere tillittsnivået mellom eget tilsyn og  
o overordnet departement, andre departement  
o andre direktorat – nasjonalt og på EU-nivå 
o EU institusjoner, herunder nettverk av reguleringsmyndigheter 
• Hva er det som avgjør tillitsnivået til disse institusjonene? Hva bygger/bryter ned tillit? 
• Hvor viktig mener du tillitt mellom offentlige organisasjoner er? Er tillitt avgjørende 
for eksempelvis velfungerende institusjoner og for at statlig styring og internasjonalt 
samarbeid fungerer effektivt? På hvilken måte?  
• Opplever du at [direktoratets] europeiske samarbeid påvirker forholdet til overordnet 
departement, og på hvilken måte? (mht. til for eksempel tillitt, autonomi, samarbeid?)  
• Hvordan ville du forholde deg dersom det oppstår konflikt mellom EU og nasjonale 
myndigheter?   
• Hvilke konsekvenser har slik deltakelser for ditt arbeid - endres horisont for eget 
arbeid - fra nasjonalt mot internasjonalt-perspektiv, endres lojaliteter og 
rolleforståelse? 
7. Avslutning 
• Hvilken betydning tror du Brexit vil ha for arbeidet og europeisk samarbeid? 
• Er det noe du føler du ikke har fått sagt som kan være nyttige opplysninger? 
















































































































































































                                                                                                                                                                                                  
SENTRALADMINISTRASJONSUNDERSØKELSEN 2016 
Saksbehandlere og sjefer med minst ett års tjenestetid i direktorater og annen 
sentraladministrasjon utenfor departementene får med dette tilsendt et 
spørreskjema som omhandler trekk ved arbeidsformer, personell og 
beslutningsprosesser. Den gjennomføres som en web-basert survey, se link 
nedenfor.  Undersøkelsen er allerede gjennomført blant departementsansatte. 
Undersøkelsen representerer en oppfølging av fire tidligere spørreundersøkelser 
som omfatter hele den norske sentralforvaltningen. Undersøkelsen startet med 
Maktutredningens departementsstudie i 1976 med professor Johan P. Olsen som 
prosjektleder. Ti år etter ble det i regi av Forskningsrådets innsatsområde ’ledelse, 
organisasjon og styringssystem’ (LOS), gjennomført en nært beslektet 
undersøkelse. I 1996 og 2006 ble den tredje og fjerde tilsvarende undersøkelse 
gjennomført, den gang i regi av ARENA, Universitetet i Oslo, i samarbeid med 
Institutt for statsvitenskap, Universitetet i Oslo og Universitetet i Bergen.  
Siden sist undersøkelse har et nytt tiår passert, og vi ønsker igjen å følge opp 
mange av de samme temaene. Undersøkelsen i år gjennomføres og finansieres av 
Universitetet i Oslo i samarbeid med Universitetet i Agder og Universitetet i Bergen. 
Den tekniske utførelsen skjer i regi av Norsk Senter for Forskningsdata (NSD) som 
også ivaretar personvernhensyn i datainnsamlingen. Vi vil med dette få et - i 
internasjonal sammenheng - enestående innblikk i utviklingstrekk mht. 
forvaltningens arbeidsformer, personalsammensetning og verdiorientering over en 
40-års periode. Vi tror at undersøkelsen vil bidra vesentlig til forvaltningens 
selvforståelse, samfunnets forståelse av den, og dermed til arbeidet med å 
vedlikeholde og skape en god forvaltning.  
Spørreskjemaet inneholder også noen spørsmål som er spesielt utarbeidet for det 
regjeringsoppnevnte lovutvalget som skal revidere Forvaltningsloven, under ledelse 
av professor Inge Lorange Backer, oppnevnt ved kongelig resolusjon 23.11 2015. 
Prosjektledere er professor Per Lægreid, Universitet i Bergen og Rokkansenteret, 
professorene Tom Christensen og Morten Egeberg, Universitetet i Oslo, og 
professor Jarle Trondal, Universitetet i Agder og Universitetet i Oslo. Alle forskerne 
har stått sentralt som prosjektmedarbeidere og prosjektledere i de tidligere 
undersøkelsene.  
Prosjektet er meldt til Personvernombudet for forskning ved NSD. Resultatene fra 
undersøkelsen vil selvsagt bli presentert slik at enkeltpersoner ikke kan 
gjenkjennes. Etter prosjektavslutning vil dataarkivet bli oppbevart i uendret form for 
framtidige forskningsformål.  
 
Spørreskjemaet består av noen spørsmål med faste svaralternativer og noen åpne 
spørsmål. I tillegg til er det åpne rubrikker hvor det kan gis kommentarer. Utfyllingen 








































oppfatning. Skjemaet består av 5 sider. Det er ikke nødvendig å fylle ut alle sidene i 
spørreskjemaet med en gang. Når du eventuelt går inn i skjemaet igjen, oppgir du 
passordet på nytt og blar deg fram til aktuell side. Skjemaet vil da være 
forhåndsutfylt med allerede besvarte spørsmål. Merk at du også kan endre allerede 
besvarte spørsmål. Vi ber om at undersøkelsen besvares i løpet av tre uker.   
NB: Viktige trekk ved deg som skal svare på undersøkelsen er at du:  
* er ansatt i et direktorat eller annet organ i sentraladministrasjonen utenom 
departementene 
* har minst ett års tjenestetid 
* er på saksbehandler- eller sjefsnivå 
Skjemaet sendes til hver tredje ansatt som inngår i denne populasjonen. Ut fra 
tilsendte lister og tilgjengelige kilder har vi prøvd å finne fram til så korrekt 
undersøkelsespopulasjon som mulig. Dersom du likevel ikke tilfredsstiller kravene 
ovenfor, vil vi be deg returnere denne e-posten (reply) med en kort henvisning til 
hvorfor du ikke skal delta, slik at vi kan stryke deg fra populasjonen og du slipper å 
motta eventuelle purringer fra oss.  
Deltakelse i undersøkelsen er frivillig og du kan når som helst trekke deg. Du kan 
reservere deg mot deltakelse og purring ved å gi oss melding om det. Du vil da ikke 
motta flere henvendelser fra oss. Dersom du skulle ønske ytterligere informasjon, ta 
gjerne kontakt med en av de fire nevnte prosjektlederne. Tekniske spørsmål kan 
rettes til rådgiver Vidar Rolland: vidar.rolland@nsd.uib.no/ tlf. 55583866 {{Lenke til 
undersøkelsen}}  









































































































Forespørsel om deltakelse i forskningsprosjekt med 





Prosjektet er en del av doktorgradsarbeidet med arbeidstittel The influence of European institutions 
on domestic administrations. Formålet med prosjektet som helhet er å belyse ulike konsekvenser 
administrativt samarbeid har for norsk sentralforvaltning. Aktuelle problemstillinger og 
forskningsspørsmål er eksempelvis  
o Hvordan kan organisasjonsteori bidra til å forklare samarbeid på tvers av styringsnivå? 
o I hvilken grad bidrar europeiske fagnettverk til utvikling av felles agenda; hvordan påvirker disse 
nettverkene rolleforståelse og faglige identiteter? 
o I hvilken grad, og hvordan, påvirker europeiske institusjoner forholdet mellom sentrale 
forvaltningsorgan på nasjonalt nivå? 
 
Doktorgradsprosjektet bygger på datamateriale fra spørreundersøkelser gjennomført i samtlige norske 
direktorat og departement i 2016 (Sentralforvantingsundersøkelsen). For å få mer inngående 
kunnskap om hvordan norske forvaltningsorgan opplever EU-samarbeidet, er det også ønskelig å 
gjennomføre intervjuer med ansatte i [direktorat]. Sentrale tema for disse intervjuene vil være 
hvordan det arbeides mot europeiske nettverk, innflytelsesforhold mellom institusjoner samt 
endringer over tid.  
 
Hvem er ansvarlig for forskningsprosjektet? 
Universitetet i Agder ved doktorgradsstipendiat Nadja Kühn. 
 
Hvorfor får du spørsmål om å delta? 
Du får spørsmål om å delta fordi du er ansatt i [direktorat] og arbeider mot europeiske 
samarbeidsnettverk. Det vil gjennomføres mellom 10 og 20 intervjuer. Ledelsen i [direktorat] er 
informert og har gitt samtykke til studien. 
 
Hva innebærer det for deg å delta? 
Studien innebærer at du deltar på et intervju med rundt én times varighet. Det vil bli tatt lydopptak av 
intervjuet. Lydopptak vil bli transkribert og deretter slettet.  Transkripsjon av intervjuene vil bli brukt 
som datamateriale i vitenskapelige publikasjoner.  
 
Anvendt data blir anonymisert og vil i utgangspunktet ikke kunne tilbakeføres til deg i publikasjoner. 
Dersom jeg ønsker å sitere noe som ikke lar seg anonymisere, vil jeg aldri gjøre dette uten ditt 
forhåndssamtykke. Jeg vil da ta kontakt med deg hvis det behovet oppstår.  
 
Personopplysninger som samles inn vil være avdelingstilhørighet, stillingstittel, utdannelse/faglig 
bakgrunn samt antall år du har vært ansatt i organisasjonen. Hovedfokus i intervjuet vil være dine 
erfaringer og tanker rundt det administrative samarbeidet mellom eget forvaltningsorgan og EU.  
 
Det er frivillig å delta 
Det er frivillig å delta i prosjektet. Hvis du velger å delta, kan du når som helst trekke samtykke 
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tilbake uten å oppgi noen grunn. Alle opplysninger om deg vil da bli slettet. Det vil ikke ha noen 
negative konsekvenser for deg hvis du ikke vil delta eller senere velger å trekke deg.  
 
 
Ditt personvern – hvordan vi oppbevarer og bruker dine opplysninger  
Opplysningene om deg vil kun bli brukt til formålene vi har fortalt om i dette skrivet. Opplysningene 
behandles konfidensielt og i samsvar med personvernregelverket.  Data anonymiseres og lagres på 
universitetets passordbeskyttende server. Datamaterialet vil kun brukes til vitenskapelige 
publikasjoner og vil kunne deles med vitenskapelige ansatte ved Universitet i Agder.  
 
Hva skjer med opplysningene dine når vi avslutter forskningsprosjektet? 
Prosjektet skal etter planen avsluttes ved utgangen av 2020. Datamaterialet vil kunne bli oppbevart 




Så lenge du kan identifiseres i datamaterialet, har du rett til: 
- innsyn i hvilke personopplysninger som er registrert om deg, 
- å få rettet personopplysninger om deg,  
- få slettet personopplysninger om deg, 
- få utlevert en kopi av dine personopplysninger (dataportabilitet), og 
- å sende klage til personvernombudet eller Datatilsynet om behandlingen av dine 
personopplysninger. 
 
Hva gir oss rett til å behandle personopplysninger om deg? 
Vi behandler opplysninger om deg basert på ditt samtykke. 
 
På oppdrag fra Universitet i Agder har NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS vurdert at 
behandlingen av personopplysninger i dette prosjektet er i samsvar med personvernregelverket.  
 
Hvor kan jeg finne ut mer? 
Hvis du har spørsmål til studien, eller ønsker å benytte deg av dine rettigheter, ta kontakt med: 
• Doktorgradsstipendiat Nadja Sophia Kühn, på epost nadja.s.kuhn@uia.no eller telefon 93 23 
99 60. 
• Vårt personvernombud: Ina Danielsen, på epost ina.danielsen@uia.no eller telefon 45 25 44 
01 
• NSD – Norsk senter for forskningsdata AS, på epost (personverntjenester@nsd.no) eller 
telefon: 55 58 21 17. 
 
 
Med vennlig hilsen 
 
 
Nadja Sophia Kühn 
 











Jeg har mottatt og forstått informasjon om prosjektet The influence of European institutions on 
domestic administrations, og har fått anledning til å stille spørsmål. Jeg samtykker til: 
 
¨ å delta i intervju 
¨ at informasjon fra meg brukes i vitenskaplige publikasjoner 





































































































































































































Per Lægreid  
Institutt for administrasjon og organisasjonsvitenskap Universitetet i Bergen  
Christiesgt. 17  
5007 BERGEN 
 
Vår dato: 20.07.2016 Vår ref: 48979 / 3 / HIT Deres dato: Deres ref: 
 
 
TILBAKEMELDING PÅ MELDING OM BEHANDLING AV PERSONOPPLYSNINGER 
 
 







Administrasjonssurveyen 2016  
Universitetet i Bergen, ved institusjonens øverste leder  
Per Lægreid 
 
Personvernombudet har vurdert prosjektet, og finner at behandlingen av personopplysninger vil 
være regulert av § 7-27 i personopplysningsforskriften. Personvernombudet tilrår at prosjektet 
gjennomføres. 
 
Personvernombudets tilråding forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med opplysningene gitt i 
meldeskjemaet, korrespondanse med ombudet, ombudets kommentarer samt 
personopplysningsloven og helseregisterloven med forskrifter. Behandlingen av 
personopplysninger kan settes i gang. 
 
Det gjøres oppmerksom på at det skal gis ny melding dersom behandlingen endres i forhold til de 
opplysninger som ligger til grunn for personvernombudets vurdering. Endringsmeldinger gis via et 
eget skjema, http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/meldplikt/skjema.html. Det skal også gis melding 
etter tre år dersom prosjektet fortsatt pågår. Meldinger skal skje skriftlig til ombudet. 
 
Personvernombudet har lagt ut opplysninger om prosjektet i en offentlig 
database, http://pvo.nsd.no/prosjekt  
 
Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 01.09.2019, rette en henvendelse 
angående status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.  
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Personvernombudet for forskning 
 
 




NASJONAL SAMARBEIDSSTUDIE  
Det fremgår av informasjonsskrivet at prosjektet er en nasjonal samarbeidsstudie, der Universitetet i Oslo og 
Universitetet i Agder inngår, i tillegg til Universitetet i Bergen, som er behandlingsansvarlig institusjon. 
Personvernombudet forutsetter at ansvaret for behandlingen av personopplysninger er avklart mellom 
institusjonene. Vi anbefaler at det inngås en avtale som omfatter ansvarsfordeling, ansvarsstruktur, hvem 
som initierer prosjektet, bruk av data og eventuelt eierskap. 
 
FORMÅL  
Administrasjonssurveyen 2016 sendes til saksbehandlere og sjefer i alle departementer og direktorater. 
Spørreskjemaet omhandler trekk ved arbeidsformer, personell og beslutningsprosesser. Den gir i internasjonal 
sammenheng et enestående innblikk i utviklingstrekk mht. forvaltningens arbeidsformer, 
personalsammensetning og verdiorientering over en 40-års periode. Undersøkelsen vil bidra vesentlig til 
forvaltningens selvforståelse, samfunnets forståelse av den, og dermed til arbeidet med å vedlikeholde og 
skape en god forvaltning. 
 
INFORMASJON OG SAMTYKKE  
Utvalget informeres skriftlig om prosjektet og samtykker til deltakelse. Informasjonsskrivet er i utgangspunktet godt 
utformet, men det må presiseres at deltakelse er frivillig, og at man kan velge å trekke seg underveis. 
 
DATAMATERIALETS INNHOLD  




Personvernombudet legger til grunn at forsker etterfølger Universitetet i Bergen sine interne rutiner for 
datasikkerhet. 
 
NSD websurvey er databehandler for prosjektet. Universitetet i Bergen skal inngå skriftlig avtale med NSD 
websurvey om hvordan personopplysninger skal behandles, jf. personopplysningsloven § 15. For råd om 
hva databehandleravtalen bør inneholde, se Datatilsynets veileder: http://www.datatilsynet.no/Sikkerhet-
internkontroll/Databehandleravtale/. 
 
PROSJEKTSLUTT OG ANONYMISERING  
Forventet prosjektslutt er 01.09.2019. Ifølge prosjektmeldingen skal innsamlede opplysninger da anonymiseres. 
Anonymisering innebærer å bearbeide datamaterialet slik at ingen enkeltpersoner kan gjenkjennes. Det gjøres 
ved å:  
- slette direkte personopplysninger (som navn/koblingsnøkkel)  
- slette/omskrive indirekte personopplysninger (identifiserende sammenstilling av bakgrunnsopplysninger som
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f.eks. bosted/arbeidssted, alder og kjønn) 
 
 
Vi gjør oppmerksom på at også databehandler (NSD websurvey) må slette personopplysninger 
tilknyttet prosjektet i sine systemer. Dette inkluderer eventuelle logger og koblinger mellom 

































































































































































                                               
 
